VZCZCXRO8840
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0436/01 0731736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141736Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3937
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1042
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000436 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ECON ENRG EINV MARR HU RO
SUBJECT: BASESCU PREDICTS CALM ETHNIC HUNGARIAN "AUTONOMY 
DECLARATION," TOUTS NEW ENERGY INITIATIVES 
 
REF: A. BUCHAREST 410 
 
     ¶B. BUCHAREST 278 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin 
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  President Traian Basescu predicted to the 
Ambassador during a March 13 meeting that a planned March 15 
"autonomy declaration" organized by a fringe ethnic Hungarian 
group would be a relatively low-key event.  He characterized 
it as the product of a power struggle between the mainstream 
ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR) and radical fringe activists, 
adding that he had taken steps to prevent the occurrence of a 
"counter demonstration" by Romanian nationalists aligned with 
Greater Romania Party (PRM) leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor.  He 
also made it clear he suspected nationalists in Hungary of 
stirring the ethnic pot in Romania, citing Victor Orban and 
Fidesz specifically.  In response to the Ambassador's 
expression of interest in Basescu's views on energy security, 
the Romanian president asserted that while Romania was less 
dependent on external sources of energy than many other 
European countries, he was exploring various options for 
energy diversification.  Basescu claimed Romania would take a 
position within the next month regarding its planned 
acquisition of F-16 aircraft, saying the GOR hoped to acquire 
F-16s from either the Netherlands or the U.S.  At the same 
time, he ruled out acquisition from Israel.  End Summary. 
 
"Intelligent" Response to Ethnic-Hungarian Gathering 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶2.  (C) During a March 13 meeting in Basescu's office, the 
Ambassador expressed his concern over the prospect of 
violence at an ethnic Hungarian gathering in the 
Transylvanian town of Odorheiul Secuiesc March 15, where a 
tiny, fringe ethnic Hungarian group's declaration will 
reportedly make a declaration of "autonomy" (Ref A).  The 
Ambassador reaffirmed the U.S. strongly supported Romania's 
EU accession in January 2007 but added that any "untoward 
incident" on  March 15 could have a negative impact on May 15 
(the date of Romania's crucial EU spring accession report.) 
Basescu immediately assured the situation would remain under 
control.  "We are intelligent," he stressed, continuing that 
"we will let the Magyars talk...and we will block the 
Romanians from going to Odorheiul Secuiesc."  Basescu said he 
had recently spoken with extreme nationalist and Greater 
Romania Party (PRM) leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor and warned 
him not to go to Odorheiul Secuiesc or to send followers 
there.  The Romanian president  reported that security forces 
would block the roads and turn back any attempt by ethnic 
Romanians to travel to Odorheiul Secuiesc for the March 15 
event.  (Note:  March 14 press reports quoted Tudor as 
stating that following discussions with Basescu, Interior 
Minister Vasile Blaga and Romanian Intelligence Chief Radu 
Timofte he had canceled plans to hold a counter-demonstration 
in Odorheiul Secuiesc.  End Note.) 
 
¶3.  (C) Basescu affirmed that for the majority of ethnic 
Hungarians March 15 was "a celebration...a holiday for them." 
 The GOR would only react to the Odorheiul Secuiesc 
declaration if "Romanian territorial integrity" were called 
into question.  The issue, he explained, was "whether the 
declaration will be followed by actions that are 
unconstitutional."  In response to the Ambassador's question, 
Basescu promised he would "follow constitutional means."  He 
acknowledged that he has been in contact with the organizers 
of the March 15 declaration, including the Mayor of Odorheiul 
Secuiesc,  to see if they would "modify their statements." 
In response to the Ambassador's question as to whether he 
planned to travel to Odorheiul Secuiesc, Basescu admitted he 
was "thinking about it," but would only go if he was assured 
any declaration would not be "against the Constitution." 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador told Basescu that he had recently met 
with mainstream ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR) leader Bela 
Marko, who had claimed that the impasse over the proposed 
minorities law, a subject near and dear to the heart of UDMR 
members, had contributed to the splinter group's planned 
autonomy declaration. (Ref A)  Basescu retorted that "the 
minority law is not the issue, the issue is the internal 
dispute within the Hungarian community."  He pointed to a 
power struggle between the mainstream UDMR's leaders and 
radical ethnic Hungarians as the root of the problem. 
Basescu also blamed outsider agitators, singling out Viktor 
Orban, "one of Europe's last extremists," and Hungary's 
Fidesz party, and expressing the hope that "Orban won't push 
for undemocratic processes."  Basescu asserted that the 
 
BUCHAREST 00000436  002 OF 003 
 
 
"standard for minorities in Romania is very high compared to 
other European countries."  He ticked off a list of benefits 
enjoyed by ethnic Hungarians, such as schools, a university 
and theaters employing the Hungarian language.  Basescu 
concluded by reiterating his earlier promise to handle the 
March 15 events "with intelligence," assuring the Ambassador 
that the day's events would not negatively affect Romania's 
EU accession prospects. 
 
