VZCZCXRO4377
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #0859/01 0871400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281400Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8635
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5728
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3006
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6878
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4115
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1428
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1368
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3683
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4070
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8602
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO 
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND 
NSC FOR DFISK 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET SOCI ELAB PTER BL
SUBJECT: CONTINUED GOVERNMENT INSINUATIONS OF U.S. ROLE IN 
DEADLY BOMBINGS 
 
REF: LA PAZ 815 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4d and b. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Bolivian Government officials, including 
President Morales, have continued to suggest a possible USG 
role in the deadly La Paz bombings March 21 (ref).  While 
Morales has persisted in professing ignorance about any 
formal expression of U.S. displeasure, March 26 news articles 
outlined the concrete steps the Embassy has taken to 
underscore our concern.  Bolivia's Ambassador-designate to 
the U.S. Sacha Llorentty told us the president's accusations 
were exacerbated by his having been branded a terrorist by 
the U.S. in the past, but denied that Venezuelan and Cuban 
advisors had any hand in shaping them.  Embassy interaction 
with the GOB remained largely frozen last week, though the 
Ambassador will likely resume ministerial-level contacts this 
week.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Following his initial polemical accusations of 
official U.S. involvement in the bombings that killed two 
people and injured a number of others last week in downtown 
La Paz (ref), President Evo Morales and other high-level 
government officials continued to suggest a possible 
behind-the-scenes U.S. role in the crime.  In a March 24 
meeting with international donors, Morales reportedly 
emphasized the "suspicious" circumstances of the crime and 
said that treating it as an isolated incident was 
inconceivable.  In a late March 24 meeting with Vice Foreign 
Minister Mauricio Dorfler, Ecopol counselor reiterated 
official U.S. concern, and asked how the government planned 
to respond.  He was then shown the text of a draft communiqu 
that called for a full investigation into the facts but also 
clearly left open the possibility of U.S. involvement. 
Following notice of our objections to the draft, the MFA 
decided not to release the statement.  Over the March 25-26 
weekend, other GOB officials, including Minister of the 
Presidency de la Quintana, likewise have refused to retract 
earlier accusations or move to limit further damage. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) At the same time, Morales and other high-level 
government officials have persisted in professing ignorance 
about any formal expressions of U.S. displeasure in 
connection to the president's remarks.  According to news 
reports, De la Quintana said he had heard nothing from the 
U.S. Embassy, but added that if any message was passed, it 
would amount to an attack against the government. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) News reports on the issue suggest that government 
officials are playing dumb.  One full-page March 26 article 
in the La Paz-based newspaper La Prensa outlined the concrete 
steps the U.S. Government had already taken to express its 
displeasure.  These were: canceling a planning meeting for 
the Vice-President's proposed trip to Washington; sending no 
representative to the March 24 international donors' meeting 
with Morales (a clear message from Bolivia's number one 
donor, the article emphasized); sending a lower-ranking 
representative to Bolivia's "Day of the Sea" celebrations (in 
which Bolivia's officialdom reaffirm the country's historical 
claim for an outlet to the sea); and calling in Bolivia's 
Charge d'Affaires in Washington to request formal 
clarification of the president's comments.  The article 
failed to note the Ambassador's March 22 telephone call to VP 
Garcia (ref).  (Comment: All told, it is certain that Morales 
and his key Ministers have received the messages but have 
chosen to feign public ignorance about them for internal 
political reasons.  End Comment.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) During a March 25 social dinner attended by poloff, 
Bolivia's Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Sacha Llorentty 
speculated about the president's deeper motives in straining 
bilateral relations at this time, offering a cautious 
 
LA PAZ 00000859  002 OF 002 
 
 
psychoanalytic mix of "I don't know, but you must 
understand."  He said that violent, high profile crimes like 
these were rare in Bolivia, and therefore rocked the 
political environment disproportionately.  Moreover, that 
this bombing had occurred at the outset of Morales' term fed 
his view that he  -- and his new government -- had been 
explicitly targeted.  Llorentty said that Morales remained 
resentful about his prolonged ostracism, and his having 
(allegedly) been branded a narco-terrorist, by the U.S. 
government, and that this feeling had exacerbated his 
reaction.  Poloff responded that this explanation could 
convince a person inclined to feel sympathetic, but would not 
hold water with many others, including in Washington. 
Llorentty disagreed that Venezuelan and Cuban advisors within 
the government had helped shape the tone and content of the 
President's public remarks, emphasizing that Bolivia would 
maintain its many friendships but submit to no foreign power. 
 
¶6.  (C) Embassy interactions with the GOB have remained 
largely frozen.  The Ambassador, however, will likely attend 
meetings with the Minister of Hydrocarbons (March 28) and the 
Minister of Mining (March 31).  We have made our point and as 
of now are on the high ground.  As we move forward, we will 
continue to adjust to--but also try to influence--this 
turbulent political environment. 
GREENLEE