This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CAR 
WHA/OAS 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM KCRM GY
SUBJECT: EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS 
 
REF: A. GEORGETOWN 224 
 
     ¶B. GEORGETOWN 205 
     ¶C. GEORGETOWN 181 
     ¶D. GEORGETOWN 167 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen 
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Members of the Private Sector Commission 
(PSC) met with donors March 8 and 10 to discuss their deep 
concerns about preparations for Guyana's upcoming elections, 
the deteriorating security situation, and the disturbing 
nexus between the two.  These Guyanese civil society figures 
are certain that the two major political parties (the ruling 
PPP/C and opposition PNC/R) have heavily armed groups at 
their disposal.  The PSC implored the donors to intervene 
somehow to defuse the situation.  The donors demurred, 
reminding the PSC that it is primarily the Guyanese people's 
responsibility to resolve the country's political impasse. 
Separately, Ambassador met March 10 with Guyana Defence Force 
(GDF) Chief of Staff Edward Collins, who tried to dispel 
rumors of a coup plan by expressing his commitment to 
defending the state.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Private Sector Group Predicts Escalating Political Violence 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The PSC is an advocacy group of prominent business 
leaders (Guyana's wealthy and wise) that takes public stances 
on various issues - including governance and security 
matters.  It is as active a civil society organization as 
exists in Guyana, a fact that often puts it in the GoG's 
doghouse, given the GoG's instinctive aversion to unsolicited 
advice from outside the cabinet.  In addition to Ambassador, 
U.K., Canada, Brazil, EU, UNDP, IMF, and IDB Chiefs of 
Mission attended. 
 
¶3. (C) Norman McLean - Chairman of the PSC Subcommittee on 
Governance and Security, former Commissioner of Police, and 
former head of the GDF - told donors he believes that the 
recent paramilitary-style assault in Agricola and Eccles and 
the theft of thirty-three AK-47s and five Baretta pistols 
from a storehouse at GDF's headquarters (ref B) was an act of 
political violence.  McLean warned that the stolen weapons 
are intended for sinister purposes with national security 
repercussions, rather than "to help criminals rob people". 
PSC member Kit Nascimento sounded an even more ominous note, 
saying the assault bore the hallmarks of an insurrection and 
that the GoG is "on the verge of losing control" as criminal 
elements can take over the country "whenever they wish".  He 
argued that these criminal elements have now proven their 
ability to isolate Georgetown by blocking the city's southern 
approach (the East Bank Highway) at Agricola and its eastern 
approach (the East Coast Highway) at Buxton. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Opposition Thinks Election Delay Plays into its Hands 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (C) PSC vice-chairman Jerry Gouveia, referring to 
unspecified PSC sources, said that political motives were 
probably behind the weapons theft and Agricola/Eccles 
assault.  The implication is that the political opposition is 
willing to let militant factions employ violence to prevent 
elections.  Nascimento said the opposition leaders know they 
cannot win the national election at this time, but a delay 
will help them capitalize on the government's increasing 
difficulty in handling economic and security issues. 
 
¶5. (C) McLean and Gouveia both said opposition leader Robert 
Corbin felt that the PNC had blundered in its negotiations 
after the disputed 1997 and 2001 elections.  The PNC accepted 
the victorious PPP party's promise of constitutional reform 
too hastily in exchange for ending post-election unrest. 
Constitutional reform then failed because neither the PNC nor 
the PPP wanted real change.  The PNC under Desmond Hoyte 
thought that it could somehow win an election and so did not 
want to diminish executive powers.  Corbin does not want to 
make the same mistake again, so he is prepared to create 
"mayhem" in order to drive the PPP to the negotiating table 
and extract concessions giving the PNC greater involvement in 
Guyana's governance.  Note: It is hard to imagine the 
increasingly strident President Jagdeo conceding much 
executive power. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
GDF's Loyalty in Doubt; Ambassador Meets with Head of GDF 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The PSC leaders doubt that the GDF and GPF are "loyal 
to the state this time".  This long-held theory has gained 
traction in recent weeks.  The PPP government has always 
viewed the predominantly Afro-Guyanese uniformed services 
warily.  Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon 
shared this fear with Ambassador as recently as March 3 (ref 
A). 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador met with the GDF Chief of Staff, 
Brigadier-General Edward Collins, before the PSC meeting 
March 10.  Ambassador mentioned that he had heard rumors 
circulating of a possible coup plan involving former GDF 
officers.  Collins did not reveal any prior knowledge of 
these rumors, but he did assert the need to "preemptively 
destroy" any such threats while they are still at an 
embryonic stage.  He stated unequivocally that the GDF is 
part of the government, suggesting that any coup attempt 
would have to topple the GDF top brass first before it took 
on the political leadership.  Although Collins expressed his 
commitment to defending the state, his enthusiasm for 
President Jagdeo's leadership came across as lukewarm. 
Collins does not appreciate Jagdeo's overly personal style of 
running Guyana's affairs. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PSC Plea for Help and Donors' Response 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) After warning the donors how threatening the nexus 
between crime, violence, and political brinksmanship has 
become, the PSC leaders called on them to intervene.  The 
donors responded that they are each supporting Guyana's 
electoral process through bilateral channels.  However, the 
donors explained that they would not broker some sort of 
compromise between the GoG and the opposition through 
bilateral channels.  Rather, it is primarily the 
responsibility of the Guyanese people and influential 
segments of society (like the PSC) to drive changes in the 
country's ruptured political system.  The donors are wary of 
getting dragged too far into Guyana's political morass, 
setting themselves up to be scapegoats if the election 
process fails. 
 
¶9. (SBU) As an alternative solution, the donors raised the 
idea of appeasing the opposition through an OAS-brokered 
political pact on a post-election reform agenda - as proposed 
by OAS A/SYG Ramdin (ref D).  The PSC found the concept 
promising but thought it would require watertight guarantees 
from the international community to convince the opposition 
that the pact is not just a rehash of past deals.  This would 
require a credible threat of cutting off multilateral loans, 
and possibly even bilateral aid, to Guyana if the GoG does 
not fulfill its obligation under the pact. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) McLean, Nascimento, and Gouveia all had strong ties 
to the pre-1992 PNC regime.  Post is inclined to take their 
comments seriously because, as Nascimento himself put it, "we 
know how they think".  The PSC highlighted three key forces 
playing out in Guyana.  Heavily armed, well-organized groups 
are capable of conducting major operations with impunity and 
without interference from law enforcement.  The political 
opposition mistakenly believes that preventing elections and 
fueling unrest will help it gain power.  The armed criminal 
groups will take instructions from political interests as 
long as it suits them.  The donors were already aware of 
these issues to some degree, but hearing Guyana's "wise men" 
describe them so bluntly underscored how volatile this 
election year has become. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment continued: Home Affairs Minister Teixeira 
made a convincing case to Ambassador and DCM the evening of 
Friday March 10 that the Agricola murders were a targeted 
operation by "Fine Man"'s criminal organization against the 
Roger Khan organization, describing connections between the 
dead (or their family members) and Khan.  This does not 
change the above analysis.  A criminal organization was able 
to cut the link between the capital and the airport for 45 
minutes with impunity while conducting a search and destroy 
mission against an enemy organization.  While this may have 
been a criminal-directed rather than political-directed 
operation, it is widely perceived to be politically directed 
and certainly demonstrated to the public the expanding 
ability of criminal organizations to seize control from the 
state.  END COMMENT. 
BULLEN