VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #1186/01 0781324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191324Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7765
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0702
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY LE
SUBJECT: REGIME SENSES SYRIA POLICY AT IMPASSE 
 
REF: DAMASCUS 1158 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In separate meetings with Syria desk 
officer March 13, two key contacts noted that the SARG 
believes that U.S. policy towards Syria has reached an 
impasse, and that the U.S. is in the process of changing its 
approach.  That shift will take six months, in their view, 
during which the regime will likely continue to crack down 
hard on any internal opposition and maintain its 
confrontational posture regionally in ways likely to 
exacerbate anti-American sentiment.  Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, mavericks with assorted, sometimes 
combative, ties to leadership figures, described the regime 
as confident and relaxed.  XXXXXXXXXXXX criticized U.S. policy 
towards Syria and the region, noting that instead of 
isolating the Islamists, the U.S. has created conditions that 
have united Islamist nationalists and secular Arab 
nationalists.  On other issues, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed the regime 
may be considering an opening to the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood and described a new think tank he will head.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) CONTACTS SEE U.S. POLICY SHIFT COMING:  XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX told visiting Syria desk officer 
and Emboffs that they believe the U.S. policy shift has 
already begun.  In coming months, they expect the U.S. to 
abandon its Syria policy of "no carrots/only demands," as 
well as its larger regional policy of trying to roll back 
Arab nationalism by establishing a pro-U.S. regime in Iraq. 
During this period, the regime will feel free to crack down 
internally and will flex its muscles regionally to 
demonstrate its confidence.  In this "vacuum between U.S. 
policies," the SARG will seek to set in place a variety of 
anti-American currents.  Both men pointed to an emboldened 
regime that, in XXXXXXXXXXXX 's words, "can burn down European 
embassies," close the EU-sponsored human rights center, and 
then welcome Spanish FM Moratinos to Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX  also 
pointed to the widely publicized "new redlines" (reftel) as a 
troubling sign that the regime is planning for a repressive 
period with no reforms. 
 
¶3.  (C) REGIME SEEN AS CONFIDENT, RELAXED:  XXXXXXXXXXXX described 
the regime as very confident and relaxed, as it savors what 
it feels is a string of triumphs:  Hamas' electoral victory; 
rising influence in Lebanon (for example among the Sunnis in 
the Sidon area, where he asserted that Sa'ad Hariri's 
influence was waning); containing Brammertz and the UNIIIC 
investigation; and successful diplomatic efforts with the 
Saudis and Egyptians.  On the Hamas victory, XXXXXXXXXXXX 
elaborated that Syria will not play a major direct role but 
will stay "in the shadows," seeking to benefit from the 
rising Islamist influence in the territories and the downfall 
of its nemesis, the Fatah-supported PA. 
 
¶4.  (C) U.S POLICY CRITICIZED AS SELF-DEFEATING:  Speaking 
more critically of U.S. foreign policy than he has in the 
past, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed disappointment that the U.S. has 
driven Syria in a direction not good for the country, but 
very good for the regime.  The regime senses that the U.S. 
has played its hand very badly, using its war on terror in a 
counterproductive way.  Instead of isolating the Islamists 
and creating the kind of dynamic social ferment and gradual 
upheaval that was evident in the USSR and Eastern Europe in 
the mid- and late-1980's, the U.S. has created conditions 
that have united, in Syria at least, Islamist nationalists 
and secular Arab nationalists.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , the 
U.S. has succeeded in making Syria a hero in the Islamic 
world.  U.S. support for the opposition has not been 
effective  The fact that Ba'ath Party thugs, with some 
security services support, could beat up a group of 
opposition activists, intellectuals, and cultural figures 
peacefully protesting the continuation of Emergency Law was a 
far more important signal than the USD five million that the 
U.S. set aside to support the opposition, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX . 
 
¶5.  (C) A REGIME OPENING TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD?  Touching 
on other subjects, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the imposition of 
Section 311 sanctions is having no impact and they are not 
being taken seriously.  He said the regime is wagering "at 
much higher levels," placing strategic bets on Hamas, 
Hizballah, and Iran.  On a much more speculative note, he 
said he had picked up signals that the regime may be 
considering an opening to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a way to 
transform a potential threat to the regime into a tool to 
shore it up and encourage greater anti-Americanism.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
reported that emissaries from the MB came to Damascus from 
London a few weeks ago, including a relative of MB 
leader-in-exile Bayanouni.  XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated that U.S. 
policies had created ripe conditions for such an opening. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that some consideration was being given to 
canceling Law 49, the provision making membership in the MB a 
capital offense.  (Comment:  While we have heard occasional 
reports of such a SARG initiative in the past, they have not 
proceeded very far, primarily because of deep-seated regime 
hostility to what it views as its most serious potential 
threat.)  On a related note, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the 
regime, with its carefully modulated policies supporting 
Hamas, PIJ, and Sunni groups in Iraq, as well as Hizballah in 
Lebanon, has made sure that the Islamists in Syria "have no 
case" to make against the regime. 
 
¶6.  (C) A NEW THINK TANK AND MU'ALLIM'S PROSPECTS:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
noted that he has launched a new think tank that will include 
"all political currents in Syria."  He described FM (then 
Deputy FM) Walid Mu'allim  as the driving force behind the 
center.  In previous conversations, XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized the 
project as designed to counter some of the hard-line advice 
being provided to the President by Hisham Ikhtiyar and a 
center he launched while head of the General Intelligence 
Directorate (and apparently continues to oversee).  On a 
related note, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Bashar al-Asad has become 
much more ideological and less pragmatic in orientation. 
Regarding XXXXXXXXXXXX mentor Mu'allim's promotion to Foreign 
Minister, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed doubt that it would have much 
impact on policy.  While Mu'allim is savvy enough to get 
control over the MFA bureaucracy relatively soon, he "will be 
sandwiched in by the two Hourani spies," VP Farouk a-Shara'a 
and DFM Faisal Mikdad.  More importantly, the MFA has never 
been in charge of key policies, primarily the purview of the 
security services.  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted the particularly important 
role that Mohammed Nassif Khairbek had played in the past 
over policies involving Hamas, Hizballah, Lebanon, and Iran, 
often shored up by the selective use of money, corrupt 
influence, and violence.  XXXXXXXXXXXX offered a very ambivalent 
view of Nassif's current status, claiming he still wielded 
influence but suffered from occasional bouts of "dementia." 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX are secular 
intellectuals with ties of various shadings with the regime. 
Both have consistently spoken to us about the need for U.S. 
engagement with the SARG.  XXXXXXXXXXXX exceptionally critical 
view of U.S. foreign policy is new and likely represents a 
reaction to the success of hard-line Syrian policies that he 
and his friend Mu'allim have consistently struggled to 
counter over the past several years.  The increasing 
sharpness in tone may reflect his frustration that his views 
have fallen into disfavor for the time being and that 
hard-line advocates seem to be crowing that their views are 
paying big dividends for Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX most salient point 
is that those hard-line policies could pay dividends for the 
regime and still lead Syria down a dead-end path of no 
reform, no engagement with the West, and increasingly 
dangerous engagement with Islamist political currents likely 
to erode further Syria's embattled secular identity.   End 
Comment. 
 
 
SECHE