VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0511/01 0662359
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 072359Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5511
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0567
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MANAGUA 000511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI OAS NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ATLANTIC COAST ELECTIONS: PLC GARNERS 
MOST VOTES, CSE HAS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0485 
 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 0464 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 0355 
     ¶D. MANAGUA 0212 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Belying early predictions of an FSLN victory 
in the March 5 regional council elections for the North 
Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and South Atlantic 
Autonomous Region (RAAS), the PLC surged ahead as late 
returns from rural voting centers were added to the vote 
count.  The FSLN remained in second place in both regions, 
while indigenous party Yatama came in third in the RAAN, and 
Eduardo Montealegre's ALN-PC took third in the RAAS.  All 
other parties, including Herty Lewites' MRS, trailed behind 
winning negligible percentages of the vote.  The PLC lowered 
expectations before the elections with a calculated media 
campaign accusing the FSLN and Supreme Electoral Council 
(CSE) of fraudulent activities and blaming Montealegre for 
dividing the Liberal vote and contributing to a projected 
FSLN victory.  The PLC's shrill tone quieted considerably by 
March 6, when a more complete vote count showed the party 
ahead in both regions.  Ultimately, all parties accepted the 
results of the elections. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary continued: The environment on election day 
was calm and orderly, despite some earlier threats of 
violence in Bluefields and the Mining Triangle (RAAN: Rosita, 
Bonanza, Siuna).  Over 94 percent of voting tables (JRVs) 
opened on time, with the proper equipment, and representation 
from the competing political parties' official poll watchers 
(fiscales).  Although observers did not detect systematic 
fraud, they noted problems and difficulties regarding the 
training of poll workers, equipment malfunctions and other 
issues, and confusion regarding JRV assignments.  While the 
CSE managed to execute elections that will not likely face 
serious challenges by the political parties and civil 
society, the organization has considerable room for 
improvement before the November national elections.  End 
Summary. 
 
PLC COMES OUT AHEAD, BUT LOSES GROUND IN THE RAAS TO LIBERAL 
RIVALS 
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- - - 
 
¶3. (U) The following is a rank-ordered comparison of the 
performance of each party in the 2006 and 2002 regional 
elections.  (Note: The 2006 vote numbers are based on 92% of 
JRV reports.  The PRN, a constituent party of the ALN-PC 
contested the 2002 elections.  End Note.) 
 
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN): 
 
PARTY 2006 VOTE               2002 VOTE 
 
PLC   20,923 (35.9%)          16,584 (36.3%) 
FSLN  17,942 (30.7)           14,961 (32.7%) 
Yatama      11,769 (20.2%)          9,837 (21.5%) 
ALN-PC (PRN)      3,149 (5.4%)            1,109 (2.4%) 
MRS   1,373 (2.4%)            N/A 
PAMUC 1,251 (2.1%)            3,240 (7.1%) 
APRE  1,197 (2.1%)            N/A 
CCN   746 (1.3%)              N/A 
 
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS): 
 
PARTY 2006 VOTE               2002 VOTE 
 
PLC   15,968 (47.0%)          17,245 (62.4%) 
FSLN  7,248 (21.4%)           7,272 (26.3%) 
ALN-PC (PRN)      5,371 (15.8%)           1,425 (5.2%) 
Yatama      3,169 (9.3%)            1,727 (6.2%) 
MRS   1,302 (3.8%)            N/A 
CCN   660 (1.9%)              N/A 
APRE  225 (0.7%)              N/A 
PAMUC N/A                     N/A 
 
¶4. (SBU) The PLC is down slightly in the RAAN compared to 
2002, while the FSLN appears to have lost about two points. 
While still winning by a comfortable margin in the RAAS, a 
traditional stronghold, the PLC ceded a significant number of 
votes to the ALN-PC.  PAMUC, an indigenous rights party 
formed largely by Yatama dissidents, virtually disappeared 
despite discontent within the Miskito population regarding 
the flirtation of Yatama's leadership with the FSLN. 
 
(Comment: Disgruntled Miskitos likely defected to the 
reformist ALN-PC or MRS rather than support a defunct PAMUC. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶5. (U) The RAAN and RAAS are each composed of 15 electoral 
districts that elect three councilors each, for a total of 45 
per Region, to the regional councils.  The multi-member 
district proportional representation system allocates seats 
in successive rounds via an electoral quotient formula, as 
proscribed in Articles 147-149 of the Electoral Law.  Large 
parties and parties with geographically concentrated support 
have a disproportional advantage under this system.  As a 
result, Yatama is projected to win more seats in the RAAS 
than the ALN-PC despite capturing a smaller percentage of the 
total vote.  Analysts at La Prensa project that in the RAAS, 
the PLC will win 19 seats, with 12 for the FSLN, 9 for 
Yatama, and 5 for the ALN-PC.  In the RAAN, La Prensa 
estimates 18 seats for the PLC, 16 for the FSLN and 11 for 
Yatama.  El Nuevo Diario, a rival publication, estimates that 
in the RAAS, the PLC will take 22 seats, with 14 for the 
FSLN, 5 for Yatama, and 4 for the ALN-PC.  In the RAAN, El 
Nuevo Diario projects 16 seats for the FSLN, 15 for the PLC, 
and 14 for Yatama.  The parties are currently in the 
strategic process of filing official complaints with the CSE 
regarding supposed "irregularities" at JRVs whose votes they 
hope to invalidate in order to gain an advantage. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Nicaraguan press trumpeted the abstention rate 
as the most notable feature of the elections.  At an 
estimated 55-60 percent, the abstention rate was high, but 
actually registered a small improvement over 2002, when 62.5 
percent of the population declined to vote.  In addition, the 
abstention rate is based on the total number of people 
registered in the padron, even though the padron is 
acknowledged by all parties to contain a high percentage of 
invalid registrants (including those who have died, 
emigrants, prisoners, etc.)  Some NGOs criticized the CSE for 
failing to promote the regional elections, but most of the 
blame lies with the inept regional councils themselves, which 
have failed to constructively implement autonomy for the 
Atlantic Coast or improve the daily lives of Coastal citizens. 
 
