VZCZCXRO5363
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0410/01 0691724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101724Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3905
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1039
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI HU RO
SUBJECT: CLAMOR SURROUNDING ETHNIC HUNGARIAN FRINGE GROUP'S 
PLANNED DECLARATION OF "AUTONOMY" 
 
REF: 05 BUCHAREST 2423 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin 
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR) leader and 
Deputy Prime Minister Bela Marko told the Ambassador on March 
10 that Marko and his party do not support a March 15 ethnic 
Hungarian "autonomy proclamation," slated to occur in a small 
Transylvanian town.  He predicted a small and peaceful event, 
although senior GOR officials insist they are worried about a 
violent confrontation.  Marko expressed frustration, however, 
with the center-right government's failure to pass a draft 
law on minority status, blaming President Traian Basescu and 
his Democratic Party (PD) for the impasse.  Basescu's 
advisers claim that they are angry the UDMR has not supported 
recent anti-corruption legislation.  The UDMR is looking at 
the "big picture" -- EU Accession in 2007 -- and is unlikely 
to formally break with the center-right coalition.  End 
Summary. 
 
A Celebration in the Szekler Homeland 
------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) A tiny group of extremists within the ethnic 
Hungarian "Szekler" community has chosen March 15, the date 
Hungarians around the world commemorate the Revolution of 
1848, to proclaim "autonomy" for the "Szekler land" region in 
Transylvania.  However, mainstream ethnic Hungarian party 
(UDMR) leader and Deputy Prime Minister Bela Marko told the 
Ambassador March 10 that the UDMR has unequivocally 
disassociated itself from this endeavor.  The event in 
question is slated to occur in the mid-sized Transylvanian 
town of Odorheiul Secuiesc, smack dab in the heartland of the 
Szekler minority.  Marko stressed that he -- and the vast 
majority of Romania's ethnic Hungarians -- viewed March 15 as 
a sort of "Hungarian national pride" day without a specific 
political context.  Marko stressed that since 1997 Romanian 
presidents and prime ministers had sent a congratulatory 
message to ethnic Hungarians every March 15. 
 
¶3.  (C) Marko stressed to the Ambassador that March 15 was "a 
big festival" for ethnic Hungarians of virtually all 
political stripes and that the vast majority of attendees at 
the March 15 event in Odorheiul Secuiesc would be there for a 
"celebration," not an overt political display.  Marko stated 
that he, like most ethnic Hungarians, did not want March 15 
"to be used for political purposes."  He predicted that the 
event would transpire peacefully and without untoward 
incident, as the "organizers will be very careful."  Marko 
recommended against a uniformed police presence in Odorheiul 
Secuiesc March 15, wryly opining that if one person "gets 
slapped" there would be a media uproar.  (Note:  A senior 
intelligence official told the Ambassador on March 9 that 
while the GOR was worried about the prospect of violence at 
the event, it planned a "discreet" security presence.  End 
Note.)  Marko mentioned that he and the Hungarian Ambassador 
would attend and participate in another town's festival 
marking March 15. 
 
¶4.  (C) Marko told the Ambassador that, in his view, the 
proposed autonomy proclamation was an effort by a splinter 
group of radical Szeklers to thwart the political standing of 
the UDMR, which is a member of the governing center-right 
coalition.  According to Marko's personal advisor Viktor 
Sata, the National Szekler Council (CNS), the party which is 
leading the move to proclaim autonomy March 15, has a 
membership of less than 2,000.  (Note: About 1.5 million 
ethnic Hungarians live in Romania.  End Note.)  Marko 
characterized Odorheiul Secuiesc Mayor Jeno Szasz as a man 
"with no values, only interests," focused exclusively on 
advancing his own political agenda.  UDMR leaders, including 
Marko, predict a relatively modest turnout in Odorheiul 
Secuiesc, between 5,000 and 10,000 people.  Marko did 
acknowledge that the opposition FIDESZ party in Hungary might 
be attempting to gain votes in the upcoming Hungarian 
elections by appealing to the more radical Szeklers, whose 
relatives live in Hungary. 
 
¶5.  (C) According to several ethnic Hungarian sources, the 
draft proclamation has not been finalized.  Even the ethnic 
Hungarian senator representing Odorheiul Secuiesc told PolOff 
that he had "not seen" the proclamation.  According to 
various sources, the proclamation may be either a relatively 
straightforward list of demands for greater civil liberties 
and cultural protections for ethnic-Hungarians in the Szekler 
region or an outright "declaration of independence." 
Odorheiul Secuiesc Mayor and CNS leader Jeno Szasz told 
EmbOff that the Szekler minority is "tired of waiting" and 
 
BUCHAREST 00000410  002 OF 003 
 
 
impatient with what he described as Romanian bureaucratic 
indifference.  He asserted that ethnic minorities in other 
countries achieved results through "active resistance." 
 
