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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/11/2016 
TAGS: KJUS KAWC PHUM KPKO TT
SUBJECT: TRUTH AND FRIENDSHIP COMMISSIONERS PUSH FOR ACCESS TO SCU 
DOCUMENTS 
 
REF: A) 2005 DILI 493, B) DILI 84 
 
DILI 00000112  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, Embassy Dili, 
State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) The bilateral Indonesia-East Timor Truth and Friendship 
Commission (TFC) has made a surprise request for full access, 
with necessary redaction to assure witness confidentiality, to 
the files of the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU).  After 
Prosecutor-General Longuinhos Monteiro refused the request, the 
TFC sent letters to President Xanana Gusmao and UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Sukehiro Hasegawa 
requesting access.  TFC Co-Chairman Dionisio Babo jusPtified 
this request by stating that documents such as the records from 
the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM) and the 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) will be useful in 
completing the TFC's final report, but are not "judicial 
documents" and thus cannot be relied upon to provide precise 
factual evidence such as that found in the SCU documents.  Babo 
also gave his impressions of the TFC's visit to East Timor, 
stating that the commission's plenary meetings during the visit 
were productive in establishing the criteria for selecting the 
priority cases that the TFC will investigate.  A visit to the 
site of a 1999 massacre in Liquica in 1999 reportedly served as 
an eye-opening experience for the Indonesian Commissioners. 
Babo did indicate, however, that certain Indonesian and Timorese 
members of the Commission are becoming easily influenced by 
political pressures from outside and are thus less rigorous and 
thorough in their quest for truth.  Finally, the Co-Chairman 
discussed the February 22 Bali meeting between the Presidents of 
East Timor and Indonesia, indicating that the two Presidents 
discussed the issue of amnesty for 1999 criminals, a possible 
extension of the TFC, and the relationship between the eventual 
report of the TFC and that of East Timor's domestic CAVR . End 
Summary. 
 
Access to SCU Documents Requested 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) EmbOffs met with TFC Co-Chairman Dionisio Babo to hear 
his impressions of the weeklong visit of the Indonesian members 
of the Truth and Friendship Commission.  He stated that one of 
the disappointments of the trip was that the TFC was not granted 
access to the SCU files, currently being held by the 
Prosecutor-General's Office under the supervision of the sole 
remaining UN advisor to the SCU (see reftel A).  The initial 
request for access to these documents was made to 
Prosecutor-General Longuinhos Monteiro in a meeting with the 
full TFC membership.  Acting consistent with his promise to bar 
inappropriate access to the SCU files, Longuinhos deferred the 
request to President Gusmao and SRSG Hasegawa stating that a 
long-awaited formal handover of the SCU files (see reftel B) had 
yet to take place and that he was therefore not in a position to 
grant such access.  Frustrated, the Commissioners drafted a 
letter to President Gusmao and SRSG Hasegawa requesting that the 
GOET and the UN come to a decision about who has definitive 
control of the files and to grant access to the TFC. 
 
¶3. (C) After EmbOff expressed concerns about witness 
confidentiality were the TFC given full access to the files of 
 
SIPDIS 
the SCU, Babo assured EmbOff that the TFC would follow proper 
witness-protection procedures and ask that the documents be 
redacted before being handed over to the TFC.  He noted that 
court documents from the Court of Appeals concerning serious 
crimes appeals cases had been appropriately redacted before they 
were given to the TFC.  When asked why the TFC would need to 
have access to the SCU evidentiary files given the availability 
of the documents from KOMNAS HAM, the indictments and other 
official court documents from the Special Panels on Serious 
Crimes, and the newly release extensive CAVR report, Babo 
asserted that only the SCU files provide "factual and judicial" 
reports of the violence which took place in 1999.  He stated 
that the other documents would be useful in preparing the TFC's 
final report, but that the evidence obtained while conducting 
the high-quality SCU investigations must be made available to 
the TFC for the body to have a complete factual background of 
each case.  In addition, Mr. Babo noted that in any case in 
which amnesty would be recommended, he would want such a 
recommendation to be based on documents created by a "judicial 
or legal body" rather than those from CAVR and KOMNAS HAM. 
 
