VZCZCXRO8863
PP RUEHIHL
DE RUEHIHL #0039/01 0651050
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061050Z MAR 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0568
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0553
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0616

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, AND DS/ITA 
BAGHDAD FOR MGT, RSO,  AND NCT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/6/2016 
TAGS: ASEC AEMR AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: MEETING OF REO AL-HILLAH EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE (EAC) 
 
REF: 05 AL-HILLAH 0301 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department 
of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (c), (g) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  The REO Al-Hillah EAC was convened on 1 March 
¶2006.  It was chaired by the Regional Coordinator, and in 
attendance were representatives from RSO, POL, PRT, USAID, KBR, 
and ORA.  The REOs US Army LNO and the 2/4 BCT S-9 were also 
present, and advised on the posture of Coalition forces in the 
region.  This meeting was called after REO management learned of 
an impending closure of FOB Charlie in Al-Hillah.  The scheduled 
date for full removal of Coalition forces is currently set at 31 
May, despite the concerns previously forwarded in the reference. 
 The reference, dated 19 October 2005, set forth an EAC 
assessment of the impact FOB Charlie's closure will have on the 
REO's operations.  The EAC reviewed the ramifications of the 
newly revised closure plan, focusing on the security 
requirements necessary to maintain the REO's existing location 
and operational posture.  A summary of the findings is set forth 
herein.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Details:  REO Al-Hillah was established in close 
proximity to FOB Charlie out of necessity, with the FOB 
providing the REO with essential security and logistical 
services.  The operational environment in the South Central 
region remains non-permissive, and this necessity remains. 
Because the FOB's proposed closure is due to circumstances 
beyond the control of the REO, the continuation of REO 
operations is fully contingent on the future provision of those 
services currently fulfilled by FOB Charlie.  This reality 
exists regardless of existing FOB closure plans.  As previously 
stated in the reference, REO Al-Hillah's future viability will 
depend on the continuation or replacement of the essential 
security functions that the FOB provides to our diplomatic 
activities such as QRF, safehaven, and an active presence in our 
vicinity, in addition to basic logistical services.  It should 
also be noted that the other three REOs in Iraq are either 
located on or adjacent to Coalition bases, for good reason.  A 
closure of FOB Charlie would put REO Al-Hillah in a uniquely 
vulnerable position, further exacerbated by the absence of an 
improvement in key facets of the security environment in South 
Central Iraq.  Particularly noteworthy is the fact that one of 
the most active combat zones in Iraq is located in Northern 
Babil Province, a mere 20 miles from Al-Hillah. 
 
¶3. (C)  The presence of a Coalition base alongside the REO has 
been continuous to date, and the EAC believes that its 
stabilizing effect on the area has been critical.  Both its 
function as a deterrent to hostile activity in the area, and the 
defense in depth provided by Coalition combat patrols operating 
out of the FOB are essential elements to the REO's current 
security posture.  Without active patrolling in our AO, 
chokepoints, key intersections, and MSRs can become easy targets 
for IED emplacement.  Hostile forces could operate in the 
vicinity with virtual impunity, especially during the hours of 
darkness.  The IED threat in this region is also well 
documented, and the REO's operational tempo remains high. 
Overland travel is a necessity in the absence of dedicated air 
assets, and choice of routes to and from the provinces is very 
limited.  Existing combat patrols also clearly deserve much of 
the credit for the infrequency and abbreviated nature of 
indirect fire attacks conducted against the REO to date. 
Without fear of immediate reprisal, these attacks could become 
extended in nature, with observers located on vantage points 
around the REO adjusting fire onto key locations of the compound. 
 
¶4. (C)  The REO's small footprint makes the requirement for a 
QRF a fundamental one in the existing threat environment. 
Potential external threats to the compound are numerous, and the 
current 5 - 15 minute response capability provided by the US 
Army Armored Cavalry Squadron currently stationed at FOB C is 
critical.  Without this external capability, worst case 
scenarios could include both points of egress from the compound 
being sealed off by outside forces, or external direct or 
indirect fire attacks continuing unabated.  Historical examples 
in both Najaf and Al-Kut (CPA facilities) demonstrate how a 
rapidly deteriorating security situation can leave a small 
facility isolated and untenable.  Even if FOB Charlie was turned 
over to the ISF, an accessible safehaven for REO personnel would 
cease to exist if these forces lost control of a deteriorating 
situation or became unwilling to fight.  The size of the REO 
compound and correspondingly few landing zones dictate that an 
air evacuation would take an inordinate amount of time and 
successive sorties.  This leaves overland evacuation as the only 
option in the event a short-fuzed drawdown of the REO becomes 
required.  Such an action would be impossible without a 
Coalition FOB in the area, especially given existing limitations 
 
