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OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #2744/01 0610724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020724Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0386
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 9067
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0598
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL PGOV ID
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL FALLON'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER 
JUWONO SUDARSONO 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RAYMOND RICHHART.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  PACOM Commander Admiral Fallon February 23 
discussed with Indonesian Minister of Defense Juwono 
Sudarsono difficulties budget shortfalls caused for TNI's 
ability to respond to "natural and man-made disasters" and 
the GOI's procurement focus on transportation assets, which 
could be employed for humanitarian as well as military 
purposes. Juwono warned of TNI's limited absorptive capacity 
and consequent need to focus U.S. assistance.  Admiral Fallon 
noted U.S. interest in concluding a Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA); Juwono was non-committal.  The PACOM 
Commander stressed to Juwono the importance the U.S. placed 
on maritime security in the region and told him that the U.S. 
was very interested in discretely supporting cooperation 
among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  End Summary. 
 
Sad State of the Defense Budget 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) PACOM Commander Admiral Fallon opened his meeting 
February 23 with Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono by 
stressing the mutual benefits of the recently normalized 
bilateral military relationship and sought Juwono's views on 
Indonesian defense priorities.  Juwono lamented the state of 
the defense budget and how shortfalls restricted the 
priorities he could set.  TNI's budget this year was $2.4 
billion, which represented only 49 percent of the $5.6 
billion he believed necessary to properly fund TNI at the 
minimum level.  Of the budgeted amount, 70 percent was for 
personnel and basic maintenance of facilities and materiel. 
Because of budget shortfalls, the Army was at 70 percent 
readiness and the Navy and Air Force at 40 percent readiness. 
 He expected that for the next five to ten years TNI would 
experience difficulty responding to natural and man-made 
disasters, adding that the potential for local conflicts in 
Indonesia remained.  He noted that of TNI's 100 battalions, 
only one was a medical unit.  PACOM's donation in January of 
a fleet hospital, therefore, represented a particularly 
welcome augmentation of capacity. 
 
¶3.  (C) Admiral Fallon replied that the hospital donation was 
a "good place to start" because it added capacity for 
disaster assistance and would boost morale in TNI's own ranks 
because it gives TNI the capability to care for its injured 
and wounded.  He noted that the U.S. could do much to assist 
TNI and asked about GOI's priorities for TNI.  He explained 
that FMF had a normal lead-time of three years and would 
require time to reach increased levels, although his Command 
and the Embassy had sought ways to accelerate the process. 
 
Procurement Focus on Transport 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Juwono, referencing the "triangle" of procurement 
options -- strike force, transport and supplies -- said that 
the GOI would focus on transport, in particular ships and 
airplanes.  Indonesia would not have the money to upgrade its 
"strike force" by purchasing fighters and refurbishing its 
submarines.  Admiral Fallon noted this matched the U.S. 
assessment, and that he understood TNI's budget constraints. 
The Admiral asked the status of TNI's businesses.  Joewono 
responded that "not much is left of TNI businesses," many of 
which had collapsed during the past five years, he said, in 
part because of competition from privately owned firms. 
Juwono stated that an interagency group, with participation 
by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry 
of Law and Human Rights, was evaluating the military 
businesses.  Juwono said that of the 219 identified TNI 
businesses -- full-fledged businesses, cooperatives and 
foundations -- only 6 or 7 were viable enterprises. 
 
¶5.  (C) Admiral Fallon discussed the importance of basic 
security and stability to the democratic process.  Juwono 
agreed and noted that for the next ten years TNI would be one 
of the most important "delivery systems" to provide 
government services.  TNI would emphasize Air Force C-130s 
and Navy LST craft, which were appropriate both for disaster 
response as well as military purposes.  The "ability to do 
good things" remained important for TNI's role in Indonesia. 
Admiral Fallon noted that the U.S., too, was changing its 
doctrine and strategy to emphasize smaller vessels for 
 
JAKARTA 00002744  002 OF 003 
 
 
littoral operations, changes that were especially relevant to 
Southeast Asia.  He said that PACFLT Commander Roughead would 
visit soon to gain a better understanding of Indonesia's 
needs. 
 
Training for Non-Commissioned Officers 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Explaining that the U.S. had found that well-trained 
non-commissioned officers allowed U.S. forces to do more with 
fewer people, Admiral Fallon introduced USMC Sergeant Major 
Bill Kinney, PACOM Senior Enlisted Leader, and offered that 
the U.S. could work with Indonesia to identify training 
programs for senior enlisted personnel.  He suggested that 
training with U.S. and Indonesian NCOs side-by-side had a 
very high potential payoff.  Juwono noted that U.S. Navy 
Seals currently were conducting training in a JCET.  Admiral 
Fallon responded that the U.S. planned to continue training 
to assist Indonesia to develop its capability to secure the 
sea routes exploited by terrorists and criminals. 
 
Limited Indonesian Absorptive Capacity 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Juwono stressed to Admiral Fallon that U.S. 
assistance should be selective, because outside help could 
overwhelm Indonesia and become counterproductive.  Admiral 
Fallon agreed that the U.S. would be sensitive to this 
concern, noting that the U.S. wanted to make available 
programs the TNI could readily absorb.  He added that he 
would give appropriate guidance to his component commanders 
who were primarily responsible for the conduct of US training 
and exercise programs.  Juwono observed that not many 
Americans realize how influential their country has become 
and how overwhelming it can be, adding that the U.S. military 
budget is larger than those of the next fifteen combined. 
 
Indonesian Peacekeeping Force 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador asked Juwono for details behind 
reports that Indonesia had plans to increase its peacekeeping 
capacity.  Juwono said that Indonesia had undertaken 
peacekeeping assignments since 1956 and Indonesian troops had 
performed very well.  Indonesia had done well in Cambodia and 
the GOI now wanted to build on this experience.  The 
Ambassador noted that in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. had 
found it lacked lightly armed gendarme forces to help 
maintain order, and that this might be an area in which 
Indonesia could contribute.  Juwono indicated that Indonesia 
could consider fielding such forces, as long as it did so 
under UN auspices.  He did not rule out a future deployment 
to Afghanistan with international forces. 
 
Status of Forces Agreement 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Admiral Fallon told the Minister that the U.S. was 
interested in concluding both a Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) and an Article 98 Agreement with Indonesia, and asked 
whether the Department of Defense would have responsibility 
for the negotiation of these.  Juwono replied that the 
Department of Foreign Affairs was responsible for negotiating 
an Article 98 Agreement.  Ambassador Pascoe reminded Juwono 
that the U.S. and Indonesian had quickly concluded a 
confidential SOFA to facilitate tsunami relief efforts by 
 
SIPDIS 
U.S. forces, and urged that action be taken to being talks on 
a permanent SOFA. 
 
Importance of Maritime Security Efforts 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Admiral Fallon stressed to Juwono the importance the 
U.S. placed on maritime security in the region and told him 
that the U.S. was very interested to support discretely 
cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  He 
added that the U.S. was pleased with the coastal surveillance 
radar Indonesia planed to install, noting that this would be 
a "good foundation to build and expand on" for future 
cooperation.  He reiterated that maritime security was a high 
U.S. interest.  Juwono replied that that "the big problem is 
equipment," adding that this was not so much a problem of 
surveillance as the ability to respond.  The Ambassador noted 
 
JAKARTA 00002744  003 OF 003 
 
 
that the U.S. ICITAP program would provide training and boats 
for the Marine Police, which would provide some pursuit 
capacity. 
 
¶11.  (U) Admiral Fallon has cleared this message. 
PASCOE