This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR KPAL XF IR IZ QA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR ZELIKOW'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN 
MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMED FORCES 
 
REF: DOHA 445 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary. Department Counselor Dr. Philip Zelikow met 
with the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chief of 
Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs March 20 to begin a strategic dialogue 
between the two countries, consult on Iran, and enlist 
support for decisive strategic investment in Iraq. The 
foreign minister, Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ), agreed 
with Zelikow's analysis of Iran's objectives in the region 
and methods Iran is using to implement them. He said that 
Qatar is working with GCC states to develop a policy to 
address these difficult issues and will provide USG a 
proposal in the next couple of weeks, which will include a 
meeting for GCC ministers in the near future followed by a 
GCC-U.S. meeting. HBJ also outlined Qatar's idea to create a 
$5 billion development bank for Iraq; he will send a study on 
the subject to the Counselor in Washington. Qatar is also 
considering a $200 million micro-credit institution for the 
Palestinians. 
 
¶2. Summary Continued. The Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed 
Forces characterized bilateral relations as excellent in the 
military area but not as robust as they should be 
politically. The Counselor said the U.S. is ready to 
concentrate on the challenges the U.S. and Qatar must work on 
together. Two meetings with the Minister of Finance will be 
reported septel; reftel reports the meeting with Qatari 
Amir's consort, Sheikha Mozah. End Summary. 
 
¶3. (U) Dr. Philip Zelikow met March 20 with Qatari First 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to discuss 
regional security. Accompanying Dr. Zelikow were Ambassador 
Untermeyer, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, NEA DAS Gordon Gray, 
EB Financial Economist Alexei Monsarrat, C Staff David 
Aidekman, and P/E Chief. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶4. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that Secretary Rice had asked him to 
visit the region to advance a strategic dialogue on regional 
security as a follow-up to her recent meetings with GCC 
foreign ministers. The U.S. is now developing a comprehensive 
strategy toward Iran and needs to consult allies in the 
region. The Counselor explained that Iran's nuclear program 
is just one of many U.S. concerns with Iran which stem from 
the revolutionary nature of the Iranian regime and its 
violent, extremist agenda. Iran's primary objective is to 
push the U.S. out of the Gulf in order to pressure and 
intimidate regional governments. The U.S. seeks to counter 
the impression that the Iranian tide is surging while the 
American tide is ebbing. The U.S. hopes to work with Gulf 
states to utilize diplomatic, security, and economic 
strategies to counter the Iranian threat. A U.S.-GCC 
strategic dialogue should also focus on supporting moderation 
in Iraq through an international strategic investment compact 
outlining clear commitments for the new Iraqi government. It 
could discuss ways to reassure international energy markets 
about the possibility of any Iran-related supply disruption 
by examining options for stockpiling oil, increasing 
production levels, and protecting shipping. The U.S. and Gulf 
States also could engage in quiet, low-key discussions on 
security cooperation and planning. He said that countries of 
the region, which are facing some turmoil, have a choice to 
choose progress and reform or to seek revolutionary and 
violent change. Qatar has chosen the former path; terrorist 
groups and Iran have chosen the latter. However, the Iranian 
people primarily care about their domestic situation and for 
the most part do not share the Iranian government's desire to 
export revolution to the region. In Iraq specifically, the 
U.S. wants a country that is prosperous, independent, and 
secure, and which could be a strong partner in regional 
security. Iran prefers to have a weak, divided, and dependent 
Iraq as its neighbor. 
 
¶5. (C) HBJ agreed strongly with Dr. Zelikow's analysis of 
Iran's motivations and goals, noting Iran's active support 
for subversive elements in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and 
eastern Saudi Arabia. HBJ added that while the Iranian public 
does not support the regime's foreign policy goals writ 
large, the U.S. should not underestimate the degree of 
domestic support for the nuclear program based on a 
nationalistic agenda. Zelikow said he would like the GCC to 
take steps that will show Iran that it is not intimidated. He 
understood that Qatar might prefer to use the GCC forum to 
advance its security needs so as not to risk harming its 
sensitive relationship with Iran by acting unilaterally. 
 
¶6. (S) HBJ said the GCC was ready to come forward and 
coordinate on regional security. Qatar is working with 
neighbors and meetings are happening that are not reported 
publicly. He believes that five GCC countries can get 
together at the ministerial level, including military 
representatives. Because Saudi Arabia has been problematic in 
the GCC, he doubts they would participate but believes the 
meeting can continue without them. Oman would be the right 
state to urge Saudi attendance. (NOTE: When Dr. Zelikow 
observed that the Omanis appeared to be acting friendly 
toward the Iranians, HBJ urged the Counselor not to make too 
much of this, noting that Oman is very worried about Iran. 
END NOTE) Following these initial internal discussions, the 
group would meet with a U.S. representative, possibly at 
HBJ's London residence, and possibly within the next month. 
 
