VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLC #0191/01 0831336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241336Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8914
INFO RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0602
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1238
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0278
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0770
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0363
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0890

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 000191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM GB
SUBJECT: GOG EXPLAINS RAIDS THAT LED OPPOSITION LEADER TO 
FLEE 
 
REF: A. LIBREVILLE 186 
 
     ¶B. LIBREVILLE 189 
 
Classified By: DCM Katherine Dhanani.  Reason: 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On March 24 the GoG explained to the 
diplomatic corps the circumstances of its March 21 raid on 
the headquarters of an opposition political party, which 
resulted in party leader Mamboundou's flight to the South 
African Embassy (reftels).  The GoG told diplomats it had 
intelligence indicating the existence of a plot to carry out 
a campaign of violent civil disturbances, including the 
destruction of infrastructure.  The raid, carried out with 
all legal authorities, followed demonstrations in which 
police were fired upon.  The GoG reports the raid yielded 
dynamite and 20 rifles, as well as military uniforms and 
blank ID cards.  The GoG claims it had never sought to arrest 
Mamboundou.  There may be some weaknesses in the GoG's story, 
but they pale in comparison to the implausibility of 
Mamboundou's claim that the GoG seeks to assassinate him. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ping convoked the 
diplomatic corps on March 24 in order to provide them with an 
account of the context in which opposition leader Mamboundou 
took refuge in the South African Embassy on March 21.  Ping 
was flanked by Minister of Defense Ali Bongo and government 
spokesman Minister of Communication Rene Ndemezo'Obiang. 
Minister of Interior Andre Mba Obame was expected but did not 
attend.  The dip corps was present in force, despite less 
than two hours notice of the meeting.  The same subject had 
been discussed at a press conference the evening of March 23. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Minister Bongo and Minister Ndemezo'Obiang described 
the build up to the governments March 21 raids in much the 
same way: 
--The government had never impeded Mr. Mamboundou's efforts 
to legally participate in elections or to appeal the 
announced results in the court system.  Mamboundou was 
provided a security detachment for his personal protection 
when he became an official candidate for the president.  He 
requested members of the gendarmerie for his bodyguard, and 
was granted them.  He requested a reinforcement of the 
detachment and was given more agents.  Although his appeal 
failed, his protection has not been removed. 
--Both spoke of the increasingly violent nature of recent 
civil disturbances.  They cited the events of March 7, when a 
demonstration by military retirees led to the torching of 
several logging trucks and the blockading of both the main 
road out of Libreville and the railroad. 
--On March 14, Mamboundou wrote a letter to the Minister of 
Interior announcing that the Union of Gabonese Patriots (UPG) 
would hold a march on Saturday, March 18 and requesting 
security for the route.  The Minister replied that the ban on 
marches imposed during the November 2005 election campaign 
remains in effect, and that any march would be illegal. 
--The UPG marched anyway on March 18, and the march was 
violent and disruptive. 
--Further demonstrations on March 20 resulted in more 
violence.  Demonstrators fired on the police.  One 
demonstrator was killed.  (Bongo said that demonstrators had 
also fired on police March 18, while Ndemezo'Obiang said 
March 20 was the first time this had occurred.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Minister Bongo gave more details on intelligence he 
said the GoG has obtained in recent months.  According to 
Bongo, the GoG had responded to all the legitimate demands of 
military retirees, but a few among them were insisting on 
additional concessions outside their legal rights.  He said 
the GoG learned Mamboundou had entered into contact with 
these disgruntled elements, and joined with them other former 
military agents who had never made it to normal retirement 
due to misconduct.  Intelligence reports indicated that this 
group was going to be used by Mamboundou to carry out attacks 
on infrastructure, such as blowing up bridges.  This 
campaign, including the disturbances of March 7, had been 
planned out of the UPG headquarters in Libreville's Awendje 
neighborhood. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Both Ministers told the dip corps that the 
government had scrupulously followed the law in responding to 
recent events.  They obtained search warrants from both the 
governor and the prime minister authorizing them to sweep the 
entire neighborhood and seize any arms discovered.  The 
 
attorney general had dictated in writing the hours during 
which the raid could be carried out. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Both Ministers stressed that the March 21 operation 
was a search and seizure raid, and never aimed to arrest Mr. 
Mamboundou.  The GoG displayed for the press on March 23 the 
results of their searches, which included dynamite, 20 
rifles, ammunition and military uniforms.  (Only 2 of the 20 
rifles were found at UPG headquarters; the rest were seized 
from homes and shops in the neighborhood.)  The Ministers 
told the diplomatic corps that they also seized blank 
national identity cards and student IDs, as well as a number 
of duplicate ID cards, showing the same photo with two 
different names.  Minister Bongo said the police were pleased 
that Mamboundou was not at home, since they would not have 
known what to do with him. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Minister Ping explained that the GoG did not wish to 
arrest Mr. Mamboundou and had no interest in whether he 
remained at the South African Embassy or not, although an 
ongoing inquiry into items seized during the raid might lead 
to a request that he answer some questions before the 
Minister of Justice.  Ping said that the South African 
Ambassador (who was present at the briefing) had contacted 
him on March 21 and been assured that Mamboundou was not 
wanted or in danger.  The GoG's only request to the South 
African Embassy was that it not permit Mamboundou to contact 
directly the media; the South African Ambassador had agreed. 
(This followed a number of radio and press interviews on the 
22nd by telephone.  In some, Mamboundou reportedly claimed to 
have the support of the USG as well as the SAG.) 
 
¶8. (C) Comment:  There are discrepancies in the GoG's story. 
Emboff went to the UPG headquarters the morning of March 21 
and was told by police that they wished to bring Mamboundou 
in; this order was only retracted later in the day.  If the 
GoG has the kind of testimony and evidence it describes, its 
lack of interest in arresting Mamboundou is implausible.  On 
the other hand, the assignment of political motives to the 
activist military retirees is interesting, since the violence 
of their methods seemed inconsistent with their avowed 
intent. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment cont:  Minor discrepancies do not entirely 
discredit the GoG's story, nor do they lend credence to 
Mamboundou's claims that he fears assassination.  The GoG has 
been relatively restrained in its response to increasingly 
violent demonstrations.  Ping stressed this, saying that the 
GoG has exercised patience despite accumulating evidence of a 
plot to hatch urban guerilla warfare, heretofore unknown in 
Gabon.  His rhetoric may be somewhat exaggerated, but not 
nearly as much as that of Mamboundou. 
WALKLEY