VZCZCXRO0273
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0683/01 0830842
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240842Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1224
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0774
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/APEC COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HANOI 000683 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL APEC ASEAN CH VM
 
SUBJECT: VIETNAM FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS ON CHINA, THE UNITED 
STATES AND ASIAN REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
 
REF: Hanoi 670 
 
HANOI 00000683  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  During a frank discussion with visiting 
Deputy NIO Terrence Markin and Poloff, senior officials at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Institute for International 
Relations (IIR) encouraged the United States to stay closely 
engaged in Southeast Asia, but avoid making Southeast Asian 
states uncomfortable; to participate in and shape regional 
architecture institutions, but not insist on membership in 
geographically restricted forums; to address the issue of 
China's gains at U.S. expense, but not focus too much on 
China; and, to involve itself in Southeast Asia's 
development and evolution, but stay out of politics.  The 
mixed messages, delivered by some of Vietnam's top thinkers 
on foreign policy, reflected Vietnam's ambivalence and 
uncertainty about the role of the United States in the 
region. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary, cont'd:  The officials grudgingly agreed 
that continued (and deepened) U.S. involvement in Southeast 
Asia is beneficial for regional stability and economic 
development.  U.S. involvement also acts as a comforting 
balance to the rise of Chinese influence, which they also 
agreed was a cause for worry and concern for Southeast Asia 
in general and Vietnam in particular.  The experts expressed 
a desire for the reform of regional architecture 
institutions and for ASEAN to become a stronger and more 
coherent institution.  The IIR Deputy Director General also 
expressed a surprisingly positive and progressive view of 
the political developments in Thailand and the Philippines, 
in contrast to recent statements by other GVN officials 
(reftel) who have cited events in Bangkok and Manila as 
examples of dangerous instability.  End Summary. 
 
The Event 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Visiting Deputy National Intelligence Officer for 
East Asia Terrence Markin, accompanied by Poloff, spent two 
hours at the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Institute 
for International Relations participating in a roundtable 
discussion of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and Asian 
regional architecture at the IIR headquarters in Hanoi.  The 
IIR participants (who all have advanced degrees from U.S. 
institutions) included Deputy Director General and Director 
of Research Dr. Hoang Anh Tuan, Director of the Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies Dr. Luan Thuy Duong, Duong's deputy 
Dang Cam Tu, Deputy Director of the Center for European and 
American Studies Ta Minh Tuan and senior researcher Pham 
Ngoc Uyen.  All of the participants participated 
enthusiastically in the discussion. 
 
The Venue: IIR 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Institute is Vietnam's premier degree-granting 
international affairs university, diplomatic training 
institution, think tank, research center and publishing 
house all combined into a single entity.  IIR researchers 
and officials prepare classified policy analyses and teach 
classes; they also attend international academic and foreign 
policy conferences and publish books and articles.  IIR 
publishes a foreign affairs weekly magazine called 
"International Weekly."  The IIR Director General is a 
senior diplomat; the current DG, Ambassador Trinh Quang 
Thanh, has just been named the next Ambassador to Sweden. 
IIR officials have wider latitude to express their personal 
opinions and diverge from the official line than their 
colleagues at MFA headquarters.  However, they are insiders 
and for the most part echo official GVN policy. 
 
The Discussion 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Dr. Tuan said the United States' view of Southeast 
Asia is distorted by its historical experience and needs to 
be more "objective and accurate."  The United States sees 
Southeast Asian countries as economically backward, 
marginalized by China and occupied with issues of radical 
Islam.  In fact, Southeast Asia is one of the fastest- 
growing regions in the world economically despite the 
setbacks of the 1997 financial crisis.  Southeast Asia's 
future is promising, with long and stable (though delayed) 
development.  There is also a solid foundation for democracy 
and political development, as evidenced by the exercise of 
"people power" in Thailand and the Philippines.  Some in the 
region see recent events in these countries as troubling, 
and others see them as evidence of strong political growth 
 
HANOI 00000683  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
and increasing political participation by the population, 
Tuan said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In response to Poloff's observation that others in 
the GVN have told the Embassy that events in Thailand and 
the Philippines are object lessons in why Vietnam should be 
wary of democratic political development, Dr. Tuan grimaced 
and commented that "there are different opinions within the 
Government."  Vietnam's lesson from the developments in the 
Philippines and Thailand is that the Government needs to pay 
close attention to the issues and concerns that are 
important to the people, Dr. Tuan stated.  The process of 
globalization and improved communications technology means 
that it is easy for citizens to detect inconsistency between 
the words and actions of their governments, and then 
immediately spread discontent. 
 