¶7. (C) HBJ had just returned from France, where he met with 
French PM Dominique de Villepin, whom he advised to maintain 
solidarity with the other permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. HBJ reported that he told the French that 
their diplomacy with Iran was not going well and it would be 
the wrong signal for the Iranians to find a gap in the 
Security Council. 
 
¶8. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that in fact U.S. relations with 
France are in "harmony" on most issues. The British, French, 
and Americans have been aligned on the UNSC for a year. All 
three agree on the need for a serious policy toward Iran. 
 
¶9. (C) HBJ said that the Iranian foreign minister was to come 
to Doha Wednesday, March 22. (NOTE. The foreign minister met 
with the Amir. END NOTE) "I still have hope that if they are 
pushed to the edge, they will do something" to end the crisis 
over nuclear enrichment, HBJ said. The Iranians don't want to 
destroy themselves or their long-term strategy for influence 
in the region. He said Qatar fears a military response, which 
"if not done cleanly," could result in retaliation against 
the nearest U.S. forces, i.e., those in Qatar. "I hope we 
don't reach this stage, and I don't recommend it," he said. 
President Ahmedi-Nejad told HBJ in January that the Iranians 
"could make big trouble for the Americans"; HBJ said he 
advised Ahmedi-Nejad against such a course of action. 
 
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Guatemala and UNSC 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Dr. Zelikow said he believed that Qatar would support 
Guatemala's UNSC candidacy over Venezuela. He said the U.S. 
appreciates the position as a great example of international 
harmony. HBJ confirmed Qatar's position, and other MFA 
officials told Embassy Officers that Qatar will support 
Guatemala, rather than fellow oil-producer Venezuela, because 
Guatemala had supported Qatar in its own UNSC bid. Zelikow 
mentioned some additional concerns about Venezuela's 
behavior. HBJ said he too had a skeptical view of President 
Hugo Chavez. 
 
----------------------------- 
Concern About America's Image 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) HBJ suggested that some U.S. foreign policies have 
damaged America's image. He noted that the climate in Europe 
was against the U.S. "A lot can be said or done differently," 
he said, so as not to aggravate allies while achieving the 
same results. Dr. Zelikow thanked him for this advice "from a 
friend" and noted that the U.S. was pursuing such a strategy 
on the Iran issue. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Need to Restart Regular, High-Level Dialogue 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) According to HBJ, Qatar used to host an informal 
discussion with U.S. officials every six months in London, 
but the practice was discontinued. At Dr. Zelikow's request, 
HBJ said he would get in touch with A/S Welch and Zelikow in 
several weeks to discuss plans to re-start the dialogue. 
(NOTE: It was not clear whether this discontinued dialogue 
had involved all GCC States or just Qatar. END NOTE) 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶13. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that we are facing a difficult time 
in Iraq but that we could get past it. It is important to 
form an inclusive government. There are qualified, dedicated 
people, and if a good government is formed, we will need to 
take quick, decisive action to ensure that it has a good 
start. He observed that the idea of an "International 
Compact," such as Afghanistan's, was attractive; it would be 
a contract between the responsible Iraqi government and the 
international community that would assure donors of progress. 
Iraq will need financial assistance for the Compact, and he 
urged Qatar and other friends in the region to be ready to 
move decisively. 
 
¶14. (C) HBJ said Qatar had evaluated creating a $5 billion 
bank to invest in - rather than grant money to - Iraq's 
industries, such as oil, gas, and agriculture. The GOQ had 
commissioned a study with the Bahrainis and Citibank, which 
HBJ promised to send to Dr. Zelikow. The Iraqi financial 
expert who has charge of the proposal, Nemir Kidar of 
Investcorp, will be in New York shortly and HBJ will ask him 
to travel to Washington to brief U.S. officials on the idea. 
 
------------------------- 
Let Hamas Make its Choice 
------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Hamas came to power by elections, HBJ said. They will 
come around slowly. Either they will fail or they will 
deliver, which would require engaging Israel. "We advised 
them to let Abu Mazen deal with the Israelis," he said. 
Although the GOQ supported Hamas's legitimacy, Qatar will not 
transfer cash. Qatar is committed to paying $3 million 
monthly to the Palestinian Authority for salaries; beyond 
that, there will be no cash transfers, the minister repeated. 
Qatar is discussing with former PA Finance Minister and now 
PLC member Salaam Fayyad the creation of a $200 million micro 
credit facility. The Palestinians are clever, HBJ said; they 
will succeed in helping their economy and will have a low 
default rate. Qatar is also considering building hospitals or 
schools in lieu of providing cash. 
 
