VZCZCXRO8996
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKUK #0075/01 0901529
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 311529Z MAR 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0550
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0586
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0614

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, ROL COORDINATOR, USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR PHUM PINS PREL PINR KDEM KWMN IZ IR
SY, TU 
SUBJECT: KURDISH TRIBAL LEADER DOWNS KDP AND PUK, URGES U.S. TO STAY 
 
REF: A) KIRKUK 61, KIRKUK 65 
 
KIRKUK 00000075  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Acting Regional Coordinator, , REO 
Kirkuk, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.   A leader from the influential Kurdish tribe 
of Surchi said tribes were forced to work with the KDP and PUK 
because the parties controlled all the region's revenue.  He 
thought the two Kurdish parties were incapable of working 
together.  Shaykh Surchi urged the U.S. to remain in the region 
and establish permanent military bases.  His tribe's main 
concern was political, economic, and social equality.  The 
Surchi tribe historically fought against the Barzanis.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  This is third in a series of interviews with leaders 
from four influential tribes in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 
including the Harki (REFTEL A), Baradusti (REFTEL B), Surchi, 
and Zebari.  On March 9, IPAO's met with Shaykh Mazhar Surchi 
(please protect), a leader of the Surchi tribe. 
 
Parties Control the Tribes 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Shaykh Surchi said the tribes had no formal role in the 
Kurdistan Regional Government, though both the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan paid large 
sums of money to tribal leaders for political loyalty.  The 
tribes were forced to cooperate with the KDP and PUK because the 
parties controlled all employment and education opportunities. 
"If you are not a member of either the KDP or PUK, you cannot 
prosper in the KRG - the parties will insult or impose on you 
until you join.  We do not need a master and stick over us, we 
want a brother."  Surchi said he had no particular loyalty to 
either the KDP or PUK, but would favor the KDP if he had to 
choose. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Surchi said that despite public support for merging the 
two regional governments, the parties had only agreed to share 
power due to U.S. pressure.  He doubted the KDP and PUK 
administrations would actually unite, he thought the two parties 
were incapable of working together.  Surchi added, however, that 
the merger was a positive step because it held back influential 
personalities such as the PUK's Kosrat Rasul or KRG PM Nechirvan 
Barzani from becoming tyrants over the KRG.  He said that most 
inter-party conflicts occurred at the lower levels. 
 
KDP and PUK Corruption Increasing 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Shaykh Surchi complained that corruption had increased 
in northern Iraq since Operation Iraqi Freedom. He said the KDP 
and PUK had misappropriated funds allocated to fight terrorism 
and that no mechanism was in place to counter those abuses.  KDP 
and PUK leaders' - and their cronies' - priority access to fuel 
facilitated the region's robust black market.  Surchi described 
the KDP in particular as "like a god."  He argued that while the 
PUK was as nepotistic as the KDP, the PUK was more open and 
willing to listen to the people. 
 
KDP and PUK Financing the KIU 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Shaykh Surchi believed that the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
(KIU) remained influential in the region because it was playing 
by the KDP and PUK's rules.  Both parties supported the KIU 
financially.  Surchi said his tribe did not support Islamic 
parties.  He claimed the KIU was better than "the other 
fanatics" and was a solid party, but he said he was concerned 
what it might do in the future.  People joined the KIU in 
response to injustices, not because they necessarily shared its 
ideology. 
 
Supporting Permanent U.S. Bases in Northern Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Shaykh Surchi supported permanent U.S. military bases 
in northern Iraq, fearing that if the U.S. pulled out, both 
external and internal risks would result.  Externally, Iran and 
Turkey had been enemies to the Kurds and were concerned about 
the U.S. presence in northern Iraq.  Surchi reminded IPAO's that 
Turkey, Iran, and Syria were not democracies and were inclined 
to undermine a democratic Iraq.  He estimated that 95 to 97 
percent of Iraqi Kurds viewed the Coalition as liberators.  He 
said he was confident in this estimate because no Americans had 
been killed in Kurdistan. 
 
 
KIRKUK 00000075  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶8.  (C)  Surchi said that he and his tribe were partners with 
the United States.  "Your existence here is our existence."  He 
said that although the two Kurdish political parties prevented 
democracy from flourishing in northern Iraq, the U.S. helped to 
stabilize the situation.  The Surchi tribe's main concern was 
political, economic, and social equality.  Surchi said that 
electricity and fuel should be available to everyone. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Surchi suggested that U.S. officials meet with the 
Kurdish public, not just its leadership, to understand what was 
happening on the ground.  "We only see the Coalition on 
television and never have the opportunity to actually speak with 
Americans.  We want the U.S. to build structures like hospitals 
in the KRG.  We are willing to work with you." 
 
Reconciling with the Barzanis 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Historically, the Surchi tribe had been divided into 
two branches, separated by geography and dialect.  During the 
Kurdish civil war in the mid 1990s, the Surchi branch in Arbil - 
not Shaykh Mazhar Surchi's branch - fought against the Barzanis. 
 The KDP in 1996 attacked the Arbil branch of the Surchi tribe, 
killing its leader, Shaykh Husayn Agha Surchi.  Husayn's son 
Umar and top tribal leaders fled to As Sulaymaniyah and joined 
the PUK.  Umar returned to Arbil following Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and reconciled with the KDP.  As a result, the KDP 
returned to Umar his confiscated shops and allowed him to 
establish the Conservative Party.  Husayn's second son, Najim 
Surchi, remained in As Sulaymaniyah and became the Minister of 
Transportation in the PUK regional government.  The KDP 
compensated Husayn's third son, Johar Asha, with money and a 
house for his father's death. 
 
Tribal History 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The Surchi tribe includes over 90 villages, 
primarily in three Arbil districts - Aqri, Shalawra, and 
Rawandas - as well as Mosul.  Tribal members also live in Iran 
but are somewhat disconnected to the Iraqi Surchis.  The tribe 
includes both Muslims and Christians and claims to support 
religious equality. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  No single individual has led the Surchi tribe since 
Husayn's death.  Tribal power since has decentralized to large 
families.  Shaykh Surchi heads one of the large families.  He 
attributed two things to the decline in tribal unity: first, 
Saddam's moves to destroy the tribes and their territory by 
forcing tribes to co-mingle in collected locations; and second, 
party politics. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  During the Kurdish civil war, the Surchis did not 
maintain  tribal relationships beyond Iraq; they aligned with 
the KDP because of geography.  The tribe shares close relations 
with the Zebari, Harki and Guran tribes.  The Surchi economy 
depends on agriculture and animal husbandry, and conducts trade 
with Turkey. 
 
Surchi Women 
------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Women do not hold positions of influence in the 
Surchi tribe.  Some Surchi females are members of the KDP 
women's organization.  The few Surchi women who attend college 
are free to study anything, including business and the sciences. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  Shaykh Surchi and other tribal shaykhs with whom we 
have met clearly lack confidence that the KDP and PUK 
leaderships can work together in a unified regional government. 
Surchi, like other Kurdish shaykhs, emphasized the need to 
maintain a U.S. presence in northern Iraq as a stabilizing 
influence on both the political parties as well as Iraq's 
neighbors.  He is yet another social leader  fed up with the KDP 
and PUK's domination of all facets of life in northern Iraq. 
ORESTE