VZCZCXRO2779
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHDO #0465/01 0861348
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271348Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4564
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR KNNP QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S ROBERT JOSEPH'S VISIT TO DOHA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Doha is pleased to welcome you. You will find 
the Qatari foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani 
(HBJ), will be interested to meet you to further the nascent 
Strategic Dialogue put forth by Counselor Zelikow during his 
visit March 20-21. HBJ will be particularly interested in 
discussing Iran. He met with Ahmedi-Nejad in Tehran on 
January 23, where he gave the message that Qatar would not 
break ranks with other UN Security Council members on the 
nuclear issue. The Iranian Foreign Minister visited Doha on 
March 22. HBJ expressed complete agreement with Counselor 
Zelikow on the dangers Iran poses to the region. HBJ is 
familiar with some of the non-proliferation agreements you 
might raise; you should inquire when Qatar might ratify these 
agreements. Generally, he has indicated that an improved 
climate for the bilateral relationship is the key. Qatar is 
an invaluable ally for our military efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; on a wider range of issues, Qatar has staked a 
more independent path. It views its new seat on the UN 
Security Council with the optic of responsibility toward a 
range of developing world and Arab "clients." 
 
¶2. (U) The First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 
Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (addressed as Your Excellency or 
Mr. Minister), is the key decision-maker on the issues you 
plan to raise. In consultation with you, we will also request 
meetings with the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al 
Thani, and the Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces, Maj 
Gen Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah. We would also like to organize 
a media event, with either Al Jazeera or local and regional 
newspapers. The paragraphs that follow provide further 
background on key issues of interest. 
 
---------- 
Article 98 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) A/S Rademaker raised signing an Article 98 Agreement 
with the Assistant Minister for Follow-Up Affairs, Mohamed 
al-Rumaihy, during his visit in January. Rumaihy said that 
the matter is primarily handled on the military side and that 
the GOQ is reviewing the matter. When A/S Bloomfield met with 
HBJ in October 2004, the FM made clear that he would sign an 
agreement right after the U.S. declares Qatar a Major 
Non-NATO Ally. Qatar is already a much bigger ally than some 
countries that already have this designation; it would be 
worth probing DOD colleagues to determine current views on 
this issue as it pertains to Qatar. 
 
--- 
PSI 
--- 
 
¶4. (C) Also with al-Rumaihy, A/S Rademaker urged Qatar to 
endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles. Rumaihy 
said that at the time Qatar last considered PSI, there were 
no Arab states signed on. He requested a list of Arab and 
Asian supporters of PSI, which the Embassy subsequently 
provided. The Qataris have voiced no other objections to the 
initiative; you may be able to make progress on this here. 
 
--------------------------- 
Chemical Weapons Convention 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) From October 2004 through October 2005, the Qatari MFA 
was unresponsive to requests to discuss challenge 
inspections. Qatari authorities balked at meeting a CWC 
Challenge Inspections negotiating team from Washington last 
December, and a meeting request on this issue has been 
pending for over a month. If you have time to bring this 
issue up with the minister, we will be able to determine 
whether the problems are bureaucratic in nature or whether 
the Qataris are holding back for tactical reasons. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶6. (U) Traditional Qatari regional diplomacy seeks to keep 
lines open to all neighbors. Foreign Minister Manoucher 
Mokatti met the Amir in Doha on March 22; at a press 
opportunity, he defended Iran's right to pursue nuclear 
weapons and said the U.S. position does not have the support 
of the majority in the UN Security Council. HBJ met the 
Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmedi-Nejad, delivering a verbal 
message from the Qatari Amir, on Tehran January 23. Qatari 
official press reported that HBJ described, in a press 
conference, Qatari-Iranian relations as "good in the gas and 
oil sectors, especially in terms of the South Pars Field." 
(Note. This is the Iranian name for what Qataris call the 
North Field, the largest single gas field in the world and 
 
DOHA 00000465  002 OF 002 
 
 
shared by the two countries.) He said the two countries' gas 
agreement was a model for building "brotherly" relations. 
 
¶7. (C) In their meeting March 20, HBJ agreed strongly with 
Dr. Zelikow's analysis of Iran's revolutionary motivations 
and goals, noting Iran's active support for subversive 
elements in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and eastern Saudi Arabia. 
HBJ added that while the Iranian public does not support the 
regime's foreign policy goals writ large, the U.S. should not 
underestimate the degree of domestic support for the nuclear 
program based on a nationalistic agenda. 
 
¶8. (S) HBJ said the GCC is ready to come forward and 
coordinate on regional security. Qatar is working with 
neighbors, and meetings are happening that are not reported 
publicly. He believes that five GCC countries can get 
together at the ministerial level, including military 
representatives. Following these initial internal 
discussions, the group would meet with a U.S. representative, 
possibly at HBJ's London residence, and possibly within the 
next month. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶9. (S) Qatar has been a pillar of support for our efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue, for instance, to fly 
unimpeded combat missions out of Al-Udeid Air Base. The Amir 
shares our view that restoration of order and a successful 
democratic transition are of paramount importance not only to 
Iraq but to the region. However, there is some feeling that 
Qatar's efforts over the past two years are not fully 
appreciated in Washington. The Foreign Minister has promised 
the Ambassador recently that the GOQ would provide debt 
relief to Iraq "at the right time." While the Foreign 
Minister has expressed concerns of civil war in Iraq, he has 
stated publicly that the coalition needs to stay in the 
country to establish wider security. The GOQ also points to 
the importance of establishing a power structure in Baghdad 
that is fully inclusive of the Sunni bloc. 
 
¶10. (C) Qatar has evaluated creating a $5 billion bank to 
invest in - rather than grant money to - Iraq's industries, 
such as oil, gas, and agriculture. The GOQ had commissioned a 
study with the Bahrainis and Citibank; the Iraqi financial 
expert who has charge of the proposal, Nemir Kirdar of 
Investcorp, will be in New York shortly, and HBJ proposed 
that he travel to Washington to brief U.S. officials on the 
idea. 
 
---------- 
Al-Jazeera 
---------- 
 
¶11. (S) In his recent visit, Counselor Zelikow said that he 
had not traveled to Doha to discuss Al Jazeera and that the 
U.S. was ready to "turn the page" on the tenor of the 
relationship. Al Jazeera "creates an environment of 
legitimacy for terrorists and appears to lend credibility to 
their international call for attacks on US homeland and US 
interests in the Middle East," according to the DIA. However, 
the monitoring agency does not allege that Al Jazeera 
directly jeopardizes Americans. In response to our repeated 
protests and appeals, Al-Jazeera's management claims to have 
reduced the air time given to Al-Qaida and kidnappers' videos 
and have made efforts to address the inflammatory nature of 
its reporting from Iraq. In February, Al Jazeera's negative 
coverage of the U.S. in Iraq, as measured by DIA, stood at 
13%. The channel has stressed to us its coverage of 
pro-democracy movements in Lebanon and Egypt as well as 
broader coverage of Middle Eastern politics. The Al Jazeera 
managing director told the Ambassador, "If the Americans want 
to find a proper partner in its effort to get democracy and 
reform, they won't find a better one than Al Jazeera." 
 
---------------- 
Political Reform 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir 
after he assumed power in 1995, took a significant step 
forward last June when its first constitution came into 
force. The constitution calls for a two-thirds elected 
national legislature. These elections have not been scheduled 
but are expected to take place sometime in early 2007. Qatari 
women will have the right to vote and will be encouraged by 
the government to run for office. In municipal elections in 
1999 and 2003, women here were the first in the Gulf region 
to cast votes, and one woman was elected to the council. 
UNTERMEYER