China 
----- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The IIR officials exhibited a common Vietnamese 
contradiction:  chiding the United States for excessive 
focus on China, then virtually obsessing about China's 
expanding influence and potential threat.  Dr. Tuan, noting 
the United States needs to understand the situation in 
Southeast Asia vis-a-vis China, said Southeast Asia is seen 
as a region that can be used to help contain China at a time 
when a rising number of Americans see China as a threat.  If 
those trends continue, the United States may try to "get 
Southeast Asia on its side" against China, which would be a 
distortion of the actual situation.  Vietnam will not join 
the United States in the "China containment game" and will 
not join China against the United States, he declared. 
Vietnam wants the maximum possible big-power engagement in 
Southeast Asia to maximize stability. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The United States is losing its position and 
failing to protect its interests in the region compared with 
China, Dr. Tuan continued.  Chinese interests, meanwhile, 
are expanding quickly.  To strengthen the U.S. position in 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN wants to see a stronger linkage 
between USG statements of policy and action; that means more 
economic involvement, more encouragement of market economies 
and more direct investment.  Vietnam's WTO entry is an 
excellent test case:  the United States should support it 
and not hold out and force Vietnam into a bad position.  He 
warned that Vietnamese leaders and opinion makers compare 
the deal the United States struck with China on WTO with the 
Vietnam negotiations and see that the United States is 
actually being harder on Vietnam, sometimes blaming U.S. 
intransigence on "Vietnam Syndrome" whereby Americans cannot 
get over the war.  The experts understand that the issues in 
question are actually technical and economic rather than 
political, but domestic political calculations and 
perceptions result in the United States being seen in a bad 
light. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Researcher Pham Ngoc Uyen said that hosting APEC 
and the visit of President Bush will be very good for 
Vietnam and for the U.S. image in Southeast Asia.  The 
Secretary of State's failure to attend the ASEAN Regional 
 
SIPDIS 
Forum ministerial in Vientiane in 2005 was "very damaging" 
to the United States in Southeast Asia and resulted in a 
brief downturn in relations.  This was followed by the 
United States not being invited to participate in the East 
Asia Summit, which further fortified the notion that the 
United States is insufficiently involved in the area. 
Meanwhile, China is "harvesting a good crop" at the United 
States' expense in the form of economic cooperation, 
cultural exchanges and institution-level relations.  This is 
not in Southeast Asia's best interests, because greater 
commitment of big powers in Southeast Asia should not be 
zero-sum, with China filling gaps the United States leaves 
behind; instead, both sides should contribute to regional 
stability by increasing their involvement in the region, 
Uyen said. 
 
How to Engage with Southeast Asia 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Vietnam and Southeast Asia are fighting the side 
effects of globalization, Uyen continued, and in this there 
are high expectations of the United States.  President Bush 
should use his visit to Vietnam to declare that the United 
States will increase its commitment to reducing the earning 
gap between rich and poor, and to eradicating poverty.  He 
should strengthen the United States' support for ASEAN 
institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum and the 
 
HANOI 00000683  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Post Ministerial Conference.  He should also extend the U.S. 
commitment to fighting diseases such as HIV/AIDS and AI and 
should lay out a plan for technology transfer, especially to 
poor countries. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In addition to these positive steps, the President 
should also speak softly on human rights and democracy, and 
recognize that there are diverse cultures in the region, 
both in terms of society and political development, that 
require careful handling, the senior researcher said.  Even 
in Burma, the United States should not pressure the 
government or ASEAN.  ASEAN is already working on promoting 
positive change in Burma; referring the situation to the UN 
Security Council would be counterproductive and opposed by 
ASEAN countries.  In addition, China would certainly veto 
any action. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Overall, Uyen concluded, the United States has a 
range of interests in Southeast Asia, including meeting the 
challenges and opportunities provided by China; taking 
advantage of the benefits of greater economic ties; and, 
fulfilling the United States' role as a world leader.  In 
addition to these interests, there is also the fact that the 
U.S. presence in Southeast Asia deters the rise of Japanese 
militarism.  Finally, Southeast Asia is the second front of 
the War on Terrorism. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Luan Thi Duong, the Director of IIR's Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies, said that Vietnam sees the U.S. 
presence in Southeast Asia as a necessity given China's rise 
and the development of potential security "hotspots" in the 
region.  In addition, she said, Southeast Asia is a region 
in transition, with many countries in the midst of 
significant political development.  The United States has an 
interest in affecting the course of the transition and 
development, in particular by encouraging U.S. values.  The 
region is "building its community" through regional 
architecture, and the United States should be concerned 
about being excluded from that.  The United States' main 
challenge is to find a way to express and secure its 
interests without triggering a negative reaction from 
Southeast Asians.  In addressing that challenge, the United 
States should keep in mind that in Southeast Asia, the 
comparison of U.S. actions with Chinese actions is 
inevitable. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The United States, she said, pays too much 
attention to bilateral relations and alliances in the region 
and not enough attention to multilateral relations and the 
maintenance of U.S. interests.  The U.S. focus on Thailand 
and the Philippines provokes China into trying to generate 
its own alliances with Burma, Cambodia and Laos, and even 
possibly with Vietnam.  This is negative for stability and 
does not contribute much to China or the United States. 
China, she said, is better at building comprehensive 
relations with ASEAN as a unit and is pursuing ambitious 
goals like a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and some kind of 
China-ASEAN security agreement, including China-ASEAN 
multilateral security exercises.  The United States can 
counter this in the short term by broadening its security 
focus and diversifying from its concentration on 
counterterrorism to address all nontraditional security 
threats.  However, in the long run, the country that focuses 
the most (and the most effectively) on economic development 
in the region will have the greatest influence. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Duong said Vietnam hopes that U.S.-Vietnam 
military and defense ties will expand and will be positive. 
Vietnam expects an exchange of information and cooperation. 
This, and expanded defense and military ties elsewhere in 
the region, will be good for stability and U.S. interests, 
assuming the United States can avoid provoking a negative 
Chinese reaction. 
 
