VZCZCXRO9459
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOS #0429/01 0821542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231542Z MAR 06
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6839
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 7048
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH AFB UK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS DOE FOR GPERSON AND CGAY 
TREASURY FOR ASEVERENS AND SRENENDER 
COMMERCE FOR KBURRESS 
STATE PASS TRANSPORTATION FOR MARAD 
STATE PASS USTR FOR ASST USTR SLISER 
STATE PASS USAID FOR GWEYNAND AND SLAWAETZ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 
TAGS: EPET ENERG PTER NI
SUBJECT: BONGA SECURITY: IS DISTANCE ENOUGH PROTECTION FROM 
MEND? 
 
REF: A. 2005 LAGOS 1917 
 
     ¶B. LAGOS 48 
     ¶C. LAGOS 250 
     ¶D. LAGOS 367 
 
Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Chief Shannon Ross for Reasons 1.4 (D & 
E) 
 
--------- 
Summary 
--------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  In a meeting with the Operations Manager of 
Nigeria,s first deepwater mega-project, Shell,s Bonga 
field, he delivered a sobering assessment of the security 
situation for the Floating, Production, Storage and 
Offloading (FPSO) vessels Bonga and the SeaEagle.  His 
views are not necessarily those of senior Shell management, 
but represent the views of a man charged with the 
day-to-day management of the Bonga and Eastern Area 
(SeaEagle) fields.  He views the Bonga as vulnerable to 
attack by militia groups, and operations on the SeaEagle as 
simply "untenable" in the current security environment. 
Nonetheless, Shell maintains its official position: it 
does not want its employees to carry heavy weapons due to 
human rights concerns, and looks to the GON to ensure FPSO 
security. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Bonga Operations Manager Assesses Bonga 
Security as Poor; Naval "Presence" Only 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Bonga Operations Manager Mihlon assesses the Bonga 
FPSO as vulnerable to attack by the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) or other militia 
groups, which he believes have ample resources to attack 
the vessel.  Mihlon stated there is currently "no security 
at Bonga, just a naval presence (one small vessel), which 
would be quickly overwhelmed in an attack."  Mihlon states 
security for Bonga is typically less robust than for 
near-shore facilities, such as the Forcados Export 
Terminal, which MEND quickly overwhelmed in its February 
attack (reftel C).  While he notes reaching Bonga in 
relatively small flyboats would be logistically more 
complex for MEND than attacking near-shore facilities, he 
assesses the group is capable of doing so.  Mihlon 
categorically stated neither Shell nor the Nigerian 
military can design a security system robust enough to 
repel an attack by 20-30 MEND flyboats, such as that 
carried out on March 11 (reftel D).  The Bonga FPSO is 
located about 150 kilometers off the coast of Nigeria, 
southwest of Warri, Delta State, in oil mining lease (OML) 
bloc 118.  Bonga initiated operations in December 2005, and 
produces about 225,000 bpd (reftel A). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
The Outlook for Sea Eagle Production Grim, 
Security Situation "Untenable" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Echoing earlier comments by Shell,s West African 
Security Manager Colgate, Mihlon told us he does not see 
the FPSO Sea Eagle, with production of 115,000 bpd, coming 
back into operation for "months."  Mihlon had previously 
been steadfast in his demand for two naval vessels to 
protect the SeaEagle before he would authorize re-manning 
it.  However, after a recent MEND attack with at least 
twenty flyboats (reftel D), he has abandoned this demand, 
saying "all bets are off."  He has now concluded it doesn't 
matter whether the Nigerian Navy provides two or ten 
vessels for the SeaEagle, since they remained incapable of 
defending against such an overwhelming attack.  Mihlon, a 
former U.S. military officer, described a threat matrix 
with threat levels on one axis, and hardness of target on 
the other.  He explained he has always been a proponent of 
 
