VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDL #0277/01 0751720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161720Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6640
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 000277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD EUN YI MW SR BK BO IR
IZ, SU, CY, TU, EU, EI 
SUBJECT: PRE-GAERC RESPONSE: IRELAND NOT CONSIDERING BALKAN 
INCENTIVES OR IRAN SANCTIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 39905 
 
     ¶B. STATE 16987 
     ¶C. YOUNG-MOWREY E-MAIL OF MARCH 13 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jonathan Benton; Reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: On March 15, Post delivered ref A and B 
demarche points to Jim Kelly, Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA) EU Correspondent.  Regarding the Balkans, Kelly said 
that Member States would respect the electorate's chosen 
outcome in the Montenegrin referendum, but had not begun to 
develop incentives for Belgrade and Pristina in support of 
Kosovo's final status process.  On the Doha negotiations, the 
GOI doubted that the April deadline for defining modalities 
on manufactured and agricultural goods would be met.  Kelly 
cited the GOI,s continuing difficulties in identifying 
reconstruction projects to fund in Iraq amid continuing 
sectarian violence, and he noted that Ireland and Member 
States were not ready to consider national measures against 
Iran outside the EU-3 process.  Similarly, the GOI had not 
begun to consider the possibility of UNSC sanctions for 
Sudan.  Kelly was unfamiliar with the Commission's 
responsibilities for electricity generation in Liberia, but 
he highlighted Ireland's continuing strong interest in the 
country, with 430 Irish troops participating in UNMIL.  End 
summary. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Member States recognize the central role to be played 
by the EU in Kosovo after a political settlement, but have 
not yet begun to develop specific incentives for Belgrade and 
Pristina in support of the status talks, said Kelly. 
Planning for the EU presence in Kosovo following the status 
outcome, he noted, was already underway at the EU Council 
Secretariat level.  Kelly also recounted that UN Special 
 
SIPDIS 
Envoy Ahtisaari had positively assessed the status process at 
the March 10-11 Gymnich.  While Ahtisaari did not 
underestimate remaining challenges, he underscored that the 
Contact Group had instilled a sense of realism among the 
parties involved. 
 
Montenegro 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (C) With parameters now agreed for Montenegro's 
referendum, the EU is prepared to support any outcome chosen 
by the electorate, said Kelly.  He praised EU High 
Representative Lajcak's successful "high-wire act" in 
bringing all parties to agreement on the referendum's ground 
rules.  He added that the GOI, like the USG, regarded 
complaints about the possibility of a "gray zone" vote as 
counterproductive. 
 
Bosnia 
------ 
 
¶4. (C) Kelly recalled that Milosevic's March 11 death, 
tellingly, had no measurable impact on the Gymnich 
discussions between EU ministers and Balkan ministers the 
same day.  He observed that whereas five years ago such news 
would have disrupted the meeting, the Balkan interlocutors on 
March 11 continued along with discussion of workaday issues, 
such as visa facilitation.  The fact that so little was said 
about the death at the meeting reflected, for Kelly, the 
parties, focus on the future and their willingness to 
consign Milosevic to history. 
 
WTO 
--- 
 
¶5.  (C) On the WTO, Kelly referred emboff to Donal Kelly, DFA 
Deputy Director of EU External Relations, who reiterated 
familiar GOI comments that agriculture remained a sensitive 
sector for Ireland.  He noted that Ireland was nevertheless 
not a "one-issue" country and that the GOI hoped to see 
simultaneous progress on the agriculture, services, and NAMA 
components of the Doha negotiations.  Kelly cited a recent 
statement by Prime Minister Ahern expressing support for 
Agriculture Minister Coughlan's approach to the Doha talks. 
(Per ref C, Ahern's statement called for equal treatment of 
all forms of farm subsidies, "maximum protection" for Irish 
agricultural producers and exporters, and maintenance of the 
CAP reform limits.)  Kelly added his personal view that the 
April deadline for defining modalities on manufacture and 
agricultural goods would not be met, notwithstanding the EU's 
stated intention of working toward that goal.  He also said 
that the GAERC would probably not issue conclusions on the 
 
Doha negotiations. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶6.  (C) Ireland and Member States wish to continue to address 
the Iranian nuclear issue through the EU-3 process and are 
not at the stage of considering national measures against 
Tehran, according to Kelly.  Ireland, he elaborated, was 
content with current arrangements for the EU-3 to speak for 
Member States, an approach that proved effective in bringing 
Iran to the UNSC.  Kelly mentioned that Ireland and most 
Member States, however, favored a broader EU strategic 
engagement with Iran, to include interaction on Tehran's poor 
human rights record.  He also reiterated previous 
observations that DFA communication with the Iranian embassy 
in Dublin was complicated by the recall of the former Iranian 
ambassador for suspicious personal financial activities. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOI is pleased with the EU statement condemning 
the Samarra mosque bombing and will not make an independent 
statement, said Kelly.  In terms of Irish assistance to Iraq, 
he cited difficulties in disbursing the remaining half of a 
euro 3 million commitment to EU reconstruction efforts. 
Repeating comments in previous GAERC demarches, Kelly 
explained that continued sectarian violence complicated the 
GOI,s efforts to identify viable reconstruction projects for 
funding.  He added, however, that the violence underscored 
the need for long-term international support of the Iraqi 
government. 
 
Sudan 
----- 
 
¶8.  (C) The EU has invested heavily in the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and hopes to see the mission function 
effectively on the path to a UN re-hatting, according to 
Kelly.  The GOI understood that AMIS would continue for six 
months, with a subsequent re-hatting in the context of a 
settlement among the Abuja parties.  Regarding ref A's 
reference to targeted UNSC sanctions, Kelly said that the GOI 
had not begun to consider "where sanctions might fit into the 
process."  He predicted that the GAERC conclusions would 
include strong criticism of the Sudanese Government, but that 
the ministers, discussions might not encompass the sanctions 
option. 
 
Liberia 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Kelly said that he was unfamiliar with the 
Commission's responsibilities on electricity generation in 
Liberia, but he committed to forward this demarche point to 
Irish Aid (the new name for Development Cooperation Ireland, 
the development agency within DFA).  Kelly noted that Irish 
Aid could take up the issue with the European Development 
Fund Committee, which he believed was the locus of Commission 
development efforts on Liberia.  He pointed out that Ireland 
had strong interests in Liberia, with 430 Irish troops 
participating in UNMIL.  Regarding UNSYG Annan's recent 
request for Ireland to extend its participation to June 2007, 
Kelly pointed out that the mission had been previously 
extended and that Ireland would have to coordinate with 
Sweden, a UNMIL partner.  He also highlighted the risk of 
over-stretch, as Ireland was considering a possible UN 
mission in the Congo. 
 
Cyprus 
------ 
 
¶10.  (C) The Irish Government has not formed an official view 
on Turkey's January 24 proposal, besides welcoming the 
gesture, commented Kelly.  He said that Ireland and other 
Member States were focused on UNSYG Annan's reaction to the 
proposal, since, as noted in ref B points, the UN offered the 
most appropriate framework for resolution of the Cyprus 
dispute.  He added that the GOI had long supported Turkey's 
EU candidacy and now saw the Turkish proposal as the first 
evidence of the potential of the accession process for 
Turkish-Cypriot relations. 
 
 
BENTON