VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0568/01 0731650
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141650Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5575
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0577
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000568 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: ESTELI 
 
REF: MANAGUA 511 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Meetings with political and economic 
leaders in the department of Esteli suggest that the 
Sandinistas (FSLN) continue to dominate the city of Esteli 
and that this strength, combined with a solid organization, 
will be enough to ensure an FSLN victory in the department in 
November unless their Liberal opponents form a common front. 
Local leaders from all of the Liberal parties called on the 
Embassy to force the politicians in Managua to see reason and 
form an alliance.  Representatives of Herty Lewites, 
dissident Sandinista movement believe they could draw away a 
significant number of votes from Daniel Ortega were it not 
for the fact that the FSLN is able to use its control of 
local government and the judiciary to bring strong political 
and economic pressure against anyone who dares to openly 
support Lewites.  PLC mayors opined privately that PLC 
caudillo/convicted money launderer Arnoldo Aleman should let 
others take over the party (but would not admit this in 
public); the PLC departmental leader maintained that Aleman 
is the "indispensable" leader of the party and that the USG 
should "leave him alone."  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) On March 9-10, poloff and political FSN traveled to 
the northwestern department of Esteli, near the Honduran 
border, and met local leaders to discuss the political and 
economic situation in the department eight months ahead of 
November national elections.  Among our interlocutors were 
representatives of the "Vamos con Eduardo"/National Liberal 
Alliance (ALN), the Alliance for the Republic (APRE) and 
"Amigos de Alvarado", the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), 
"Movimiento Herty 2006", the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), 
Etica y Transparencia, the local chamber of commerce and 
ranchers association, the Movimiento Por Nicaragua, and the 
PLC mayors of the municipalities of San Nicholas and La 
Trinidad.  Post will report on social and economic issues 
septel.  Generally speaking, our interlocutors agreed that 
Esteli remains in "pre-campaign" mode and relatively little 
new political advertising was visible in the city and 
department except at campaign headquarters.  Most visible 
advertising was for the FSLN. 
 
ESTELI AN FSLN BASTION AND SANDINISTAS SURE TO WIN THERE 
UNLESS OPPONENTS UNIFY 
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¶3.  (C) The city of Esteli has a well-earned reputation as a 
Sandinista bastion, as the party has not lost an election 
there since the establishment of democracy in 1990.  However, 
the balance of the department of Esteli is not so monolithic, 
and as recently as 2000 the PLC won four out of its six 
municipalities.  In 2004, the PLC ran a poor campaign 
countrywide, and the FSLN reversed the previous balance in 
Esteli, taking four municipalities and leaving the PLC with 
just two.  While leaders of each of the liberal factions 
(PLC, ALN, APRE) in other departments often claim that their 
group can win in November even if the liberal forces remain 
divided, every single person emboffs met in Esteli stated 
emphatically that the only hope of defeating the Sandinistas 
in the department lies in unity.  The FSLN is simply too 
strong in the departmental capital and too well organized to 
be beaten any other way.  As an illustration of both the 
opportunities for success and the risks of defeat, ALN-PC 
leaders in Esteli emphasized that when the democratic forces 
were unified and ran a good campaign with good candidates in 
2000, they took four of six municipalities and only lost in 
the city of Esteli by 2000 votes--their best showing ever in 
the departmental capital. But when they were divided in 2004 
and the PLC ran a bad candidate in the city, the FSLN won the 
municipality by over 13,000 votes.  In short, without Liberal 
unity, the FSLN wins in Esteli, period. 
 
AS USUAL, DIFFERENT STORIES FROM PRAGMATIC PLC MAYORS AND 
DOCTRINAIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS 
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¶4.  (C) As has been the case in many other departments, 
emboffs heard very different stories from PLC mayors and the 
PLC departmental head.  The PLC mayors of the two small 
municipalities of San Nicholas (Damacio Machado) and La 
Trinidad (Luis Jarquin Laguna) both told emboffs privately 
that the PLC should "not be the property of one family" and 
that they seek new party leadership and a broad liberal 
alliance capable of winning the elections.  Both agreed that 
Eduardo Montealegre and Jose Antonio Alvarado are good 
leaders and should be welcome to join people like Jose Rizo, 
Ramiro Sacasa and Francisco Aguirre Sacasa as leaders of a 
broad Liberal alliance.  Of the two "outsiders", they prefer 
Alvarado, claiming that Montealegre has hurt the PLC by 
dividing it so sharply.  Both mayors promised that the 
selection of the PLC presidential candidate by the party 
convention in April would be democratic, and not simply 
rubber stamp the previous choice ("dedazo") of Arnoldo 
Aleman.  They also agreed that open, inclusive liberal 
primaries involving all contenders would be the best way to 
unify the "democratic forces."  However, neither was willing 
to stick his neck out by publicly challenging Aleman. 
 