More China Paranoia 
------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Deputy Director Tuan asked what the United States 
would do if China were to close off the Spratly Islands to 
international navigation, or to occupy them and deny other 
countries access to the area.  In the future, it is likely 
that the Chinese military will be the second most powerful 
in the world, he said.  Based on its own past experience 
with China, Vietnam is not optimistic for benign regional 
developments when China has ample power projection 
capability. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Uyen said China's "urge" is to expand its 
 
HANOI 00000683  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
influence.  To the north, east and southwest, China's 
expansion is strongly constrained.  The likely outlet for 
that expansionist urge is to the southeast, where individual 
states are relatively weak.  The developing capability of 
the Chinese navy exacerbates the worries of Southeast Asian 
states and this is why the region welcomes the U.S. 
presence, Uyen said.  Dr. Tuan agreed with this assessment, 
and noted that China has to do a lot more to convince its 
neighbors of its truly peaceful and innocent intentions. 
 
Regional Architecture 
--------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) According to Dr. Tuan, one current tactic for 
building stability in Asia is through the mechanism of a 
possible East Asian Community (EAC), a community that would 
have enormous economic potential.  Southeast Asia is anxious 
for China's participation in making this a reality.  China, 
however, may not be as enthusiastic.  In 2004, Dr. Tuan 
explained, Beijing was looking for ways to dominate the 
region in one way or another and saw the East Asian Summit 
(viewed as a possible precursor to the EAC) as a tool for 
that.  Some countries supported China's ambitions in this 
regard, and some opposed it by encouraging increasing 
involvement of other powers in the mechanism, including 
Australia, New Zealand and India.  Furious diplomatic 
maneuvering in an effort to "balance" China within the 
ASEAN+3 and by bringing in outsiders was effective, but it 
also made China less interested in the EAS. 
 
¶19. (SBU) It is clear that many countries, including the 
United States, do not truly appreciate the important role of 
an independent ASEAN in building a stable Asian community, 
Dr. Tuan said.  To be sure, he acknowledged, ASEAN may need 
to make some changes or else it will have deficiencies in 
the future.  A lack of unity is the main deficiency; a 
unified ASEAN would be Asia's second largest country, and 
that would ensure that ASEAN's voice is heard, he said 
wistfully. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Dr. Tuan noted that Asian regional architecture 
institutions have a great deal of overlap.  This overlap is 
inefficient, and the United States has an opportunity to 
reorganize or reorient Asian regional architecture 
institutions both to make the most of each institution and 
to improve the United States' role and standing in them. 
Regional institutions should return to their roots, Dr. Tuan 
said.  APEC, for example, was conceived as a forum to 
discuss trade, market liberalization, investment and 
economic development.  However, it evolved differently and 
its agenda expanded to include counterterrorism and 
security.  This expansion makes APEC a mess, he said; it is 
a very large waste of money with more than 100 meetings per 
year.  The ARF is sufficient to address security issues, and 
if the member states are not vigilant, the ARF could evolve 
into an economic forum as well.  The United States is 
persuasive in its argument for a linkage between economic 
issues and security in APEC, and it should be aware that the 
same linkage could be invoked in the other direction to 
justify expanding the ARF's mandate and diluting Asian 
institutions even further. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Vietnam, he continued, is experiencing serious 
"meeting fatigue."  Principal Vice Foreign Minister Le Cong 
Phung "at this point does nothing at all but attend regional 
meetings," Dr. Tuan said; in total, Vietnam has counted over 
700 ASEAN, APEC, EAS, ARF and other regional institution 
meetings to which it has to send representatives every year, 
consuming huge human and financial resources.  If the United 
States decides to take the lead in reforming and 
rationalizing these institutions, it can count on strong 
support from Vietnam, he said. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Dr. Tuan expanded a bit on his recommendations for 
a U.S. role in East Asian regional architecture. Ultimately, 
he said, any successful regional architecture has to be 
based on strong economic cooperation.  An East Asia Free 
Trade Area (EAFTA) will have to be the prerequisite for an 
East Asian Community, and ASEAN+3 should be the foundation 
of the EAFTA.  To make this happen, the states of Southeast 
Asia need to demonstrate more cohesiveness, a fact which is 
driving the 2020 ASEAN goals, particularly with regard to 
the ASEAN security community, the ASEAN economic community 
and the ASEAN cultural and social community.  The United 
States needs to evaluate its proper role carefully; it is an 
important part of the Asia-Pacific region, but it is not an 
East Asian power and has no more place in an East Asian 
organization than it does in the European Union.  The United 
 