¶6.  (C) The planned Odorheiul Secuiesc autonomy proclamation 
might have gone largely unnoticed on the national scene but 
for Corneliu Vadim Tudor's extreme nationalist Greater 
Romania Party (PRM), always ready to fan the flames of ethnic 
unrest.  In recent days, the PRM has called for a 
counter-demonstration of 100,000 Romanians in Odorheiul 
Secuiesc on March 15.  Marko dismissed as hyperbole the 
possibility of Tudor staging a massive rally there, noting 
that the region is "almost entirely ethnic Hungarian" and 
that, in any case, Tudor would not receive an assembly permit 
from Mayor Szasz.  Nonetheless, Tudor's vitriolic 
denunciation of the proposed autonomy declaration has 
received wide press coverage. 
 
Against a Background of Partisan Politics... 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C) During the meeting with the Ambassador, Marko 
acknowledged that relations between the UDMR and President 
Basescu's Democratic Party (PD) were at a low ebb.  Echoing 
observations made by other UDMR leaders, Marko stated that 
his party -- and the ethnic Hungarian constituency -- was 
frustrated that the PD had failed to deliver on its promise 
to pass a law giving "cultural autonomy" to regions with a 
majority of ethnic Hungarians  (Ref).  Marko stressed that 
when the UDMR ended its alliance with the PSD and joined the 
center-right alliance in late 2004, the center-right Alliance 
promised the passage of a cultural autonomy law as the key 
condition for the UDMR entry into the alliance.  Marko 
underscored to the Ambassador that, within the center-right 
coalition, only the PD opposes the UDMR's proposed 
legislation.  According to Marko, the other two coalition 
partners, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and Conservative 
Party (PC), back the UDMR's proposed legislation. 
 
¶8.  (C) Marko told the Ambassador that Basescu and his party 
opposed the draft legislation on purely political grounds, in 
order to gain traction with nationalist voters.  (Note: 
Earlier this week, Marko publicly denounced Basescu for 
attempting to "improve his popularity through nationalistic 
rhetoric." End Note.)  The Ambassador stated that he had 
heard reports that Basescu might travel to Odorheiul Secuiesc 
March 15.  Marko rejoined that he had not heard Basescu was 
planning on attending, adding that his presence there would 
add to tension and would be a "big mistake."  Marko asked the 
Ambassador to urge Basescu to support the proposed minority 
law and also to urge the Romanian president to refrain from 
traveling to Odorheiul Secuiesc.  The Ambassador promised to 
discuss these issues with the Romanian president during a 
planned meeting March 13. 
 
¶9.  (C) Marko told the Ambassador that the UDMR would "not 
quit the coalition at this time because EU accession on 
January 2007 is our biggest priority."  He opined that the 
political tumult that would result from the UDMR's withdrawal 
from the coalition, ending the center-right alliance's 
parliamentary majority, would create political instability 
that would, in turn, put January 2007 EU accession in 
jeopardy.  Nonetheless, Marko noted, without elaborating, 
that a "very droll situation" would result if a suitable law 
on minority status does not eventually pass. 
 
¶10.  (C) Presidential Domestic Policy Adviser Claudiu Saftoiu 
told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Pekala and DCM 
March 8 that Basescu was in fact considering the possibility 
of showing up in Odorheiul Secuiesc March 15, although 
Saftoiu did not elaborate on why Basescu might go or what he 
might seek to accomplish.  Saftoiu stated that Basescu and 
his senior advisers concluded that the UDMR had "retaliated" 
when the draft law on cultural autonomy failed to pass by 
refusing to support recent anti-corruption and judicial 
reform legislation.  Saftoiu suggested the real reason for 
the UDMR's reticence reflected the fact that "the UDMR has 
been in power for ten years" under various governments and 
included many "corrupt leaders" who feared effective 
anti-corruption laws.  Prosecutors, he suggested, should 
actively investigate some of them. 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment.  The UDMR is the only ethnic Hungarian 
party (or ethnic party of any stripe), which has obtained the 
five percent threshold required for entry into Parliament. 
The vast majority of Hungarians have no truck with the tiny 
CNS or its radical demands.  That said, what might have been 
a little-noticed local event in an obscure Transylvanian town 
could conceivably become a flash point for the tensions among 
 
BUCHAREST 00000410  003 OF 003 
 
 
Basescu, his erstwhile coalition partner the UDMR, and the 
followers of extreme nationalist Vadim Tudor.  As emotional 
as some of our GOR contacts have been in recent days in 
expressing their fear of an ugly confrontation at the March 
15 event, our assessment at the moment is that there has been 
at least as much political theater as sober thinking applied 
by Cotroceni and the intelligence agencies.  EC Delegation 
head Scheele, who spoke to Ambassador on March 10 after a 
meeting with Basescu, agrees and generally discounts the 
chances of a major flare-up next week among Szeklers and 
Romanian nationalists.  Bela Marko is resolutely looking at 
the big picture, even as he angles for a more favorable 
position on the minorities legislation.  UDMR leaders have 
told us that Romania's EU entry represents the best possible 
outcome for Romania and ethnic Hungarians.  They, at least, 
have no intention of sabotaging Romania's 2007 EU accession 
chances by provoking a political crisis.  End Comment. 
 
¶12.  (C) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are 
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest 
TAUBMAN