HILLAH 00000039  002 OF 003 
 
 
on vehicular resources at the REO.  Even with a reaction force 
on 24-hour standby, the most optimistic estimate on moving a 
HMMWV-mobile unit from the next closest military installation 
(FOB Kalsu) during hours of darkness would be 45 minutes. 
 
¶5. (S)  The proliferation and strengthening of armed militias in 
South Central Iraq poses  potentially serious consequences. 
Although the US Army MSC at FOB Charlie assesses the Iraqi 
Police and Iraqi National Guard in Al-Hillah as the most capable 
forces of their kind in the South Central region, the REO EAC 
remains concerned because historically, Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) throughout the region have displayed an inability or an 
unwillingness to consistently confront armed militia groups. 
Compounding this issue, most Police forces in the region are now 
thoroughly penetrated by those seeking to further the influence 
of religious parties and militias, such as JAM and Badr Corps. 
Al-Hillah remains the only major city in the area with a police 
force that cannot be considered corrupted by outside influences, 
due in no small part to the leadership of General Qaise Hamsa. 
An ongoing and concerted effort by the Babil Provincial Council 
to remove General Qaise continues, for this very reason, and it 
is highly improbable that he will be able to retain his position 
indefinitely.  The Babil Governor also recently initiated an 
attempt to move the Hillah SWAT team to Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) control.  The US Army MSC in the area assesses this as an 
attempt to relocate this effective and independent unit to 
another area, at which time the Governor would backfill the unit 
with personnel loyal to him and SCIRI; the Governor's 
pro-Iranian inclinations are well documented.  Factors such as 
these combine to cast serious doubt on the future viability and 
effectiveness of the Iraqi Police in the area.  With the closure 
of FOB Charlie, the local police force will no longer have the 
benefit of backup and moral support afforded by Coalition Forces 
stationed in the area. 
 
¶6. (S)  The expansion of Iranian influence throughout the South 
Central region also carries with it dangerous implications that 
should not be ignored.  DS/ITA recently forwarded an 
intelligence report, dated 3/3/06, confirming widespread arming 
of Mahdi Militia (JAM) members by the Iranian government.  This 
is only the latest addition to the ever-increasing compilation 
of anecdotal and actual evidence, pointing to hostile Iranian 
activity in the South of Iraq.  The effective use of surrogates 
by Iran is well documented, especially in the case of Hezbollah 
in Lebanon and elsewhere; the danger posed by a similar scenario 
could have wider implications to US diplomatic activities in the 
region if US-Iranian relations further deteriorate over the 
looming nuclear crisis.  Intelligence reporting indicates that 
JAM has threatened to attack US interests if the US undertakes 
actions to curb Iran's nuclear program. 
 
¶7. (C)  REO management was recently informed of a proposal to 
base approximately 120 military personnel on the REO, in an 
attempt to counter-balance the removal of Coalition forces from 
FOB Charlie.  It has been proposed that these troops would be 
dedicated to training and mentoring Iraqi Police and military 
units, and would not act as a dedicated security force for the 
compound.  The EAC believes that although this plus up in combat 
capable personnel could theoretically augment the capacity to 
blunt some forms of hostile action directed at the REO for a 
longer period of time, it does replace the capabilities provided 
by a local QRF.  Because of the small size of the REO compound, 
a collocated military force could be rendered only marginally 
effective or ineffective by virtue of proximity to a security 
incident or hostile action directed at the REO compound. 
Examples of this would be concentrated indirect fire along the 
compound's axis or coordinated attacks at the compound's two 
egress points, both of which could require intervention from 
outside the compound.  The 120 additional personnel could help 
to provide a marginal presence in the Al-Hillah area through 
joint combat patrols with ISF counterparts.  It must also be 
realized however, that this would represent a significant 
reduction in the current capacity, because to date this function 
has been carried out by a battalion-sized Coalition force. 
Operation of military forces off the REO will also raise the 
profile of the compound, making it not only a diplomatic 
facility but by some measure a military installation as well. 
This could possibly lead to increased targeting of the REO by 
hostile elements. 
 