 
DILI 00000112  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Plenary Meetings Lead to Criteria for Priority Cases 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Co-Chairman Babo reported that the two days of plenary 
meetings held in Dili were productive and allowed the 
Commissioners to establish criteria for assigning priority to 
cases to be handled by the TFC.  The criteria adopted include 
the number of times a case is mentioned in KOMNAS HAM, Jakarta 
Ad Hoc Tribunal, CAVR, and SCU documents; whether the event 
received international attention; whether the event is publicly 
remembered on an annual basis; the number of people killed; the 
implication of involvement by high level officials or 
institutions; whether the case resulted in mass exodus, and 
whether the case involved sexual violence.  Babo stated that 
nearly all "priority cases" are likely to mirror the cases found 
in the KOMNAS HAM report, with the few additional cases 
pertaining to sexual violence being selected from CAVR and SCU 
documents. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Apart from meeting with senior GOET officials and 
holding plenary meetings, the full TFC membership conducted a 
site visit to a church in Liquica, a town 30 minutes from Dili 
where in 1999 scores of Timorese were massacred by 
anti-independence militias with the assistance of Indonesian 
police and military officers.  The group spent two hours in the 
church listening to an account of the massacre; this session was 
followed by a three-hour meeting with friends and relatives of 
the victims.  Babo noted that several of the Indonesian 
Commissioners were visibly moved by the site visit and appeared 
to have a newfound understanding of the magnitude of the 1999 
atrocities.  Later in the week Antonius Sujata, an Indonesian 
alternate member of the TFC, commented to EmbOff that the trip 
had given context to the atrocities and provided him with a more 
vivid understanding of the impact of the massacre beyond the 
loss of the victims' lives.  According to Babo, the Indonesian 
members were unwilling to undertake any additional journeys 
outside of Dili, citing what they described as the restricted 
mobility of several elderly Indonesan commissioners. 
 
Commissioners on both sides influenced by pressure from Jakarta 
and Dili 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Apart from the chronic complaints about the lack of 
attention given to the TFC by the Indonesian members, all of who 
continue to hold other positions that take up most of their 
time, Mr. Babo noted that political pressures appear to be 
weighing heavily on certain commissioners, both Timorese and 
Indonesian.  Babo and other legally trained members of the TFC 
appear genuinely dedicated to ensuring that the Commission's 
report is compiled using sound ethical guidelines, following 
appropriate legal processes, and including a thorough and 
accurate statement of the facts. Babo indicated, however, that 
due to political loyalties in Jakarta certain Indonesian members 
of the Commission want to "wrap up" the TFC's work as quickly as 
possible. 
 
¶7. (C) Babo provided an updated assessment of the Indonesian 
commissioners' approach to the TFC. General Widjojo, heavily 
influenced by TNI leadership and said to have direct access to 
President Yudhoyono, appears to favor a cursory report including 
a blanket recommendation of amnesty, not only for individuals 
but for entire institutions including all their members, without 
requiring those individuals to meet any pre-determined criteria. 
 Benjamin Mangkoedilaga, according to Babo (please strictly 
protect), appears to be somewhat senile and not interested in 
discussing details.  Wisber Lois, a former diplomat, is reported 
to be providing information to and taking cues from various 
groups within the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Babo 
told Emboffs the two remaining Indonesian Commissioners, Bishop 
Petrus Turang of Kupang and Achmad Ali, are very supportive of a 
genuine search for truth, often siding with Babo and the 
Timorese members on key issues.  The alternates are also an 
important factor in the process.  The three alternate Indonesian 
commissioners are all reported to be very pro-truth and attend 
all of the TFC's meetings.  Babo and other East Timorese 
commissioners have frequently mentioned that the TFC operates 
more as a body with 16 members than one with 10 members and six 
alternates.  The important difference, however, is that the 
alternates do not vote on decisions unless a permanent 
commissioner is absent. 
 
¶8. (C) Some of the Timorese commissioners are reported to be 
responding to political pressure from Dili.  Although he would 
not provide names, Babo indicated that certain Timorese 
 
DILI 00000112  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
commissioners appeared far more concerned with finishing the 
report quickly and in a way that would please senior GOET 
officials than in completing a well-investigated and definitive 
report.  Babo states that these tendencies are most apparent in 
those who do not have secure positions to return to in Timor or 
those who may have political aspirations.  The Co-Chairman 
indicated that these Timorese commissioners often vote with the 
more pro-GOI Indonesian commissioners, thereby swaying the 
balance of the TFC dangerously away from that of a serious 
truth-seeking body. 
 
