VZCZCXRO5147
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0545/01 0611307
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021307Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1705
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000545 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS PGOV SU CG UG UN
SUBJECT: UNMIS HEAD OF OFFICE ON SPLA, JONGLEI CONFLICT, 
AND LRA 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 482 
 
Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons section: 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  UNMIS Head of Office in South Sudan James 
Ellory and CG met on February 24 to discuss security issues 
in South Sudan, including developments in the SPLA, how to 
keep a lid on the situation in Jonglei State, and the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA).  Ellory expressed frustration with the 
slow GoSS approach on the LRA issue and suggested that a 
muscular response was required to prevent the LRA problem 
from becoming an internal southern Sudanese affair.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------- 
SPLA Transformation 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Recently returned from leave, Ellory discussed the 
current state of security in South Sudan.  He expressed 
concern that the GoSS/SPLA had been unable to pay salaries to 
the troops.  He said that this was having a deleterious 
effect on security, with some SPLA troops resorting to 
criminal activities to support themselves.  Ellory agreed 
that the inability of the SPLA command to determine the 
number and location of troops was the root cause.  He said 
that the 2006 SPLA budget was approximately USD 80 million. 
UNMIS estimated that this would translate into a force 
structure of approximately 100,000.  Ellory said that 
restructuring the SPLA into a more efficient professional 
force was crucial.  The longer this process took, the more 
difficult DDR and the maintenance of internal discipline 
would be. 
 
--------------------------- 
Next Steps in Jonglei State 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Ellory said that he had not been to Jonglei state 
since transporting Simon Gatwich there to help stabilize the 
situation following the clash between SPLA troops and the 
White Army and elements of the SSDF (reftel).  CG explained 
the reported risks associated with a spontaneous move of Nuer 
cattle camps south toward the territory of the Dinka Bor. 
Ellory said that he would instruct the very capable UMNIS 
Sector Commander in Malakal to analyze the situation and 
devise a strategy to avoid additional violence. 
 
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The LRA 
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¶4.  (C) Ellory said that he was convinced that the aborted 
attack on the UN compound in Yambio was not the work of the 
LRA.  The tactics differed, and the LRA would not have been 
so easily deterred.  He thought that disgruntled SPLA were 
involved, as they had been earlier in a similar incident in 
Maridi.  He had prevailed on the SPLA command to move the 
regional HQ from Maridi to a different site, and the problem 
had stopped. 
 
¶5.  (C) He said that he would seek a meeting with Kiir to 
discuss the GoSS response, or lack thereof, to the LRA issue. 
 Ellory remarked that Kiir suffered from "muddled thinking" 
on the subject, as evidenced by Kiir's continued offer to 
mediate between Uganda and the LRA.  Ellory thought this 
impossible, since the problem was in Uganda, not Sudan, and 
needed to be resolved among the Ugandans.  He questioned the 
ability of LRA leadership to engage in any meaningful 
negotiations in any case.  He concluded that the SPLA and 
Kiir were taking a blinkered approach to a problem that was 
having a negative effect on the South disproportionate to its 
scope.  He concluded that there was evidence that the LRA had 
begun to take on a more Sudanese character, and that to 
ignore it risked creating a problem that could take years to 
eliminate.  He intended to press this message on Kiir. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ellory briefly discussed the deadly clash between 
Guatemalan Special Forces and the LRA in the Garamba Park in 
DRC, which he said the UN had mishandled badly on the public 
relations level.  Press reporting and UN statements had 
focused on PKO losses, not the twenty LRA killed, and press 
portrayed the incident as a UN defeat.  The outcome could 
have been much worse.  Ellory understood that the operation 
had started as a reconnaissance in force that had either been 
leaked by someone, or else had been the product of a contact 
with what the UN troops thought was a small force they could 
take down, only to find themselves surrounded by a large 
concentration of LRA in heavy undergrowth.  Whatever the 
circumstances, he expected a more cautious approach by the UN 
for the immediate future. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000545  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Ellory said that he did not believe that the LRA 
could be reformed easily.  They enjoyed their ability to take 
women and spoils at will and would not desist until they had 
been given a black eye.  He thought that a couple of 
successful search and destroy operation in Sudan would send 
the majority back across the border. 
 
¶8. (C) He said that attack helicopters were unsuitable for 
the dense terrain of the DRC, but they were perfect for the 
burnt dry season terrain of South Sudan.  If ground troops 
could flush out LRA units, gun ships could easily destroy 
them from the air.  He said that an ideal solution would be 
to use the UPDF units assisted by competent special force 
advisors to root out LRA pockets.  He noted that there were 
indications from his contacts back home that the UK 
government might be interested in such an approach.  He 
wondered what US thinking might be.  CG replied that to this 
point, to the best of his knowledge, no level of the various 
governmental layers in Sudan had requested such assistance. 
The sensitivities of such an approach were self-evident. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) A retired British brigadier who served in the elite 
Parachute Regiment, and who has been in both Sierra Leone and 
Iraq, Ellory is prone to looking for muscular solutions to 
security problems.  It is unclear if his comments were 
personal musings, or if they sprung from prior consultations. 
 Given the nature of the LRA, the possibilities of a 
negotiated solution seem limited.  The alternative, asking a 
war-weary and unpaid SPLA force to aggressively engage LRA 
fighters, also seems problematic. 
STEINFELD