RESPONSE: EVERYONE IS A WINNER, EXCEPT HERTY 
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¶7. (U) The PLC and the FSLN both proclaimed a "victory" in 
the regional elections.  The PLC proclaimed itself 
"satisfied" with winning a plurality of votes in both Regions 
and indicated that the party would seek alliances with Yatama 
and/or the ALN-PC to control both Councils.  Likewise, the 
FSLN announced that it would ally with Yatama to form a 
controlling bloc in both regions.  Yatama says it will do 
what is best for the Atlantic Coast regions and aspires to 
the RAAN governorship. 
 
¶8. (U) ALN-PC presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre 
declared himself "satisfied" with the results of the 
elections, having captured about 10 percent of the total vote 
after a relatively short campaign.  Montealegre complained 
about the smear campaign conducted against him by the PLC, 
claiming that PLC leaders spent more time fighting the ALN-PC 
than the Sandinistas. 
 
¶9. (U) MRS candidate Herty Lewites accepted the results of 
the elections, complimenting MRS officials for defending 
their votes and CSE officials for conducting orderly 
elections.  Lewites admitted that he "took a hit" in the 
Atlantic Coast elections, but insisted that "Herty 2006" 
would do much better in the national elections. 
 
CSE: ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) In general, election day was tranquil and orderly. 
Observers noted a strong security presence including military 
and police officials who effectively maintained stability 
throughout the day.  The CSE provided multilingual staff and 
elections materials in Spanish, Miskito and English, and the 
JRVs were well-attended by fiscales.  On March 6, the OAS 
released a statement praising the CSE's "seriousness" and 
"professionalism" despite "political difficulties encountered 
prior to the elections period" (Ref B).  The missive lamented 
the "low participation of the electorate" while recognizing 
the "well-ordered" environment in which the elections took 
place.  Leaders of local NGOs that participated in 
 
observations, such as IPADE, Etica y Transparencia and the 
Movimiento por Nicaragua, also acknowledged the overall 
successful execution of the elections. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Embassy observers, likewise, did not notice 
systematic acts of fraud or willful tampering with the 
electoral process.  However, they detected problems related 
to the training of poll workers that prevented citizens from 
voting as well as equipment deficiencies and irregular 
exclusions of observers. 
 
The following is a summary of problems noted by Embassy and 
NGO observers: 
 
- Lack of Poll Worker Training.  One Embassy observer noted 
that about half of the poll workers in her electoral district 
seemed competent and comfortable with rules and procedures, 
while the other 50 percent struggled and occasionally caused 
problems for voters.  Some JRVs opened late, causing 
frustrated citizens to leave before voting.  Other JRVs 
advised people to keep searching for the voting table where 
they were registered, again resulting in frustration. 
(Comment: One observer reported that as many as 15-20 percent 
of potential voters in the Puerto Cabezas area may have given 
up trying to vote after multiple JRV rejections.  However, 
all observers noted that Article 41 was widely respected if 
citizens asserted their right to vote with a valid cedula, 
even if they did not appear on the voting list.  End Comment.) 
 
- Deficient Equipment.  Observers reported use of 
poor-quality ink that is barely noticeable, especially on 
dark-skinned people.  Some JRV &inkers8 were inking left 
thumbs instead of right, and even providing voters with 
tissues to wipe off &excess8 ink.  One police officer in 
Siuna was witnessed wiping off the ink behind a tree using a 
clear liquid before driving off on his motorcycle.  JRVs 
possessed a "blacklight" that poll workers theoretically 
could use to detect ink, though most were inoperable or 
simply not used. 
 
As with the 2004 municipal elections, the hole punchers used 
to punch cedulas did not function properly.  Mesa directive 
members and fiscales seemed to anticipate this problem (from 
their previous experience in the municipal elections) and 
quickly decided to abandon the hole punchers in most 
instances.  One observer reported that a Municipal Electoral 
Council official claimed that the hole punchers were only 
supposed to create an impression, not a perforation (false). 
(Comment: Deficiencies with the ink and hole punchers 
combined with application of Article 41 create a greater 
possibility for multiple voting by trained party militants. 
End Comment.) 
 
- Exclusion of Observers.  While the exclusion of observers 
was not widespread or systematic, it did occur in several 
instances, especially with local observation teams.  In some 
instances, CSE officials or international observers convinced 
JRVs to allow local observers to have access.  The most 
glaring example of observer exclusion was in Managua, where 
CSE officials at the national vote counting center refused to 
allow observers inside, including one member of the Embassy's 
team.  Poloff contacted senior CSE manager Rodrigo Barreto to 
inquire about the situation, and Barreto said that a space in 
the Intercontinental Hotel was reserved for Managua 
observers, where they could wait for the official 
announcement of results from CSE president Roberto Rivas. 
 
COMMENT: LOOKING TO NOVEMBER 
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¶12. (SBU) Several observers commented that the presence of 
international and national observer teams aided significantly 
in enforcing voter rights, especially in some JRVs that may 
have been inclined to ignore Article 41.  A pervasive 
observer presence is essential to foment the same type of 
open and by-the-book environment for the national elections 
in November.  Emboffs and CEPPS partners will continue 
working with the CSE to improve training for poll workers and 
CSE officials, provide appropriate equipment, produce and 
distribute cedulas, and encourage Nicaraguans to vote. 
 
TRIVELLI