VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0270/01 0801209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211209Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2549
INFO RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 1480
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 1394
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0069
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C 
EUCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RW CG KE XA
SUBJECT: US AMBASSADOR TO DRC VISITS RWANDA 
 
REF: A. 05 KIGALI 1404 
 
     ¶B. KIGALI 0004 
     ¶C. TD-314/17379-06 
     ¶D. KINSHASA 000358 
 
Classified By: Poloff GLearned. Reasons 1.4(b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. US Ambassador Meece visited Rwanda March 2-4. 
Highlights of the visit included a stop at Mutobo 
Demobilization Camp; a meeting with National Security Service 
(NSS) Secretary General Ndahiro; and a meeting with Foreign 
Minister Murigande and Ambassador Sezibera, Special Envoy for 
the President to the Great Lakes. Discussions with the 
Foreign Minister focused on relations between the GDRC and 
GOR; the security outlook in eastern Congo; the Congolese 
political process; eastern Congo trade issues; and the future 
of the Tripartite Plus.  Although Murigande acknowledged that 
the relationship between the two governments has improved 
over the last three years, he stressed that the Tripartite 
Plus still plays an important role in improving the political 
situation in the Great Lakes Region. Ambassador Meece 
described the transition government in Kinshasa as generally 
dysfunctional and likely beset by increasing internal 
tensions in the run-up to elections. End summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Mutobo and National Security Service 
------------------------------------ 
¶2. (C) On 2 March, Ambassador Meece crossed from Goma into 
Gisenyi, met up with Ambassador Arietti, and proceeded to 
Mutobo Demobilization Camp, located outside of the town of 
Ruhengeri approximately 120 kilometers from Kigali. The camp, 
run by the GOR,s Reintegration and Demobilization 
Commission, had 236 ex-combatants in training, including 
former Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 
commander Seraphin Bizimungu (a.k.a. Brig Gen Amani) (ref A). 
 Ambassadors Meece and Arietti were briefed  by Philibert 
Gakwenzire, Head of the Documentation Department, on the 
camp, the demobilization and reintegration process and the 
GOR,s policy on returning ex-combatants (ref B). The 
Ambassadors also spoke with Amani and some FDLR ex-combatants 
who had repatriated from the DRC. Upon returning to Kigali, 
Ambassadors and SIMO met with NSS Secretary General, LtCol 
Emmanuel Ndahiro (ref C). 
 
---------------------------- 
FM on GDRC and GOR Relations 
---------------------------- 
¶3. (C) In 3 March meeting with Minister Murigande and 
Ambassador Sezibera, Murigande described the relationship 
between the GDRC and the GOR as  much improved, over the 
last three years. Responding to a question, Murigande 
asserted that lines of communication between GOR and GDRC 
were open and utilized.  In fact, he mused that 
Rwandan/Congolese diplomatic contacts were more &intense8 
than several other Rwandan regional relationships, possibly 
as there are more issues to discuss.  Murigande noted a 
decrease in negative rhetoric from GDRC officials and 
increased contact between high ranking officials but said 
that it would still take time to establish full 
normalization, including the exchange of embassies. 
Murigande expressed hope that the DRC presidential elections 
will occur on schedule and that the GDRC would  turn the 
page, regarding its attitude towards Rwanda.  He said the 
DRC has had the same problems throughout its history, 
including the problems with the Mai Mai, and the GOR takes 
into account the complicated history of the region for 
context. 
 
