VZCZCXRO4614
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBU #0723/01 0871734
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281734Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3983
INFO RUCNBEH/BRASILIA ENVIROMENTAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 000723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/ES - O/CMS - Office of Crisis Management Support 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR AR
SUBJECT:  Embassy Buenos Aires Avian Influenza Tabletop 
Exercise and Updated Tripwires 
 
Reference: (A) State 219189 
           (B) State 220047 
           (C) Buenos Aires 2914 
           (D) Buenos Aires 3110 
 
¶1.  (U) Sensitive But Unclassified - Not For Internet 
Distribution. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary:  Embassy Buenos Aires' Avian Influenza 
(AI) Mission Task Force (MTF) conducted an AI mission 
specific tabletop exercise which was led by the PMO and 
included CLO, IRM, PAS and the MSG representatives on March 
2nd.  Based on the results of this exercise, the MTF 
modified existing tripwires and included a specific tripwire 
for human-to-human transmission of AI as outlined in 
paragraph six.  The revised tripwires represent a more 
plausible scenario in the event of a pandemic.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Based on the results of a March 2nd mission- 
specific tabletop exercise, Embassy Buenos Aires modified 
its existing avian influenza (AI) tripwires (see paragraph 
six).  The changes include a specific tripwire for human-to- 
human transmission of AI.  Participants in the tabletop 
included the Avian Influenza (AI) Mission Task Force (MTF), 
which is chaired by the DCM and composed of ESTH, MED, CONS, 
RSO, MGMT, MILGRP and FAS, along with representatives of 
CLO, IRM, PAS and the MSG. 
 
----------------- 
Tabletop Scenario 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) During the tabletop exercise, led by the PMO, 
participants were asked to consider scenarios in which AI 
had been discovered in both Argentina and neighboring 
countries through animal-to-human transmission.  The 
exercise also included situations in which an eligible 
family member (EFM) contracted AI, the disease becomes 
widespread in birds in Argentina, and human-to-human 
transmission is discovered in China.  The participants 
determined that the appearance of human AI in Argentina 
through contact with animals could result in widespread 
panic, looting of drugstores, and a possible reduction in 
FSN staff reporting to work.  If AI reaches pandemic 
proportions and appears in the U.S. before appearing in 
Argentina, airports and other modes of transportation will 
likely cease functioning.  Since Buenos Aires serves as an 
air transportation hub for USG missions in several 
neighboring countries, Post may become the "safe-haven" for 
USG employees from those missions who are stranded in 
Argentina due to the shut-down of transportation services. 
 
------------------ 
Modified Tripwires 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In modifying the tripwires, the MTF factored in 
the fast transmission rate that would occur if the virus 
develops the ability to spread directly from human-to-human 
and the historically rapid geographical dispersion of 
pandemics, which would be magnified by the pace of modern 
air travel.  As before, all tripwire responses have been 
made under the assumption that an effective human vaccine 
will not be available.  Any of the tripwires discussed below 
could occur independently of each other.  It is also 
possible that two or more tripwires could occur sequentially 
or simultaneously. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Following are the Revised Tripwires and Responses: 
 
Tripwire One:  A substantial and sustained spike in the 
number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal-to- 
human cases anywhere in the world. 
 
  - EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed. 
  - Provide Mission briefings for American and LES 
  employees and dependents. 
  - Ensure that any public announcements or travel warnings 
  issued are disseminated to American citizens in 
  Argentina. 
  - Begin preparations for actions in Tripwire Two. 
 
Tripwire Two:  A spike in the number and/or broadening 
geographic spread of animal-to-human cases in Latin America 
(including Argentina). 
 
- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed. 
- Provide Mission briefings for American and LES employees 
and dependents. 
 