¶8. (C)  The proposed basing of troops on the REO also poses 
certain logistical problems.  First and foremost, little usable 
space remains on the compound.  The one open area not currently 
dedicated is overlooked by a vehicle overpass; to date this area 
has been deemed unsuitable for housing COM personnel, for this 
very reason.  A survey by MNFI force protection experts would be 
required to determine if this area could be made usable to 
billet MNFI personnel through emplacement of 20 foot T-walls or 
similar defensive items.  Additionally, space constraints 
dictate that the REO is unable to accommodate a large increase 
 
HILLAH 00000039  003 OF 003 
 
 
in personnel in the current configuration.  Due to an influx of 
personnel for the PRT, there are currently no additional 
billeting spaces available.  Should the decision be made to add 
personnel and vehicles to the REO, the following must be taken 
into consideration: 
 
-       Additional office and billeting space would have to be 
made available, in amounts proportionate to any planned increase 
in REO occupancy. 
-       Parking for additional vehicles is virtually non-existent. 
 
-       No maintenance ability for military vehicles exists at the 
REO. 
-       TO-100 would have to be modified to support the increase 
in personnel.  Depending on the number of personnel, additional 
support facilities would have to be constructed (DFAC, laundry, 
etc.) 
 
The current FRAGO with the 1/10 Cavalry based at Camp Charlie 
provides escort for all PWC (food) and equipment delivered to 
the REO.  Loss of this support would necessitate implementing 
another FRAGO to provide bi-weekly escort to and from Scania or 
another location, to include immediate escort return, due to a 
lack of parking on the compound for extended stays of 
semi-trucks/trailers.  FRAGO would also have to include 
provision for outgoing mail and financial service support/escort 
on a bi-monthly basis. 
 
¶9. (U)  REO Al-Hillah can facilitate an agreement with 
landowners for space on the REO compound, in the event the 
security concerns for the location next to the overpass could be 
addressed.  Past experience dictates however, that the time line 
being considered for construction of the proposed camp to house 
the additional troops is overly optimistic.  As there are no 
other billeting options available at the REO, a more realistic 
schedule for FOB Charlie's closure would need to be considered. 
 
¶10. (C)  While the EAC believes the relocation of 120 troops to 
the REO compound is preferable to a complete withdrawal of all 
Coalition forces in the area, this concept does not truly 
address the problem at hand.  The previously discussed factors 
combine to make it problematic at best, and its implementation 
would be accompanied by the automatic assumption of a 
significant amount of increased risk.  Moving the REO to 
collocate with Coalition Forces at another FOB in the region is 
an option that could potentially be viable, in spite of the fact 
that the closest such installation to FOB Charlie is FOB Duke - 
also slated for closure in the near future. 
 
¶11. (C)  Conclusion:  To date, local Coalition Forces have 
facilitated the conduct of diplomacy in the midst of a war zone, 
with a minimum margin of safety, by fulfilling the critical 
functions outlined above.  The EAC is unanimous in its belief 
that in order for the REO to truly operate safely in the current 
threat environment, Coalition Forces at their current level 
should remain in close proximity to the REO to provide the 
necessary continuing presence, as well as QRF and safe haven 
functions.  In the absence of a distinct improvement in the 
security situation in South Central Iraq, any exception to this 
standard would automatically entail a proportionate increase in 
the risk posed to our operations.  All EAC members also believe 
that a full reliance on Iraqi security forces at the present 
time poses an unacceptable level of risk to US civilian 
personnel at the REO.  REO Al-Hillah would "find out the hard 
way" if local ISF were not up to the task, and the consequence 
could be nothing less than needless loss of lives.  If 
maintaining diplomatic engagement in South Central Iraq is to 
remain a USG priority, then appropriately providing for the safe 
conduct of this activity should be a concurrent and equally 
important USG priority.  The importance of this tenant is 
underscored because USG engagement has recently been expanded 
with the activation of the Babil Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT).  The overall success or failure of this initiative (to 
include planned PRTs dedicated to Karbala and Najaf, with 
proposed future collocation at REO Al-Hillah in some cases) will 
be heavily dependent on the nature of the local security 
environment.  The Al-Hillah EAC believes that MNFI base closure 
plans should be adjusted to reflect this reality, and to support 
the broader USG agenda in this region. 
FONTENEAU