¶5.  (C) By contrast, PLC department head for Esteli Gabriel 
Rivera Zeledon, a die-hard Arnoldista, was every bit as 
doctrinaire as his counterparts in other parts of the 
country.  Zeledon stuck to the party line, blaming the GON 
and the media for all of the PLC's electoral setbacks, 
proclaiming that the party's relatively strong performance in 
the March 5 Atlantic coast elections showed that it (and its 
leader) are "indispensable" to defeating the FSLN, and 
declaring that corrupt individuals utterly beholden to Aleman 
(such as Enrique Quinonez, Noel Ramirez, and Haroldo 
Montealegre) would be ideal presidential candidates.  Zeledon 
had nothing but scorn for Montealegre, portraying him as a 
spoiler who could never win on his own, but who could hand 
victory to the FSLN by dividing the Liberal vote. 
 
MONTEALEGRE ENJOYS SOLID STRUCTURE AND POPULAR SUPPORT, BUT 
CAN'T WIN ALONE 
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¶6.  (C) Raul Herrera, the departmental coordinator of the 
"Vamos con Eduardo" movement, told emboffs that after a year 
of work in Esteli, the group and the ALN have developed a 
solid organization.  Herrera asserted that the ALN has 
managed to co-opt whole elements of the PLC party structure, 
something denied by the PLC, but confirmed by other 
interlocutors.  Numerous local business leaders have declared 
their support for Montealegre and are providing much of the 
funding for the ALN's efforts in the department.  Herrera 
noted that Montealegre has campaigned vigorously and 
regularly throughout the department and reported that the 
candidate had recently held a successful fund raising dinner 
in the city with 500 attendees. 
 
¶7.  (C) Despite this progress, Herrera admitted that the ALN 
will never be able to defeat the FSLN alone in Esteli.  He 
noted that the ALN still maintains fairly good relations with 
local PLC voters and some officials, and he believes that 
unity is still possible--if the problems could be worked out 
in Managua.  He added that while Montealegre is very popular 
with the liberal base, persuading long-time PLC voters to 
switch from the PLC's slot on the ballot (casilla number one) 
to the ALN's (casilla number nine) is a tough sell. 
Nonetheless, Herrera regarded the ALN's performance on the 
Atlantic Coast as a major success, considering that it was 
the result of only two months of campaigning, and saw the 
outcome as strengthening the hand of Montealegre in any 
efforts to bring the PLC to terms. 
 
APRE HOPELESS AND LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ALVARADO, BUT 
SOME KEY ACTORS LIKE HIM 
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¶8.  (C) Although emboffs found no evidence of any significant 
popular support for Jose Antonio Alvarado in Esteli, the APRE 
candidate does enjoy the support of certain well-placed 
individuals and organizations in the department.  As noted 
above, the two PLC mayors preferred Alvarado over 
Montealegre.  Additionally, Alvarado enjoys the support of 
many local government workers from ministries he formerly 
headed (particularly the ministries of Health and Education), 
and is supported by the influential head of the Esteli 
ranchers association, Perfecto Rodriguez.  However, beyond 
this limited circle, Alvarado was rarely even mentioned by 
anyone unless prompted by emboffs.  By contrast, 
Montealegre's name came up spontaneously in virtually every 
conversation, positively or negatively depending on who was 
speaking. 
 
¶9.  (C) As for APRE, Alvarado's current political vehicle, 
Jorge Ali Lopez (also the local "Amigos of Alvarado" 
representative) and other local APRE officials conceded that 
their party had performed extremely badly in the Atlantic 
Coast elections.  They attributed this defeat to the lack of 
resources provided by the national APRE leadership for the 
elections and, when pressed by emboffs, admitted that they 
too received virtually no political guidance or financial 
support in Esteli.  The APRE officials argued that 
negotiation with the PLC would be necessary and that no one 
could beat the FSLN alone, but they admitted that it would be 
most effective for Montealegre and Alvarado to join forces 
first in order to be in a stronger position vis a vis the PLC. 
 
SOME DISSIDENT FSLN SUPPORT FOR HERTY, BUT FSLN DRIVING IT 
UNDERGROUND 
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¶10.  (C) Local leaders of the dissident Sandinista alliance 
supporting Herty Lewites told emboffs that their candidate 
enjoys widespread popularity in both urban and rural areas of 
Esteli, and is capitalizing on local weariness with Daniel 
Ortega and his clique.  However, they stated that much of 
this support has been driven underground by the FSLN.  Noting 
that die-hard supporters of Ortega control the mayoral 
offices in four of the six Esteli municipalities, the Lewites 
camp reported that the FSLN is able to bring strong political 
and economic pressure on anyone who dares to openly support 
Lewites.  Local government workers who support Lewites lose 
their jobs, university students are threatened with the loss 
of their scholarships, and business leaders are pressured 
with the loss of operating licenses and government contracts, 
as well as politically-motivated judicial processes against 
them.  These credible allegations were supported by numerous 
other interlocutors unaffiliated with the Lewites movement, 
including Movimiento Por Nicaragua, Etica y Transparencia, 
the ALN, APRE, and PLC, and the chamber of commerce. 
 
