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DE RUEHKU #0913/01 0770436
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O 180436Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3513
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KUWAIT 000913

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S/CT, NEA, INL (TODD), PM; NCTC FOR HARTLEY; DOJ FOR
SWARTZ; OSD FOR MANCUSO; LONDON FOR TSOU; PARIS FOR ZEYA;
PLEASE PASS TO USAID (WARD);

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL IZ KU SY JO TU SA
SUBJECT: REGIONAL CT STRATEGY FOR IRAQ AND ITS NEIGHBORS:
RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MARCH 7-8 COM MEETING

REF: STATE 11946

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(c) and (d)

¶1. (S REL AUS UK) Summary: U.S. Chiefs of Mission and
Embassy representatives from Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and Turkey met in Kuwait, March 7-8, as a
first step to develop a regional counterterrorism strategy.
Ambassador for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton and U.S.
interagency representatives participated. The meeting sought
to understand the flow of Terrorists/Foreign Fighters (T/FFs)
to Iraq and identify countermeasures. Chiefs of Mission
considered the possibility that clandestine T/FF support
networks might be used to disperse fighters out of Iraq into
the broader region, or to form the nuclei of future
underground networks targeting regional states and societies.

¶2. (S REL AUS UK) Summary continued: Chiefs of Mission
concluded that: (a) T/FF support networks are so adaptive
that cutting them at a single point (such as the Syria/Iraq
border) will have a limited temporary effect at best, (b) a
more effective strategy would degrade the flow by
simultaneously attacking all phases of the T/FF lifecycle
from recruitment to operational tasking, (c) Syria remains
the key transit country for T/FFs, making behavior change in
Damascus a key element of the strategy, and (d) the primary
motivator for most T/FFs, as reported by U.S. military
intelligence, remains perceived U.S. abuses of and lack of
due process for detainees at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay -
making this issue a key driver of T/FF flows - and a key
element undermining international confidence in the United
States' ability to conduct an effective war on terrorism that
remains true to American values. Chiefs of Mission also
identified a series of specific proposals to help build a
common regional CT strategy, and agreed to meet in one month
(via videoconference) to monitor progress. End summary.

Understanding and Countering T/FF Flows
---------------------------------------

¶3. (S REL AUS UK) T/FFs originate from countries across
North Africa and the wider Middle East, and travel to Iraq
via informal networks of sympathizers, facilitators, and
supporters. Networks converge on Syria, a key staging and
training hub. Crossing into Iraq (often with support from
border tribes and traditional smuggling networks), T/FFs move
up the Euphrates River Valley (ERV) and other routes toward
operational areas in central Iraq. Other T/FFs enter Iraq
from terrorist safehavens in northwestern Iran. Iraq's
borders are long, porous, and partially controlled; terrain
favors infiltration. Experience has shown that T/FF flows
must be degraded in depth, well before infiltrators reach the
border, if interdiction is to succeed. This suggests greater
cooperation on the part of originating countries to stem the
flow of individuals before they enter the terrorist pipeline.
Moreover, T/FF networks have shown a remarkably high degree
of adaptability, evolving rapidly to overcome
countermeasures. Thus, Chiefs of Mission concluded cutting
T/FF flows in any one place is likely to have a temporary and

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partial effect at best.

¶4. (S REL AUS UK) Instead, we propose a strategy that
simultaneously attacks each stage of the T/FF lifecycle:
recruitment, movement, staging, reception, and operational
tasking. By imposing pressure on each stage of the process
concurrently, we can limit the enemy's ability to adapt.
This will increase the "friction" in the overall T/FF
pipeline, degrading the enemy's ability to move and operate,
and ultimately reducing the overall flow of T/FFs. But this
approach will require a highly coordinated and flexible
response at the whole-of-government level. Thus, we propose
an integrated regional network of country teams, working
together to create a virtual "region team" that brings to
bear all instruments of national power.

¶5. (S REL AUS UK) Chiefs of Mission noted that the
long-term security problem in Iraq is neither T/FF flows nor
the anti-American insurgency, but rather the potential for
sectarian conflict leading to regional destabilization.
Meanwhile, the T/FF networks represent the strategic link
between the war in Iraq and the broader war on terrorism.
They will retain their significance even after the situation
in Iraq is stabilized - as potential clandestine
subversive/terrorist networks within regional societies, or
as a means for dispersal of terrorists from Iraq. Therefore
countering the flow of T/FFs is a separate issue from our
success in Iraq, is part of our long-term CT effort in the
wider region, and needs to be considered within a policy
context broader than Iraq.