Diverse Energy Options 
---------------------- 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador stated that the U.S. supports a 
competitive and diverse energy sector in the region.  Basescu 
remarked that Romania is relatively less dependent on 
imported energy sources than other states in the region, 
observing, however, that its dependence on imported gas, in 
particular, became more acute in winter months.  Last year, 
at the EU Hampton Court gathering, he had advocated that 
other European countries  consider "relaunching their nuclear 
plants," an idea which only Berlusconi had seconded. 
Germany, he observed, along with the Scandinavians, were 
sitting on the fence.  The Ambassador agreed that Romania had 
some domestic energy sources but pointed out that it would 
require more energy in the future to fuel a growing economy. 
Basescu asserted "we are putting huge amounts of dollars into 
supporting undemocratic states" which produce oil, implying 
that these resources could be better spent elsewhere.  He 
stated that Romania supported the Nabucco natural gas 
pipeline, explaining, "we don't want energy from one source." 
 
¶6. (C) Basescu also bruited the possibility of building a 
compressed natural gas terminal at the Black Sea port of 
Constanta for Qatari gas, noting that Qatar currently 
supplies natural gas to Japan, India and Spain.  According to 
Basescu, "Romania is prepared to receive Qatar's natural 
gas...and we can build pipelines to Poland and Ukraine." 
Romania is preparing to "do a study to determine what part of 
Europe can be supplied (with natural gas) from Constanta," 
adding that unspecified "other European countries" could 
pitch in.  Basescu added that he would like American 
compressed natural gas handling equipment, which he had seen 
during his February visit to Qatar, and which he labeled as 
"the best." Basescu, a former sea captain, asserted that 
300-meter ships carrying gas from Qatar would have "no 
problem" passing through the Bosphorous, since the Turks in 
recent years had taken the necessary safety measures for this 
type of ship traffic. 
 
 
Come Fly With Me: Romania Evaluates F-16 Acquisition 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶7.  (C) Basescu reported that Romania planned to take a 
position "in the next month" regarding its planned 
acquisition of F-16 aircraft.  He stated that Romania's 
decision would be based upon the underlying premise of "how 
we can adapt our armed forces to NATO standards."  Basescu 
said it was "clear" that Israeli-provided fighters "are not a 
solution" and Romania has "drawn a line through" the 
possibility of acquiring F-16s from Israel.  Basescu 
continued that Romania would choose between "new F-16s (from 
the U.S.) or Dutch F-16s."  He noted that the "Dutch price is 
good" but expressed uncertainty about the maintenance 
contracts for the Dutch-provided F-16s.  Basescu described 
Romania's ultimate goal as the acquisition of Joint Strike 
Fighters (JSF) and speculated about whether new or used F-16s 
would provide the "best access to the new JSF."  He stated 
that he would appreciate guidance on whether it was better to 
obtain new or used F-16s, but stressed he was conscious of 
the advantages of acquiring new planes.  The Ambassador 
observed  that proper aircraft maintenance would be vital, 
and took note of the fact that Romania had experienced some 
difficulties in meeting the less complex requirements for 
keeping up its modest fleet of C-130s. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment.  Although Basescu was deliberately evasive 
about whether he would attend the March 15 event in Odorheiul 
Secuiesc, he appeared confident the gathering would unfold 
peacefully, twice assuring the Ambassador of an "intelligent" 
response by the GOR.  Basescu's polite but forceful 
insistence that the March 15 declaration was in no way linked 
to the Romanian parliament's failure to pass a minorities law 
sought by the ethnic Hungarian community suggested that this 
episode is as much about domestic politics as it is about 
national security.  The fact that Basescu acknowledged he has 
been in direct contact with Hungarian minority politicians 
who are behind the Odorheiul Secuiesc event -- and vying for 
 
BUCHAREST 00000436  003 OF 003 
 
 
political leverage with their UDMR rivals --  suggests that 
the Romanian president is, as usual, playing all the angles. 
End Comment. 
 
¶9. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are 
available on 
the Bucharest SIPRNet website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest 
TAUBMAN