BUENOS AIR 00000723  002 OF 003 
 
 
- Conduct a town hall meeting for US citizens in Argentina. 
- Restrict official and unofficial travel to suspected 
areas. 
- Consider authorized departure should cases of animal-to- 
human transmission of AI be confirmed in Argentina. 
- Restrict incoming official travel to Argentina giving 
priority to personnel involved in investigative/containment 
efforts, or as otherwise deemed necessary by COM. 
- Increase coordination with appropriate GOA ministries and 
schools. 
- Begin plans to operate Embassy with reduced personnel in 
the event LES absences increase. 
- Ensure that staff purchases sufficient supplies of food, 
water and other necessary domestic items for a shelter-in- 
place scenario and inform U.S. citizen community in 
Argentina of the need to do the same. 
- Begin preparations for actions in Tripwire Three. 
 
Tripwire Three:  Confirmed human-to-human transmission of AI 
anywhere in the world. 
 
 - EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed. 
 - Provide mission briefings (perhaps by phone or email) for 
American and LES employees and dependents. 
- Ambassador to decide whether to request authorized or 
ordered departure of non-essential staff and family members. 
If this is not possible due to shutdown of airports or if 
the disease has already reached the U.S., non-essential 
staff and families should shelter in place.  (It is probable 
that staff and family members will only have a limited time 
to depart Argentina.  This will depend on the rate of 
dispersion of the disease and the pandemic-associated 
shutdown of national and regional airports.) 
- IF AD/OD is not feasible, instruct all non-emergency 
American and LES staff to remain home on administrative 
leave.  Children should remain home from school.  Provide 
similar information to U.S. citizen community in Argentina. 
- Cancel incoming official travel to Argentina except for 
personnel involved in investigative/containment efforts, or 
as otherwise deemed necessary by COM. 
- Coordinate with CA/OCS on issuance of guidance (public 
announcement or travel warning, as appropriate) urging 
American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to 
Argentina and particularly the affected regions. 
- In coordination with the Department, prepare press 
guidance. 
- Provide situation updates to Department as needed. 
- Recommend social restrictions to staff and U.S. citizen 
community in Argentina (restrict movements of all personnel 
in the city; restrict dinner parties, participation in 
sporting events, etc.) 
- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents that 
have been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI 
infection and implement at-home monitoring procedure. 
- Implement social distancing (limit movement of all 
personnel and dependents in the city) and inform U.S. 
citizen community in Argentina of the need to do the same. 
- Plan for home visits to sick individuals who receive care 
under the Embassy health unit. 
- Plan delivery service of food and other essential items to 
residences, as needed. 
- Depending on level of public inquiries, Embassy staffs and 
equips a situation room.  Consular officers should establish 
a database tracking American citizens who have been 
quarantined, hospitalized or ill at home.  Also, prepare 
guidance for American citizen community on treatment 
options. 
- Reduce consular operations to emergency consular services 
only. 
-  Consider segregating the Marine Security Guard detachment 
from the rest of the mission to decrease the risk of spread 
of the disease. 
- Severely restrict visitor access to Mission. 
- Consider prophylactic Tamiflu treatment only for staff 
required to be in direct contact with potentially infected 
persons and those at high risk if they develop the disease. 
- Provide personal protective gear to staff required to have 
continuing contact with the general public. 
- In the event of civil unrest, attempt to increase the size 
of the local guard force and the frequency of patrols to 
personal residences.  If necessary, consider relocating 
personnel sheltering in place to a safer location. 
- Prepare to provide safe haven in case members of other USG 
missions, who must transit Buenos Aires to return to the 
U.S., become stranded in Argentina due to airport closures. 
 
Alternate Tripwire:  Mission emloyee or eligible family 
member develops AI infection. 
 
 
BUENOS AIR 00000723  003 OF 003 
 
 
Alternate Tripwire Response: 
 
- Employee or eligible family member begins Tamiflu 
treatment. 
 
- Medevac if possible; otherwise use local medical 
facilities and/or home quarantine patient and anyone who has 
had direct contact with patient. 
 
GUTIERREZ