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FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8444
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5687
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2954
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6836
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4066
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1387
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RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3637
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4029
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8548
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND PDAS SHAPIRO 
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND FRENCH AND PETRONI 
STATE PLS PASS TO USTR FOR BHARMON 
NSC FOR DFISK 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016 
TAGS: ETRD EAGR EINV ECON PGOV PREL USTR BL
SUBJECT: URIBE TELLS MORALES "NO" ON SOY 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 692 
 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 644 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Robinson for reasons 1. 
4(d) and (b). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: President Evo Morales' March 14 meeting 
with his Colombian counterpart, Alvaro Uribe, appears not to 
have gone Bolivia's way.  Uribe reportedly told Morales he 
could not guarantee continued access to Colombia's market for 
Bolivian soy because the free trade agreement (FTA) with the 
U.S. was concluded, and that Bolivia should probe the U.S. 
side for flexibility instead.  Colombia's Ambassador to 
Bolivia told us that Bolivian government officials had 
insisted that FTA negotiations with Peru provided a precedent 
for Colombia's re-opening a finished agreement. 
Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera called the Ambassador 
late March 14 to request an urgent meeting -- now set for 
March 16 -- to discuss the issue.  In anticipation of that 
meeting, post asks the Department to clarify our willingness 
to show flexibility, if any, on Bolivian soy and to offer 
guidance on what level a probable Bolivian delegation should 
be received.  In the meantime, the GOB's jitters in the face 
of strong public criticism at home for losing the Colombian 
market may give us an opening to press for quiet pragmatism 
on matters of central concern to us, including 
counter-narcotics.  See action request in paragraph 7.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Following the public success of President Evo 
Morales' trip to Chile, and the bilateral energy agreement 
signed March 13 with Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez (ref 
A), Morales appeared to be on a roll, and may have imbued GOB 
officials with a misplaced confidence that Colombian 
President Alvaro Uribe, who visited Bolivia briefly on March 
14, could be persuaded to allow continued preferential access 
for Bolivian soy products to Colombia's markets -- a priority 
issue for the GOB.  Bolivian soy exporters could lose this 
important market to more efficient U.S. producers as a result 
of the FTA with Colombia. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) During their March 14 meeting in La Paz, however, 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe gave no ground to Morales on 
this issue.  (See septel for media reaction.)  Colombian 
Ambassador to Bolivia, Edgar Papamija (present in the 
presidential meeting), told us March 15 that Uribe had 
underscored Colombia's solid partnership with the U.S., and 
had unambiguously stated that Colombia's free trade agreement 
with the U.S. was now concluded and could not be re-opened 
for additional negotiation on any issue.  Papamija said 
Bolivian negotiators had insisted that U.S. FTA negotiations 
with Peru provided a precedent for such post-agreement 
tinkering, and that Colombia ought to do the same in this 
instance.  According to Papamija, Uribe responded that he had 
no knowledge of the Peru precedent, and recommended that 
Morales call President Bush to probe for flexibility on the 
U.S. side instead. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Papamija added that Uribe had also conveyed 
willingness to assist Bolivia by providing credits and other 
support, including a joint technical commission, to help its 
producers become competitive; at the same time, he suggested 
Bolivian soy was overpriced and should be lowered and seek 
space in the Chinese market.  Uribe reportedly also said that 
Colombia was prepared to support any Bolivian initiative to 
gain U.S. flexibility on this score, but that Bolivia would 
need to take the lead because Colombia would not do so. 
However, Uribe told reporters after the meeting with Morales 
that Colombia would consider joining a high level delegation 
to approach Washington for concessions, but in a strictly 
 
LA PAZ 00000712  002 OF 002 
 
 
supportive role. 
 
¶5. (C) Papamija said that Uribe's visit was also intended to 
expose Morales to regional political and economic 
perspectives different from those of Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.  He noted that 
President Morales and his advisors, particularly Vice Foreign 
Minister for Economic affairs Maria Luisa Ramos, had behaved 
more like union bosses during the meeting -- rudely demanding 
concessions and accusing the Colombian President of bending 
to U.S. pressures -- rather than as state representatives 
disposed to negotiate in favor of Bolivia's national 
interests. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Immediately prior to Morales' March 14 joint press 
conference with Uribe, Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera 
called the Ambassador requesting an urgent meeting to discuss 
the soy issue -- now set for March 16.  (Comment: When he met 
with the Secretary in Chile last week, Morales sounded the 
note of a statesman focused on the economy, soliciting 
flexibility on soy and an extension of the ATPDEA -- ref B. 
In a March 15 media appearance, however, Morales vowed he 
would never pursue a Free Trade Agreement but proposed a 
"People's Trade Agreement" -- "Tratado Comercial Popular" -- 
with the U.S., explaining helpfully that the latter would 
better protect the interests of Bolivia's small producers. 
The technical definition of such an hypothetical agreement is 
anyone's guess, but its political meaning -- to placate the 
rabid anti-free-traders among the MAS's social sector bases 
as the campaign season for the Constituent Assembly gets 
underway -- is clear.  End Comment.) 
 
Action Request: 
--------------- 
¶7.  (SBU) In anticipation of the Ambassador's March 16 
meeting with Morales, post requests the Department clarify 
our willingness to show flexibility, if any, on soy in the 
Colombian FTA and to offer guidance on what level a probable 
Bolivian delegation should be received.  In the meantime, the 
Morales administration is on the defensive for supposedly 
losing its most important agricultural market and knows, as 
Vice President Garcia Linera told reporters, "We are in the 
U.S.'s hands;" at least on this issue.  We may have an 
opening, however temporary, to press for quiet pragmatism on 
matters central to our own interests, like counter-narcotics. 
 
GREENLEE