¶4. (C) Murigande said the International Community (IC) should 
be "encouraged" to increase the pressure on the former Armed 
Forces of Rwanda (FAR)-Interahamwe as it is the largest, most 
battle hardened group, and represents the biggest security 
problem in eastern Congo.  He reiterated that the GOR 
considers the Tripartite Plus as an important mechanism for 
the four countries to discuss regional security issues. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Meece agreed with the assessment that the 
FDLR (which Murigande referred to as ex-FAR-Interahamwe) is 
the largest and most militarily capable negative force in the 
region, but added that there are a number of threats to both 
the general security and the upcoming elections.  Other 
groups in fact, such as the Ituri militias, the &Jackson8 
Mai Mai group, and Laurent Nkunda,s troops have created 
greater disruption to the elections process.  He added that 
available evidence suggests the FDLR leadership has thus far 
made the decision to not directly threaten the DRC election 
process.  Ambassador Meece said that a more generalized 
threat to the region is the slow pace of army integration, 
the related disarmament, demobilization and re-integration 
(DDR) process, and critically important administrative 
reforms of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC).  He observed 
that these problems will still be around after the elections. 
 He noted the International Committee to Accompany the 
Transition (CIAT) has a unified approach in engaging with the 
GDRC and, despite a  broad range of interests there is 
agreement on the fundamentals,. 
 
¶6. (C) Murigande said that he had not heard anything about a 
possible end to the Tripartite Plus after the elections, he 
agreed that the challenges would remain after the elections 
and restated his position that the Tripartite Plus should 
continue. In response to questions, however, he was vague 
about what he viewed as the desired objectives or format for 
the future Tripartite Plus process.  Ambassador Arietti noted 
that the USG recognizes the eastern DRC problems will 
continue after the elections and emphasized the need to 
discuss the issues with the Tripartite Plus members while 
assessing the process and the most helpful way to continue. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Meece summarized the latest DRC electoral 
crisis over the territorial status of Minembwe (ref D) and 
noted that all parties have hardened their positions, making 
reasonable discussion more difficult and delaying the 
implementation of the recently adopted election law. 
Murigande acknowledged the situation as a problem and 
expressed hope that the CIAT would be able to help with the 
resolution. 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Arietti noted that it is becoming more 
important to focus on economic issues as economic development 
will help both countries.  Minister Murigande agreed, stating 
that the GOR tried to "jump-start talks" to set up an 
electrical power cooperation. The Minister confirmed, 
however, that existing Rwanda/DRC/Burundi energy cooperation 
arrangements continue to function.  He said there is free 
movement of people and goods due to the "laissez passer" 
recognized by both countries, but claimed that the GDRC was 
dragging its feet in further discussions on the tri-border 
economic cooperative. Ambassador Sezibera added that the IC 
could help to encourage this trade and noted that economic 
cooperation is just as important as security. He said that 
there is an unhelpful tendency by some groups to 
"criminalize" free trade. (Note. In past discussion with 
Emboffs, Ambassador Sezibera has been critical of some NGOs 
and UN panels and organizations as being anti-free trade. End 
note). 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Meece observed that there is a perception 
in Kinshasa that Rwanda and Uganda benefit from eastern DRC 
trade at the expense of the GDRC.  The GDRC,s existing lack 
of ability to extend central authority, including the control 
of borders and revenues, exacerbates the problem and furthers 
the impression of large-scale illegal activity.  Ambassador 
Meece said trade regulation should be recognized as part of 
the problems between the two countries but noted that a 
post-election government will open up options and 
possibilities that do not now exist. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Sezibera asserted that it was unfair to 
blame Rwanda for both the illegal actions of individuals in 
the Kivus and the inability of the of the GDRC to police 
itself.  Ambassador Meece agreed that Rwanda should not be 
blamed for poor governance by the GDRC and noted that the Sun 
City accords were not designed to set up an efficient, 
self-supporting government, but to end the war and initiate a 
transition process.  A part of these arrangements was a deal 
to allocate Ministerial and other positions, and authority, 
making coherent decision-making in the Transition problematic 
at best. Ambassador Arietti added that the budget and 
capacity limitations of the DRC, eight-two times larger in 
size than Rwanda, are not conducive to accurately tracking 
revenue. All agreed that the scale of the problems in the DRC 
is huge. 
ARIETTI