LAGOS 00000429  002 OF 003 
 
 
focusing on hardness of target, since one cannot control an 
external threat level.  However, he is now at a loss, since 
he does not consider any hardness of target adequate to 
re-man the SeaEagle.  In sum, he currently considers the 
SeaEagle,s security situation "simply untenable." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  On the technical front, Mihlon said the SeaEagle 
will continue to deteriorate.  The vessel was abandoned 
with little warning in January after a sea-based assault 
and the kidnapping of four hostages from a nearby Tidex 
vessel (reftel B).  The vessel was not properly shut down 
to prepare for long-term inactivity, and equipment and 
pipes are deteriorating.  Mihlon expects that repairs which 
might have taken three weeks if carried out immediately 
could take eight weeks or more by the time Shell is able to 
re-secure access to the vessel.  Shell was able to send a 
crew to the vessel for three days two weeks ago, but the 
visit was not long enough to accomplish much. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Shell: "We,re Not in the Militia Business" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Despite Mihlon,s frustration with security 
challenges, he indicated Shell,s official position remains 
the same: it does not want its employees to carry heavy 
weapons due to the potential for human rights abuses. 
(Note: Given accusations against Shell for previous 
human rights abuses, particularly during the era of military 
rule in Nigeria, Shell remains sensitive to any suggestion 
its employees have arms, which Nigerian law limits to 
government security forces (GSF).  End note.) 
If the Nigerian military is unable to provide effective 
security, 
Mihlon indicated Shell will simply withdraw from the 
operational 
area.  Mihon stated, "We,re not in the militia business," 
explaining that Shell is willing to mount security to repel 
a limited assault, but no more.  He voiced his frustration 
that the military is not responding to the breakdown of order 
in 
the Delta, stating Nigeria needs to have "some baseline of 
law and order."  He concluded, noting "Nigeria needs to get 
its military up to speed, or we can,t operate here." 
Mihlon indicated that a Nigerian military capacity to mount 
effective perimeter security for facilities such as Bonga 
would be acceptable. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Helicopter Warning of Threats to Bonga: 
On a Propeller and a Prayer? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Mihlon notes Shell sends three helicopters per day 
on round trips to Bonga, and hopes the helicopters might 
provide some type of early warning in the event of any 
attack.  However, the helicopter flights are not designed 
to provide security for Bonga, nor manned by security 
personnel, so any contribution to Bonga security would 
purely fortuitous.  Mihlon also voiced his 
frustration Bonga was not receiving the support of fast 
vessels the U.S. Coast Guard recently donated to the GON 
for use in Delta security. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
A Bonga and SeaEagle Security Wish List 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  To provide early warning of a possible attack on 
Bonga, Mihlon has requested a 30-knot patrol vessel to 
patrol the passage between Bonga and shore.  He has also 
requested a 40-50 meter, 30-knot vessel with defensive 
capability, for surveillance.  Mihlon stated the Sea 
Eagle needs a full complement of security craft, including 
at least two 20-meter, 30-40 knot interceptor craft, 
with crew residing on a 75-meter, 15-knot supply vessel 
 
LAGOS 00000429  003 OF 003 
 
 
equipped with weaponry.  He stated this would allow Shell 
to intercept one to two boats attacking SeaEagle, which 
he considers a bare minimum.  It remains unclear whether 
senior Shell management will authorize these acquisitions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Security Information Sharing Next on the Agenda 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.  (C)  In the meantime, Mihlon is planning to reach out 
to other oil companies to carry out information-sharing and 
benchmarking exercises on security issues.  Among other 
goals, he would like to develop common industry standards 
regarding when to de-man and re-man facilities under 
threat.  His current goal is to convince Shell management 
to concur with his recommendation for Shell to match AGIP,s 
use of crew-served weapons, rather than personal weapons, 
even if only to allow GSF to cover a retreat by Shell 
personnel and security forces.  (Note: Mihlon,s insistence 
on "getting across" to Shell management the need for 
crew-served weapons suggests he may be waging a losing 
battle.  End note.) 
 
¶9.  This cable was cleared by Embassy Abuja. 
HOWE