VZCZCXRO9741
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHKU #0892/01 0741409
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151409Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3480
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1196
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0957

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KU FREEDOM AGENDA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA - ELECTORAL REFORM PART II OF III: 
WHO SUPPORTS AND WHO OPPOSES THE REDUCTION? 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT (PART I) 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 656 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 636 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶D. 05 KUWAIT 5186 
 
Classified By: DCM Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary and comment: This is the second in a series 
of three cables on electoral reform in Kuwait.  A majority of 
Kuwaitis support reducing the number of electoral districts 
from the current 25 to 10, or fewer; however, there is still 
an influential minority opposing the reform.  The most vocal 
opponents of the reform have been members of Parliament's 
Independent Bloc, a coalition of 18 pro-Government, "service 
deputy" MPs who are unlikely to be re-elected if the reform 
is passed.  Some also question the Government's support for 
the reform: despite its public and private support for ten 
constituencies (refs A and C), many contacts report that 
several influential ministers and members of the ruling 
family are loath to adopt a reform that would limit their 
influence in Parliament.  Even MPs supporting the reform 
could vote against certain proposals that they see as 
detrimental to their political interests, such as reducing 
the number of Shi'a representatives.  In the end, support for 
the reform will depend primarily on the particular reduction 
proposal and the Government's willingness to expend political 
(and financial) capital to ensure its passage.  Even if the 
reform stalls yet again, the participation of women in the 
2007 elections for the first time in Kuwait will more than 
double the number of voters in each constituency and serve to 
limit the scope for electoral corruption.  End summary and 
comment. 
 
Liberals and Islamists' Marriage of Convenience 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The strongest support for a reduction comes from 
liberals and Islamists, who see the reform as a critical 
component of broader political reform in the country and a 
possible precursor to official Government recognition of 
political parties.  If the reform is passed, it will likely 
force candidates to campaign on more broad-based platforms to 
the benefit of established political associations, 
particularly the Islamists.  The recent vote to move up the 
date for discussing the issue from June 30 to April 17 may 
indicate how Parliament would vote on an actual proposal: 23 
MPs and 10 ministers voted for the earlier date, while only 
12 MPs voted against it.  (Note: Only 56 out of Parliament's 
64 members were present for the vote.  End note.) 
Complicating the issue, however, is that, while in principle 
many MPs support a reduction, they are likely to oppose 
proposals they believe will harm their political interests. 
For example, Shi'a MPs who support the reduction have voiced 
concern that certain proposals could diminish Shi'a 
representation in Parliament.  (Note: Shi'a represent 
approximately 30% of Kuwait's citizens.  End note.)  Other 
groups make similar arguments.  In any case, support for the 
reform will depend largely on the specific proposal and its 
impact on influential political groups. 
 
Just Want to Be an MP 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The largest group opposing the reform is 
Parliament's Independent Bloc, a coalition of 18 
pro-Government, "service deputies": MPs whose political 
support is based almost exclusively on obtaining Government 
favors for their constituents.  Most of these MPs are 
unlikely to be re-elected if the reform is passed.  There 
have been recent indications, however, that a split may be 
emerging in the Independent Bloc over the issue with some 
members supporting the reform.  Vice President of Research at 
Kuwait University Dr. Jassem Mohammed Karam, who wrote his 
PhD thesis on Kuwait's electoral system, told Poloff in a 
March 15 meeting that a number of MPs would "continue to 
fight to the end to block the reform, unless constituencies 
were divided their way."  One member of the Independent Bloc 
told Poloff recently that he opposed the reform because he 
did not want to give up his "right to be an MP." 
 
The Government's Ambiguous Position 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) During a March 4 call to congratulate Minister of 
Public Works and Housing Bader Al-Humaidi on his 
re-appointment to the Cabinet, the Ambassador sought his 
assessment of the prospects for electoral reform.  The 
Minister said he personally favored five constituencies, but 
 
KUWAIT 00000892  002 OF 002 
 
 
that he thought the only proposal with a realistic 
possibility of succeeding was one with ten constituencies. 
Al-Humaidi discussed the difficulty of deciding the criteria 
for the creation of the districts, pointing to the 
possibility of disproportionate representation by more 
prolific Kuwaiti sectors representing more conservative 
elements in the society, while the population among the 
traditional Kuwaiti (and more liberal) families living in the 
older districts was not keeping up.  Thus, he did not favor 
the creation of districts simply on the basis of dividing up 
the country by population.  After meeting recently with 
pro-reform MPs, Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Mohammed 
Al-Sabah reportedly promised the Government would submit its 
reduction proposal to Parliament well ahead of the April 17 
date for discussing the issue.  While high-level Government 
officials, like Al-Humaidi, have expressed their support for 
electoral reform (refs A and C), many contacts question their 
sincerity, noting that the reform would limit the 
Government's influence on Parliament and could prevent 
legislation the Government supports from being passed. 
 
¶5.  (C) One expert on Kuwait's political system, Dr. Ali 
Al-Zo'bi, told Poloff March 11 that he supported five 
constituencies, and would even settle for ten, but doubted 
either would pass.  A sociology professor at Kuwait 
University, Al-Zo'bi questioned the Government's seriousness 
in supporting electoral reform, noting that "the Government" 
wanted to put Dr. Abdullah Al-Maatouq, the Minister of Awqaf 
and the Minister of Justice, on the ministerial committee 
reviewing electoral reform.  Al-Maatouq's addition would tip 
the balance of the committee against the reform, he said. 
According to Al-Zo'bi, other committee members opposing the 
reform were Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd Al-Sabah, the Minister of 
Energy, and Mohammed Daifallah Sharar, the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Minister of State for National Assembly Affairs, 
and Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs.  He said Minister 
of Planning Dr. Ma'souma Al-Mubarak and Minister of 
Information Dr. Anas Al-Rasheed, who also serve on the 
committee, supported the reduction.  Al-Zo'bi did not comment 
on the leanings of the committee's chairman, Minister of 
Justice and Minister of Interior Shaykh Jaber Mubarak 
Al-Sabah. 
 
¶6.  (C) Al-Zo'bi believed the Government would propose ten 
constituencies gerrymandered in such a way as to give tribal, 
sectarian, and religious groups the majority in particular 
constituencies while ignoring demographic consistency. 
According to Al-Zo'bi, this proposal would also increase the 
proportion of "urban" MPs in Parliament, which he said were 
currently under-represented.  He speculated voters would have 
either four or five votes each under this proposal, which 
would limit vote buying.  Overall, though, Al-Zo'bi was 
pessimistic about the potential for reform, arguing that 
regardless of which proposal, if any, was adopted the same 
"bad people" would be elected. 
 
¶7. (U)  The final cable in this series assesses the 
seriousnes of the government on the issue of electoral 
reform. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
LEBARON