¶6. (S REL AUS UK) In light of these considerations, the
following specific proposals address: (a) immediate
countermeasures against T/FF networks, (b) broader efforts to
build an integrated regional CT effort, and (c) broader
policy issues that directly affect our ability to counter
T/FF flows. To the extent these initiatives can be
undertaken by nations in the region without prominent USG
involvement, it will be easier to enlist the participation of
governments like Syria disinclined to cooperate with us
directly.

Specific Proposals
------------------

¶7. (S REL AUS UK) We propose the following measures to
counter T/FF flows and build a responsive regional CT network:

¶A. Regional biometrics/forensics conference. Different
countries collect, store and share biometric and forensic
data using different protocols - this hampers cooperation
against T/FF flows. Action: Embassy Jordan, with DOJ, is
requested to examine options for a regional biometrics and
forensics conference, allowing partner governments to develop
shared protocols, and brief Chiefs of Mission on a proposed
way forward, at the April 2006 regional CT videoconference.

¶B. Regional CT partnerships. Partner nations' intelligence

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services already cooperate on T/FF issues, but there is room
for improvement. And cooperation is lacking in other fields
such as CT infrastructure, training and development, and CT
funding. Action: Embassy Kuwait, with S/CT, will examine
options for regional CT partnerships on these issues and will
brief options at the April 2006 videoconference.

¶C. Saudi Arabia as a focus for regional CT. Partner
nations' commitment to countering T/FF flows varies,
according to the degree of threat they perceive towards their
own countries. Saudi society is a source of T/FF funding and
personnel, but the Saudi government perceives it is directly
threatened by such networks; increasingly, this is also the
case in Syria. Therefore Saudi Arabia working with GCC
countries, Yemen and others may be willing to exercise
regional leadership - including efforts to foster behavior
change in Damascus. Action: Embassy Riyadh, with Embassy
Damascus, is requested to canvass options for Saudi
leadership in regional T/FF countermeasures, and brief
options at the April 2006 videoconference.

¶D. State Department representation on JIACG and JIATF(W).
The Joint Interagency Coordination Group and Joint
Interagency Task Force (West) have proven a highly valuable
CT resource that integrates multiple agencies across several
countries to achieve a precisely targeted CT effect. State
Department representation on these bodies could improve
regional integration and serve as a model for future
interagency cooperation. Action: S/CT with DOD is requested
to study JIATF(W) operations, and report on the feasibility
of State Dept representation on JIATFs and JIACG, to the
April 2006 videoconference.

¶E. Specialist CT Officers. Chiefs of Mission noted that no
individual within each Embassy has CT as his or her sole
focus. Improving efforts to counter T/FF flows, and
developing a regional CT network, requires specialist CT
officers with appropriate resourcing - such tasks cannot be
conducted by existing embassy personnel at no cost to other
programs and priorities. Action: Embassies, working with
S/CT, are requested to identify personnel and funding
requirements to establish specialist CT officers or other
focal points in each post, and brief their requirements at
the April 2006 videoconference.

¶F. Regional information sharing. Sharing of information on
T/FF flows and activities inside Iraq with regional embassies
was identified as an area requiring additional effort.
Action: Embassy Baghdad with Embassy Damascus and other
embassies as needed is requested to identify specific
information needs and develop a plan for an ongoing
information-sharing mechanism, and report progress to the
April 2006 videoconference.

¶G. Conversion of JIPTC into Regional CT center. The Jordan
Iraqi Policy Training Center is completing the major portion
of its mission in training Iraq's new police forces. We
propose conversion of this center into a multi-purpose,
multi-user facility capable of providing a range of training

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and development assistance to countries across the wider
region. Action: Embassy Amman, with S/CT and INL, is
requested to develop a plan for transformation and future use
of the center, and brief options at the April 2006
videoconference.

¶H. Exchanges and Scholarships: People-to-people programs
are a very powerful tool in creating lasting favorable
impressions of the United States that undermine the
attractiveness of extremist ideology. Chiefs of Mission
agreed that the USG needs to vastly and rapidly expand these
successful programs as a key long-term instrument to counter
extremism. Action: Embassy Kuwait will draft a message to
U/S Hughes for approval by other missions supporting further
expansion of exchanges/scholarships.