Issues of amnesty and report deadline raised with SBY and Gusmao 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Co-Chairman Babo participated in a series of meetings 
during a summit held between Presidents Yudyhono and Gusmao at 
the Presidential Palace in Bali on February 22.  Babo asserts 
that during these meetings President Gusmao was able to persuade 
SBY that the CAVR report was merely a domestic Timorese 
document, and should not be regarded as inconsistent with the 
TFC process.  SBY, surrounded by senior military brass, said 
that GOI would regard the eventual report of the TFC as the 
definitive history of the 1999 atrocities, because the TFC 
report would be completed jointly by the two nations in contrast 
to the CAVR report which is an entirely Timorese document, 
 
¶10. (C) Babo took the opportunity of this meeting with the two 
Presidents to request the heads of state take action on two 
issues critical to the TFC.  First, he reiterated the need for 
guidance on recommending amnesty.  Babo says certain members of 
the Commission argue that the TFC should recommend amnesty to 
any individual or institution they see fit.  Other 
commissioners, including himself, believe it is necessary to set 
minimum criteria, including that the accused individual fully 
disclose what he knows about the 1999 crimes, before the TFC can 
recommend amnesty.   Babo is also opposed to recommending 
institutional amnesty, i.e. a blanket amnesty that would apply 
to all members of the TNI.  Second, Babo requested that the two 
Presidents formally extend the TFC for a second year.  Babo 
admitted that he doubts a meaningful report could be finished 
even within two years, but that an initial extension was an 
important first step and necessary to request financing for a 
second year.  The Presidents reportedly indicated that they 
would ask their respective governments to address these issues 
and come to a joint decision. 
 
Continued discussions on international patrons and advisors 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) TFC Commissioners have long expressed the desire to 
have an international patron, a prominent figure in the human 
rights community, to both give advice to the TFC and also to 
enhance the Commission's legitimacy.  During a recent meeting, 
the TFC identified four persons the two foreign ministries 
should attempt to recruit: Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela, Fidel 
Ramos and Rigoberta Menchu.  EmbOff asked Babo about more 
technical, hands-on international advisors for the TFC.  He 
stated that while the Indonesian members had agreed in principle 
to have such advisors, the issue remained very sensitive. 
According to Babo, it appears likely that any working-level 
foreign advisors would end up working only with the Timorese 
members.  In separate conversations with Ambassador Rees, 
however, two Indonesian commissioners, General Widjojo and 
Indonesian Co-Chairman Mangkoedilaga, indicated that they were 
now communicating directly with the Carter Center in Atlanta 
about the possibility of the Center providing advisors to the 
TFC.  They thanked Ambassador for the assistance provided by 
U.S. Embassy Jakarta in facilitating these communications. 
Finally, Babo noted that he had indicated to several foreign 
missions in Dili that these advisors would likely have to be 
funded bilaterally as the UN continues to oppose any involvement 
in the work of the TFC by UN personnel. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Comment: Both the UN and GOET have denied ownership of 
the SCU files when doing so made for a politically easy way of 
deflecting difficult requests concerning the files.  Although a 
memorandum of understanding governing access to and preservation 
of the SCU files has been pending since August 2005, the SCU 
files are located in the Prosecutor-General's Office and can be 
accessed if the remaining UN advisor approves Monteiro's 
request.  Conversely, as the SCU itself was a domestic 
institution established by Timorese law, but staffed by UN 
employees, the UN argues that the files have always legally been 
 
DILI 00000112  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
the property of the GOET. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment continued:  Although redacting SCU documents 
is one possible method for making the files ready for use by the 
TFC, the fact that the remaining UN advisor is scheduled to 
depart in the coming months and that the Prosecutor-General's 
Office has extremely limited human resources, such a project 
would be a massive undertaking and one in which witnesses' 
identities could be disclosed inadvertently.  Moreover, the SCU 
files are stored in a sophisticated electronic database and 
trained staff members would need to perform any searches for the 
Commission, rather than simply surrender a pile of documents. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to disagree with TFC Co-Chairman 
Babo's observation that the SCU files constitute the single most 
useful source of detailed information about particular crimes 
that were committed in 1999.  If, as appears to be the case, the 
TFC is serious about looking at this evidence, it is important 
that the Prosecutor General have at least one international 
advisor to ensure that legitimate access does not compromise 
witness confidentiality.  The Embassy and USAID are discussing 
with the Prosecutor General the possibility of including such an 
advisor among the 8 or 9 GOET advisors the U.S. will support 
with bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF) contributions during 
the next year.  It is also important that any international 
advisors provided to the TFC by the UN and/or bilateral donors 
include legal advisors who appreciate the importance of witness 
confidentiality and understand the technical aspects of ensuring 
 
SIPDIS 
such confidentiality. 
 
¶14. (C) Comment continued:  Prior to the conversations reported 
in this message, TFC Co-Chairman Babo had been far more upbeat 
than any of his Timorese colleagues in assessing the prospects 
for a thorough and honest TFC report.  Although it is 
encouraging to hear that at least one Indonesian commissioner 
was genuinely moved by what he saw and heard at the massacre 
site in Liquica, the more important news may be that the 
commissioners are now seriously discussing a quick "wrap up" of 
their work and a recommendation of blanket amnesty.  End 
Comment. 
REES