VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #1357/01 0861521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271521Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7937
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0714

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001357 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: KHADDAM'S NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT GARNERS MIXED 
REVIEWS 
 
REF: DAMASCUS 0702 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for 
reasons 1.4(b)/(d) 
 
¶1.    (C)  SUMMARY:  The March 17 unveiling in Brussels of 
the National Salvation Front (NSF) has received mixed reviews 
from civil society activists and other contacts.  While 
activists distanced themselves publicly from the NSF, some 
contacts took a more nuanced position privately, maintaining 
that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam, while not acceptable as 
the leader of the opposition, could play a useful role in 
weakening the regime.  Damascus Declaration signers expressed 
varying degrees of concern about the extent to which 
Khaddam's effort would divide the opposition and pointed to 
differences between the Declaration's program and that of the 
NSF.  Several also voiced puzzlement and disappointment over 
the motivations of the Muslim Brothers in signing on to the 
NSF.  One contact noted that Khaddam is serving a useful role 
in attracting anti-regime support from key Alawite figures 
who were pillars in the regime of Hafez al-Asad, while many 
contacts simply expressed puzzlement about what Khaddam is 
really up to.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.    (C)  The March 17 announcement in Brussels of the 
creation of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a 
fourteen-member committee of Syrian exile opposition figures 
led by former Vice President Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood 
chief Sadreddin Bayanouni, has received mixed reaction from 
civil society figures, opposition activists, and other 
contacts.  A number of contacts noted that the identities of 
the majority of the participating exile politicians remain 
unknown.  Press reports have offered only a limited list of 
named participants: Khaddam, Bayanouni, U.S.-based Syrian 
National Congress chief Nagib al-Ghadban, U.S.-based Syrian 
Liberal National Democratic Party SYG Husam al-Deiri, and 
Obeid Nahad, the editor of London-based thisissyria.net. 
Press reports noted other signatories included unidentified 
representatives from pan-Arabist, liberal, Islamist, Kurdish, 
and communist groups. 
 
¶3.    (C)  ANNOUNCEMENT LONG EXPECTED: The announcement of a 
Khaddam/Bayanouni partnership has been expected by local 
contacts for several weeks.  In late February, key opposition 
figure XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that he had rejected overtures 
by Khaddam and Bayanouni to join the front (ref A).  Other 
activists had expected the announcement to be made on March 9 
to mark the 43rd anniversary of the Ba'ath Party's seizure of 
power. 
 
¶4.  (C)  INTERNAL OPPOSITION PUBLICLY DISTANCES ITSELF FROM 
NSF:  Internal opposition figures quickly distanced 
themselves from the NSF. Hassan Abdulazeem, spokesman for 
both the Damascus Declaration and the National Democratic 
Front, told the regional newspaper al-Hayat that "we have no 
connection at all with the Brussels meeting... the 
preliminary stand toward what happened in Brussels is that it 
was outside the Damascus Declaration framework and has 
nothing to do with it."  He added that the Damascus 
Declaration provisional committee would soon confer on an 
official stance vis-a-vis the NSF, with the expanded Damascus 
Declaration group scheduled to hold an expanded meeting on 
April 6. 
 
¶5.  (C)  WHILE PRIVATE VIEWS MORE NUANCED:  In private, 
however, many opposition figures and activists are willing to 
entertain the notion of a Khaddam-Bayanouni alliance, with 
some even offering cautious praise.  Prominent human rights 
activist XXXXXXXXXXXX called the agreement a good step for 
the opposition movement at large, noting that the Khaddam and 
Bayanouni combine Khaddam's "best political connections" with 
the MB's bona fide opposition credentials. 
 
¶6.  (C)  SALVATION FRONT CHALLENGE TO INTERNAL OPPOSITION?  A 
number of internal opposition figures also described the NSF 
as a challenge to a relatively immobile domestic opposition. 
In an interview with al-Hayat on March 20, senior opposition 
figure and Damascus Declaration signatory Riad al-Turk said 
that "the formation of the Front is punishment for the 
Damascus Declaration leaders for lagging behind and 
hesitating." 
 
¶7.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolChief March 23 that, unlike other 
opposition figures like Abdulazeem, he does not categorically 
reject the Khaddam-Bayanouni initiative, although he does not 
accept Khaddam as leader of the opposition.  "We don't oppose 
him, but our program is different."  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the NSF 
initiative contained two critical mistakes.  First, its 
position on the Kurdish issue goes beyond calling for 
nationality for all Syrian Kurds and full cultural rights, to 
the point where it will encourage Kurdish separatism and 
provoke conflicts with the Arab majority; and second, it does 
not make explicit that Khaddam supports democracy in Syria. 
 