¶I. Private Sector Engagement. Private sector players -
including industry, NGOs, think tanks, OSACs and academia -
have a valuable role in low-profile, independently funded
efforts to reduce ideological support for terrorism and
counter T/FF flows. Action: Embassy Riyadh, with Embassy
Kuwait and other posts as needed, is requested to develop
specific proposals for engaging private sector players in CT
initiatives, and report progress to the April 2006
videoconference.

"External" Issues Influencing Success of C/T Efforts
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶8. (S REL AUS UK) A number of current issues have a
significant impact on the effectiveness of C/T policy
initiatives. These include:

¶A. Treatment of Detainees: Detainee debriefs and
intelligence reporting indicate that U.S. treatment of
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere is the
single most important motivating factor for T/FFs traveling
to Iraq. Regional concern over detainee issues undermines
our credibility, and our partners' willingness to cooperate,
on a host of CT issues.

¶B. Dealing with Syria: This overall policy reduces our
ability to engage constructively on areas such as extremist
T/FF flows. We need to consider ways of opening windows of
dialogue on issues of key C/T concern.

¶C. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict: This chronic conflict
has a distracting and alienating effect. Cooperation with us
on C/T issues is eased when Middle Eastern governments and
populations perceive an active U.S. role in addressing the
fundamental issues.

¶D. The PKK: While cooperative when requested, Turkey has
not taken the initiative against the relatively small T/FF
flow through its territory. Constructive engagement with
Ankara on Turkish concerns regarding the PKK/KGK presence in
Iraq could contribute to greater Turkish willingness to
actively pursue closing the T/FF pipeline through Turkey.
This will become more important as our pressure to stem T/FF

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flows elsewhere leads to heavier use of the route through
Turkey.

Maintaining Momentum
--------------------

¶9. (S REL AUS UK) To maintain the momentum generated by
this meeting, embassies intend to meet regularly to
coordinate an integrated regional CT approach, based on a
network of country teams and developed through face-to-face
contact and video and telephone conferences. Chiefs of
Mission agreed to hold a series of regional CT strategy
meetings, beginning with a videoconference in April - to
include posts and interagency representatives, and to review
progress and options for specific initiatives. Action:
Embassy Kuwait with S/CT is to coordinate the April
videoconference.

¶10. (S REL AUS UK) In addition, we request assistance from
Washington in obtaining and obligating significant additional
funding necessary to undertake this regional CT strategy and
increase understanding among decision-makers and budget
analysts of the CT challenges in our region. To focus
efforts and support budget requests, NEA and EUR should
consider including in the CT portion of their BPPs a specific
strategy to defeat terrorism and counter T/FF flows in the
region. Congressional staffers from appropriations committees
and OMB officials could assist in bridging this gap, as part
of a coordinated legislative outreach.

--------------------
Meeting Participants
--------------------

¶11. (S REL AUS UK) Participants at the 7-8 March meeting in
Kuwait included:

-- Amman: Ambassador David Hale, Regional Affairs Officer
Peter Enzminger
-- Ankara: Pol/Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, Regional Affairs
Officer Thaddeus Troy
-- Baghdad: DCM David Satterfield, Deputy ORA Chief Phillip
Reilly, Major Anita Harvey, SOIC MNF-I
-- Damascus: CDA Stephen Seche, Regional Affairs Officer
Thomas Sylvester
-- Kuwait: Ambassador Richard LeBaron, Pol/Mil Affairs Chief
Joseph Forcier
-- Riyadh: Ambassador James Oberwetter, Bilateral Programs
Officer Dr. Jim Leong
-- State Dept/Washington: CT Ambassador Henry Crumpton, PDAS
S/CT Frank Urbancic, Senior Strategy Advisor S/CT Dr. David
Kilcullen, INL DAS William Todd, NEA/I Director Richard Olson.
-- DOD: BG Douglas Raaberg, CENTCOM; MG Stanley McChrystal,
SOCOM; BG Robert Caslen, Joint Staff; DAS/D Mario Mancuso,
SO/LIC.
-- NCTC: MG Jeffrey Schloesser, Brent Hartley
-- CTC: Peter Minehart, CTC-Iraq
-- USAID: Mark Ward, D/AA Asia and Near East
-- DOJ: Bruce Swaartz, DAAG

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-- DNI/NIC: Susan McCormick, Transnational Threats Office

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