VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0615/01 0662140
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 072140Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8348
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5658
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2928
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6799
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4032
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1363
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1271
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3611
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4001
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8522
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T LA PAZ 000615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA A/S T.SHANNON AND PDAS C.SHAPIRO 
STATE ALSO FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI 
NSC FOR D.FISK 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PARM BL
SUBJECT: FIRESTORM OVER EMBASSY CUTTING SUPPORT FOR 
BOLIVIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM UNIT 
 
REF: A. USDAO LA PAZ IIR ID 6808-9632-06 
 
     ¶B. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9748-06 
     ¶C. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9847-06 
     ¶D. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9846-06 
     ¶E. USDAO LA PAZ 6808-9890-06 
     ¶F. TD-314/62437-05 
     ¶G. TD-314/62541-05 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4(d) and (b). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In response to our ending support for a 
specialized Bolivian military counter-terrorism (CT) unit, 
President Evo Morales publicly blasted the U.S. for 
interfering in Bolivia's internal affairs.  The decision to 
sever ties with the outfit was taken after the GOB appointed 
as commander a military officer who had previously leaked 
sensitive information to the press, among other 
indiscretions, but the media have portrayed it as reflecting 
a broader U.S. dissatisfaction with the new Bolivian 
government's policies.  The Ambassador met with journalists 
March 7 to provide a detailed background briefing to clarify 
the issue.  Severing ties with the unit was the culmination 
of a six month dialog with successive GOB's about our lack of 
confidence in the CT team's leadership.  The expected 
political blowback, now a reality, may reflect both real and 
manufactured outrage at U.S. "arrogance," but does not 
undermine the fundamental prudence of our action.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On March 3, we formally conveyed the decision to end 
support for the Bolivian military's specialized 
counter-terrorism unit: the Joint Counter-Terrorism Force 
("Fuerza Contraterrorista Conjunta").  For the past three 
years, the Embassy has backed the confidential Bolivian CT 
force with training, equipment and other cooperation, such as 
facilitating annual joint exercises with the counterpart CT 
forces in the region.  In the view of its U.S. military 
colleagues, the Bolivian CT unit was highly disciplined, 
competent and capable under its past leadership  -- a genuine 
professional elite within Bolivia's relatively 
undistinguished armed forces. 
 
¶3. (S) Despite the team's relative professionalism, however, 
Embassy MilGroup liaison officers repeatedly expressed 
discontent with the performance of its deputy commander, 
Lieutenant Colonel Rory Rodriguez, beginning in September 
¶2005.  Rodriguez had a tendency to stray dangerously from 
established U.S. tactical doctrine, was not respected by his 
subordinates, and, perhaps most damningly, had leaked to the 
press sensitive information in connection with the transfer 
of Bolivia's Chinese-manufactured MANPADS to the U.S. (Refs F 
and G).  Milgroup and other Embassy officers repeatedly 
underscored, both to the administrations of then-President 
Rodriguez and of President Morales, the difficulty we would 
have in maintaining support for the unit if LTC Rodriguez 
remained in a leadership position. 
 
¶4. (C) Our warnings aside, Rodriguez was appointed interim 
commander in early December, toward the close of the 
presidential elections, according to some reports, in 
response to pressure from then front-running candidate 
Morales as a reward for the lieutenant colonel's "heroic" 
actions in the Chinese missile case.  Embassy officers 
protested the appointment to the outgoing government and 
Rodriguez was removed from command.  In early February 2006, 
however, the new Morales administration reinstated Rodriguez. 
 In a March 3 letter to the head of Bolivia's armed forces, 
BG Wilfredo Vargas, we noted our lack of confidence in the CT 
unit's leadership and announced an immdiate end to our 
support, including calling back Bolivian officers being 
trained in the U.S. and requesting the return of U.S. 
military equipment donated to the force. 
 
¶5. (C) Formal Embassy communications on this matter were 
 
conducted within the relevant (sensitive) 
military-to-military channels, but once the information got 
to the government it quickly broke out of those channels and 
burst into public view.  During a March 6 community 
celebration in El Alto, President Morales, referring to the 
confidential Embassy communication, took the opportunity to 
 
SIPDIS 
blast U.S. "interference" in Bolivia's internal affairs and 
to denounce U.S. "blackmail."  Copies of the Embassy letter 
to the GOB were provided to the press, and showed up in 
several March 7 morning newspapers.  "The time when the 
United States appoints Ministers and Commanders is over," 
Morales railed.  Morales also noted that a lowly Colonel had 
transmitted the message, and not the U.S. Ambassador, 
insinuating that a dreadful breach of protocol had taken 
place.  According to March 7 news reports, Morales also said 
Bolivia would refuse the Embassy's request to return the U.S. 
military equipment used by the CT unit.  In a March 7 written 
response to the Embassy, Armed Forces Commander Vargas said 
the formal U.S. communication needed to be made through the 
proper "diplomatic" channels. 
 
¶6. (C) Notwithstanding the real, somewhat narrow reasons 
behind the Embassy's decision, it appears to have struck an 
emotional nerve (or, alternatively, to serve the needs of 
Bolivia's anti-American establishment) and, consequently, has 
been blown significantly out of proportion by Bolivians 
inside and outside of the government.  The media have 
portrayed it as reflecting a broader U.S. dissatisfaction 
with the new Bolivian government's policies, and even as 
intending to punish the Morales administration for 
undetermined wrongs.  In a March 7 background briefing with 
two dozen journalists, the Ambassador clarified the facts, 
placed the episode in its appropriate military-to-military 
context, and hoped the situation could be rectified to 
facilitate continued U.S.-Bolivian cooperation in the 
important counterterrorism arena.  He also drew attention to 
the Bolivian government's persistently confusing signals with 
respect to our broader bilateral relations. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  The March 3 letter was the culmination of 
six months dialog with successvie GOB's about our lack of 
confidence in the CT unit's commander.  Political backlash 
has been stiff, at least initially, and may reflect some real 
anger on the part of President Morales, always quick to 
perceive slights, but also mirrors broader anti-U.S. 
sentiment among some of his closest advisors.  At the same 
time, appointing Rodriguez as commander against our 
well-known objections politicized an otherwise well-trained, 
lethal unit, and resurrected memories of a similar police 
unit that went rogue in February 2003 with fatal results. 
With Rodriguez in place, we are better off without it. 
GREENLEE