HANOI 00000683  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
States is best suited to influence the region through 
engagement on specific issues, not through direct 
participation in its organizations. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Dr. Duong noted that ASEAN is often compared to 
(and often compares itself to) the EU, but this is an 
inaccurate comparison.  The EU members all focus primarily 
on the EU, while ASEAN members have multiple communities and 
institutions in which to participate.  The EU has a legally 
binding rule structure, while East Asian institutions are 
based on the principles of equality and noninterference, and 
are all nonbinding.  "We exist together in peace, stability 
and cooperation, without rules," Duong said.  ASEAN is now 
working on formalizing the organization through the ASEAN 
Charter.  There are many drafts and concepts under 
consideration for the ASEAN Charter, but none of them 
contains binding precepts.  Individual countries are truly 
independent, consistent with the nature of the region.  It 
is impossible to imagine any Asian community evolving into 
an EU-like structure, she declared. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Uyen hedged Duong's statement a bit, saying that 
an EU-like arrangement for Asia would be "desirable," but 
not possible in the immediate future.  In the medium term, 
he said, it could be possible, but Asia must first move 
beyond the existing system of top-down political states that 
concentrate decision-making in the leadership.  Dang Cam Tu, 
the deputy director of the Southeast Asia Center, opined 
that overlapping regional architecture structures and 
communities in East Asia are "mutually reinforcing." 
Vietnam supports "open regionalism," but is sensitive to the 
fact that the larger the core group, the more difficult the 
process is.  ASEAN+3 is a good basis to build on, he said, 
but it has some fundamental problems, namely: 
 
- The China-Japan antagonism undermines the unity of the 
ASEAN+3 grouping; 
- Maintaining ASEAN's key role in any regional architecture 
structure or process is difficult because of the lack of 
cohesion within ASEAN itself; and, 
- China, the heavyweight in the grouping, lacks enthusiasm 
for Southeast Asia-centered regional groupings and 
especially the EAC after what it perceives as a failure in 
its effort to build the EAS to its specifications last year. 
 
¶25. (SBU) With this in mind, Tu said, the United States 
should strive to handle its relations with Japan in a way 
that does not exacerbate China-Japan tensions, and support 
relations with ASEAN as a whole, rather than focus on 
bilateral relationships, in order to strengthen ASEAN 
cohesion.  The United States should also avoid the 
impression the community-building process is designed to 
counter China. 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) Vietnam's highest priority national interests were 
on display at this roundtable meeting:  a strong ASEAN, 
rapid economic development and enough U.S. presence in the 
region to provide some degree of security against a "rising" 
China that might challenge Vietnam's cherished independence. 
The discussion also demonstrated Vietnam's concern about 
U.S. intentions:  the GVN wants the benefits of U.S. 
involvement in Southeast Asia, but does not like U.S. 
interference in Vietnam's political development and wants to 
see a firm Southeast Asia identity established that keeps 
the United States engaged but on the outside.  We found this 
dialogue with some of Vietnam's foremost foreign policy 
experts from an influential institution within the GVN 
remarkable for the range of opinions expressed and the 
obvious intellectual freedom the participants enjoy.  IIR 
continues to be an excellent source of insight and a channel 
of communication to improve mutual understanding.  End 
Comment. 
 
MARINE