--------------------- 
Assistance to Lebanon 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) For Lebanon, Qatar has donated 100 military vehicles 
and $25 million for a new library. Qatar is also studying a 
real estate project that would relocate people from a 
blighted and dangerous area near the Beirut airport to a new 
location with prospects for growing a tourism industry. The 
project would cost about $3 billion, but it would be to "make 
money and help people at the same time," the minister said. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Dr. Zelikow and delegation met with Maj Gen Hamad bin 
Ali al-Attiyah, Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces. 
Al-Attiyah expressed a warm welcome and evaluated the 
relations between the two countries as good, especially on 
the military side. The Military Consultative Committee 
meetings in January went well, and liaison with the Embassy 
is excellent. The General was less positive about political 
relations, however. They started out well, at the start of 
the Iraq war, but then stagnated. Political ties are not as 
strong as the military ties. 
 
¶18. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that there have been problems, but 
the U.S. has decided to concentrate on the strategic issues 
facing the two countries. His visit and that of U/S Hughes 
the previous month are evidence of this. He said he was not 
visiting to raise the subject of Al Jazeera. Instead, he 
wanted to initiate a serious strategic dialogue and obtain 
the views of senior level Qatari officials. "This is an 
important country, and we want to treat it that way," he said. 
 
¶19. (S) We need this relationship, al-Attiyah said. We do not 
have such a defense agreement with any other country. We can 
play a big role in the region, in the war on terror, in 
helping to educate our people. 
 
¶20. (S) Dr. Zelikow said that three issues are of great 
importance and indicate progress in our relationship. First 
is Qatar's attitude toward the terrorist threat. For example, 
there were concerns ten years ago about Qatar's relations 
with Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, and this shaped Qatar's image in 
Washington. People wondered if Qatar really cared about the 
threat. Second is national security. Qatar's hosting of U.S. 
forces counts for a lot with the President, and he doesn't 
take friends for granted. Third is reform. Qatar is taking 
decisions that will define the future of the country. Its 
decisions lead it down the path of reform and progress. 
 
------------------------- 
Qatar's Security Strategy 
------------------------- 
 
¶21. (S) Al-Attiyah outlined Qatar's security posture. Most 
important is the defense agreement with the U.S. For internal 
security, a joint Defense-Interior force of 2,000 men has 
been set up and trained. For external security, Qatar is 
trying to establish a "security shield" consisting of radar 
and other technology to detect infiltration. He discussed the 
"GCC belt" with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that 
is a link of radar and communication systems. But he said 
Qatar's small military could not repel an attack from a 
powerful country like Iran. He expressed the view that the 
GCC was the proper mechanism for improving regional security. 
 
¶22. (C) Al-Attiyah discussed the GCC Peninsula Shield. Qatar 
was not happy with having radar only in Saudi Arabia and 
voiced its concerns. Saudi Arabia did not accept the point 
that the Shield should also respond to threats such as Iran. 
It feels secure. This tension has led to the Shield's 
possible disbandment, but until now there has been no 
solution. 
¶23. (C) Along lines identical to his meeting with the Foreign 
Minister, Dr. Zelikow said that the U.S. is working on a 
comprehensive policy toward Iran, not just on the nuclear 
issue. He discussed Iran's revolutionary foreign policy and 
its tools of subversion and terrorism. We want to help the 
GCC to be effective, he said. 
 
¶24. (C) Al-Attiyah said Qatar was helping the effort on Iraq. 
Qatar will train 40 military officers and soldiers in diving 
and security techniques and has invited the Iraqis to the 
Eagle Resolve domestic security exercise. But it is difficult 
for the Iraqis to send people outside the country for such 
training. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (C) At a lunch he hosted for the delegation, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Mahmoud 
expressed Qatar's concern about Iran's nuclear program and 
said the GCC was not prepared to face it (echoing statements 
by HBJ). The minister spoke in some detail about relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. He noted that the Kingdom has 
supported plotters of a coup against the Amir in 1996. (NOTE: 
The attempt was a counter-coup to restore the rule of Khalifa 
bin Hamad Al Thani.) More recently, Saudi Arabia blocked a 
gas pipeline deal with Kuwait and a causeway to the United 
Arab Emirates; in the case of the pipeline deal, Prince Saud 
bin Faisal's denial that the Kingdom had received a request 
to transit Saudi waters particularly infuriated the Qataris. 
"There is no trust," al-Mahmoud said with apparent agitation. 
He also noted that Saudi Arabia had failed in its promise to 
provide "good offices" in the now-settled territorial dispute 
with Bahrain, which, due to a lack of other options, was 
reviewed by the International Court of Justice; the ruling 
was in Bahrain's favor. 
UNTERMEYER