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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000854 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN DEMOCRACY UNDER THREAT 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 733 
 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 732 
     ¶C. LA PAZ 240 
     ¶D. LA PAZ 810 
 
Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Two months in office and Evo Morales has done 
little to burnish his democratic credentials.  Attacks on the 
press, judiciary and other institutions are beginning to look 
more like pieces of an emerging autocratic strategy aimed at 
the upcoming constituent assembly than the missteps of 
inexperience.  Coupled with periodic outbursts against the 
United States--also apparently more scripted than 
spontaneous--these early indications of Morales' intent are 
troubling.    End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The still new Morales administration may be 
telescoping a strategy going into the Constituent Assembly 
(CA) that puts at risk the integrity of Bolivia's already 
weak democratic institutions.  Below are a few examples of 
what may be a deliberate plan to bleed political influence 
from its legitimate sources and into the hands of a single 
state authority, Evo Morales: 
 
-- Free press.  Prior to assuming office, Morales began 
intimidating the press and encouraging self-censorship, which 
has intensified as journalists attempt to court GOB sources. 
 
-- Votes for carnets.  With Venezuelan support, the GOB is 
distributing carnets (government identification documents) to 
inflated numbers of Bolivians (see reftel A regarding 
implications of fraud) as quid pro quo for supporting the MAS 
in the CA. 
 
-- National Electoral Court (CNE).  Despite his overwhelming 
victory on December 18, Morales has undermined the 
credibility of the CNE.  While his previous threats to "clean 
out" the Court have toned down, he may continue to look for 
ways to register his newly-carnetized voters before the April 
3 deadline, or to extend it. 
 
-- Attacks on ex-presidents.  The GOB, via the MAS-friendly 
Attorney General Pedro Gareca, has expressed its intent to 
file criminal charges against four ex-presidents (Jorge 
Quiroga, Carlos Mesa, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and Eduardo 
Rodriguez), all of whom represent in different ways a 
political threat to the MAS (reftel B).  The GOB hopes the 
lawsuits will distract the opposition from the CA election on 
July 2. 
 
-- Dilution of separation of powers between executive and 
Congress.  The presidents of the Senate (Santos Ramirez) and 
the Lower House (Edmundo Novillo) are part of Morales' inner 
circle, and function as if part of the executive branch. 
 
-- Weakening of legislative and judicial branches.  By 
lowering government salaries as an "austerity measure," the 
GOB has spurred the resignations of the presidents of the 
Supreme Court (Eduardo Rodriguez) and the Constitutional 
Court (Wilman Duran), and of Supreme Court Justice Armando 
Villafuerte (reftel C). The newly created judicial vacancies 
will allow it to pack and control the courts. The GOB 
controls a majority of Congress, but by lowering salaries and 
reducing the Congress' operational budget, the GOB has 
further reduced the legislative branch's ability to serve as 
a check to executive power. 
 
-- Constituent Assembly (CA). Opposition party leaders have 
long worried that the Morales government would use the CA to 
consolidate power for the long term.  Morales has declared 
that the MAS plans to secure 70 percent (or more) of CA 
representatives, and is working diligently to that end 
(reftel A).  The opposition's "dark" view of the CA may be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy; unless the struggling opposition 
unites quickly, Morales may use the CA to eliminate them as a 
check on his increasing power. 
 
LA PAZ 00000854  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
-- Control of indigenous groups. Many of the largest 
indigenous groups have historically contained several 
political currents.  In the past month, the MAS has increased 
attempts to co-opt several organizations (like the CSUTCB and 
CIDOB), and has eliminated rival forces within them. 
 
-- Removal of state subsidies for CA campaign.  The GOB has 
threatened to withdraw state support for all political 
parties in the CA campaign by introducing a bill to that 
effect in Congress.  Such a measure will damage the already 
financially-weak opposition; the MAS, with government coffers 
at its disposal and funding from Venezuela/Cuba, can decline 
such funds under the guise of another "austerity" measure. 
 
-- Politics in non-political institutions.  The GOB has 
undermined independent institutions such as the military and 
the MFA by making personnel decisions using political 
criteria.  Regarding the military, Morales skipped two 
generations of promotable officers to name Wilfredo Vargas as 
Armed Forces Commander.  In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Embassy contacts have also reported isolated cases of 
personnel maneuvers rewarding political allegiances instead 
of merit. 
 
-- Mistreatment of U.S.-friendly government officials. 
Certain GOB ministries have shown hostility toward the United 
States while welcoming Venezuelan/Cuban officials with open 
arms.  Military personnel have openly mistreated Bolivian 
officers who have worked with the U.S. milgroup in the past 
via demotions, transfers, and isolation.  Working level 
Embassy contacts have reported "orders" within certain 
Ministries not to associate with the international community, 
particularly Americans. 
 
-- Manipulation of judicial system.  The GOB's recent raid of 
Spanish petroleum company Repsol and subsequent arrest of its 
principals demonstrate that the rule of law can be 
manipulated for political gain (see septel).  While the GOB's 
exact motives are unclear (possibly to gain a stronger 
negotiating position or to intimidate the hydrocarbons 
sector), it is gaming the legal system to single out Repsol, 
and increasing the state's role in the private sector. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment: Coupled with periodic outbursts against the 
United States--most recently accusing us of sending a 
"terrorist" to bomb two low rent hotels (reftel D)--these 
early indications may spell trouble for the integrity of 
Bolivia's institutions and hint at an autocratic bent in the 
presidency.  End comment. 
GREENLEE