¶8.  (C) KHADDAM'S ALAWITE SUPPORT:  Others like former MP 
XXXXXXXXXXXX viewed Khaddam as acceptable as a "bridging 
figure" between the opposition and disenchanted regime (and 
former regime) elements, noting that he believed Khaddam 
understood the limits of his role. XXXXXXXXXXXX also alleged that 
Khaddam has important, but thus far silent, support from key 
Alawites who served as pillars in the regime of Hafez 
al-Asad, including Ali Duba, Ali Zeyout, and Izzedine Nasser. 
They believe that "there is no future for the Alawites with 
Bashar" and that a Khaddam-led Sunni transition could protect 
them from any post-Asad regime. They also see Khaddam as a 
figure who would ensure the safety and stability of the 
larger Alawite community, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.

¶9.  (C) SKEPTICISM ON KHADDAM ALSO PALPABLE: On the other 
hand, some activists have criticized the Khaddam-bayanouni 
coalition from a variety of sides.  Human rights activist and 
Islamist sympathizer XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Bayanouni's 
decision to join forces with Khaddam is "bad for Islamists 
here."  Khaddam has, thus far, refused to take responsibility 
for his part in the regime's crimes (a point also made by 
Turk and others).  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Khaddam's record of 
abuses dates back to his governorship of Hama in 1964, when 
the first crackdown against the MB took place.  He must first 
admit his responsibility if "he wants to lead us again." 
 
¶10. (C) FEARS KHADDAM IS SPLITTING OPPOSITION:  While 
accepting that Khaddam is a useful tool to de-legitimize the 
regime, because of the secrets he knows, activist 
intellectual XXXXXXXXXXXX said it was clear from the way 
Khaddam spoke in interviews that he saw his role in much more 
ambitious terms. XXXXXXXXXXXX adamantly rejected any notion that 
Khaddam could lead the opposition, insisting to Polchief that 
"we have ways to make him fail if he tries." XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed 
great puzzlement at what motivated the MB to associate itself
with Khaddam on the NSF, when they had played and continued 
to play a critical role in the Damascus Declaration group. 
"It doesn't make sense unless Khaddam has a putsch planned," 
said XXXXXXXXXXXX. He criticized the NSF for "splitting the 
opposition" and undercutting the Damascus Declaration. 
Finally, he expressed concerns that Khaddam wanted to "save 
the regime" (the Ba'ath Party and the security services) by 
getting rid of Bashar al-Asad and his inner circle.  He 
described this notion as totally unacceptable to the internal 
opposition.  While the Ba'ath Party could remain in place to 
compete in a post-Asad democratic system, the leadership of 
the security services and military would need to be purged so 
as to transform them from protectors of a regime into 
institutions serving the interests of Syria, insisted XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
¶11.  (C) Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned plans in the next few 
weeks for the Damascus Declaration group to form a leadership 
group to put in place a plan of action. XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned plans 
to name 17 insiders and eight external leaders, including MB 
figures.  XXXXXXXXXXXX called these plans critical for the future of 
the Damascus Declaration group while XXXXXXXXXXXX was more ambiguous, 
hinting with some frustration that perhaps these plans had 
been undercut by the NSF announcement in Brussels. 
 
¶12.  (C) In the meantime, contacts who speak regularly to 
regime leaders continue to express puzzlement at what Khaddam 
is trying to do.  XXXXXXXXXXXX, a foreign policy analyst, said 
that Khaddam is "playing roulette," recognizing that he has 
no external military support for a coup and betting that 
UNIIIC chief Brammertz will directly accuse Asad in June of 
complicity in the killing of Hariri.  XXXXXXXXXXXX called this a 
bad bet because the Russians "will not allow" things to reach 
that level and because even if it happens, Asad has made 
clear publicly that he is determined to remain in power and 
fight such accusations.  Gadfly economist and former deputy 
minister XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Khaddam's 
capabilities had been overrated.  "He can't do anything in 
Syria because he has no support." 
 
¶13.  (C) COMMENT:  As these reactions indicate, the response 
to Khaddam's NSF initiative has been all over the map.  It is 
clear that the former VP continues to cast an imposing shadow 
over both regime and opposition figures in Syria, regardless 
of dismissals voiced about his lack of external support. 
Many attribute the regime's current nervousness (in addition 
to worries over Brammertz's intentions) to worries over what 
Khaddam has planned and what he might say next.  Internal 
opposition figures for their part are consumed with fears 
that Khaddam may be trying to hijack their largely immobile 
movement and may inadvertenly divide and weaken them. 
Khaddam also stirs fears among them about a compromise 
opposition position that would accept leaving much of the 
regime intact.  Thus far, Khaddam seems to have stirred up 
both the regime and internal opposition figures  and even 
mobilized them a bit, without, as far as we can tell, 
weakening them perceptibly. 
 
SECHE