¶11.  (C) There is no doubt that the fact that Esteli has been 
such a symbolic FSLN bastion for so long is the reason that 
the FSLN is pressuring the Lewites camp so hard there--the 
Sandinistas do not want to take any chances in such an 
important fiefdom.  Because of the newness of Lewites' 
movement and the strength and determination of the FSLN in 
Esteli, most interlocutors doubted that Lewites would make 
much of a dent in the "captive" FSLN vote on election day. 
Indeed, many people on the right still regard his candidacy 
as an FSLN ploy and fear that it will only serve to "waste" 
independent votes that would otherwise go to Montealegre or a 
hypothetical anti-FSLN coalition. 
 
IN A SURPRISE, SANDINISTA CSE OFFICIAL AGREES TO MEET EMBOFFS 
AND LETS SLIP COMMENT ON VENEZUELAN INK 
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¶12.  (C) Much to emboffs surprise, Antonio Benavides, the 
Esteli departmental representative of the Supreme Electoral 
Council (CSE), agreed to a meeting.  Benavides is a 
Sandinista appointee, and a member of the FSLN's departmental 
campaign structure, and his counterparts in other departments 
had previously refused to meet emboffs.  During the meeting, 
Benavides poured on the charm, bemoaning the politicization 
of the CSE and other state institutions and piously 
proclaiming that the work of the electoral branch of 
government should be totally apolitical and administrative. 
He blamed the electoral law for the CSE's politicization, 
noting that it requires virtually all electoral officials to 
be party affiliates.  Benavides also proclaimed that his work 
in Esteli is utterly impartial and that he is doing all he 
can to ensure that all eligible voters had identification 
cards (cedulas) on election day. 
 
¶13.  (C) Virtually all other interlocutors across the 
political spectrum, however, described Benavides as a 
hard-line FSLN militant who has participated in shenanigans 
to tilt the vote towards the FSLN over the years and has 
actively obstructed the efforts of non-FSLN voters to obtain 
cedulas.  However, when emboffs questioned Benavides' 
assertions that everything had gone smoothly in the recent 
Atlantic coast elections, noting, among other problems, that 
the ink used to mark the thumbs of those who had voted was 
not very effective, Benavides acknowledged that the ink had 
been problematic.  In a comment that he may not have intended 
to let slip, the CSE official stated that the problem might 
lie in the CSE's switch to a new ink supplier for the 
Atlantic Coast elections.  While the Mexican ink used in the 
2004 municipal elections was indeed effective, Benavides 
noted that this time the CSE had used ink from Venezuela.  As 
post reported in reftel, the ink used on the Atlantic Coast 
was very weak, faded quickly, and could be washed off. 
 
ESTELI: DEMOGRAPHICS AND VOTING PROFILE 
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¶14.  (U) 
 
Total Population (2003 est.):       214,399 
Total Urban Population:                   124,705 
Total Rural Population:                   89,694 
 
Votes Received by Party, 2004 Municipal Elections 
 
PLC:  24,521 
FSLN: 39,748 
APRE:  3,069 
CCN:     517 
PLI:     197 
AC:      122 
PLN:     823 
PRN:     803 
MSL:     137 
 
COMMENT: DIVISION MAY SPELL DEFEAT--AND THE PROBLEM IS IN 
MANAGUA 
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¶15.  (C) Esteli is a textbook case for highlighting the 
dangers of a divided liberal camp confronting the FSLN in 
November.  While it is theoretically possible that either the 
ALN or PLC could capture enough of the liberal and 
independent vote to block or limit an FSLN victory in other 
departments, in an FSLN bastion like Esteli, division 
virtually guarantees a Sandinista triumph there.  Even if the 
liberals manage to unify and field strong presidential and 
vice presidential candidates, they might still lose in 
Esteli.  Although liberal unity remains problematic as long 
as Arnoldo Aleman continues to control the PLC, post will 
continue to drive home the message to all interlocutors that 
continued infighting in Managua (particularly between the 
Montealegre and Alvarado camps) is frustrating the desire of 
voters and party activists in the departments for unity, and 
playing into the hands of pact masters Aleman and Ortega. 
TRIVELLI