This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG AM AJ TX KZ TI KG USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA, 
AND ENERGY SECURITY WITH EU OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In U.S.-EU COEST Troika consultations on 
Caucasus and Central Asia on February 23, EUR DAS Matt Bryza 
discussed with EU officials how to change the dynamic of 
discussions on South Ossetia.  Echoing an EU Presidency 
statement on February 21, EU representatives agreed that  the 
international community should explore the idea of a new 
forum besides the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to negotiate 
a political settlement for South Ossetia. EU officials 
acknowledged that Russian intransigence is 
an impediment in negotiations but said that Georgian rhetoric 
and behavior should also be moderated.  EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) for Caucasus Talvitie said that it is 
also important to say that the JCC still has a function in 
implementing previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1 
and 2 of Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan: 
de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic 
rehabilitation.  All agreed that discussions on 
Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) should continue despite the missed 
opportunities at the Feb.10-11 summit at Rambouillet.  The 
Austrian Presidency said it would like to help the cause of 
Armenian/Turkish relations during its tenure.  EUSR believes 
that the South Caucasus has a European future and it would be 
valuable to try to convince officials in Moscow of this.  On 
Central Asia, the Austrian Presidency said it will have a 
series of events focused on Central Asia starting in April in 
Astana.  On Kazakhstan, the European Commission highlighted 
three goals: 1) Support democratic 
reforms; 2) Assist in WTO accession; 3) Engage on energy.  On 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, EU has not been able to 
effectively address its priorities of democratization and 
poverty alleviation because of its limited representation. 
However, all agreed that promotion of moderate Islam in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be key to EU/US interests in 
the region.  There are no improvements in EU relations 
with Uzbekistan.  Regarding Turkmenistan, the EU pushed the 
idea of having human rights consultations in Ashgabat and 
promoting a constructive energy dialogue to promote European 
energy security. End Summary. 
 
Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) DAS Bryza acknowledged the Austrian EU Presidency,s 
February 21 statement on South Ossetia, which noted that the 
JCC should be judged according to the results it achieved, 
and that the international community should look at other 
avenues for negotiation.  Bryza suggested that one 
possibility could be a 
forthcoming OSCE Donors' Conference for South Ossetia, which 
would be attended by the EU and OSCE and member states from 
these organizations, and which could build momentum towards a 
new and potentially more successful negotiation process. 
Commission staff expressed caution, and Talvitie, while 
acknowledging 
the JCC's limitations, stressed that it is important for us 
to say that the JCC still has a function: implementing 
previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1 and 2 of 
Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan: 
de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic 
rehabilitation. 
 
¶3. (C) Talvitie urged a cautious approach on negotiations, 
wondering whether we should first acknowledge Russia,s 
preference to discuss de-militarization of South Ossetia 
before moving on status discussions.  Talvitie nevertheless 
stressed it should be made clear to the Russians that we do 
want to discuss status soon.  DAS Bryza acknowledged this 
reality but expressed concern that the Georgians need to see 
soon that there is a "light at the end of the tunnel" before 
they get discouraged and therefore emboldened.  The Russians 
need to understand that our leverage over the Georgians faces 
real limits, and Georgians may resort to force if they feel 
they lack support in the international community to press 
Russia to cooperate in advancing a peaceful, negotiated 
settlement.  Thus, the status quo that Russia seems to seek 
may not actually exist.  DAS Bryza expressed appreciation at 
the February 21 EU statement on South Ossetia noting we might 
build on it to  changeing the dynamic of negotiations over 
the conflict.  Bryza lamented that Russia had taken several 
provocative steps in recent days with respect to the South 
Ossetia conflict, including: walking back its agreement to 
attend a JCC session in Vienna if the Georgian parliament 
moderated its resolution calling for the withdrawal of 
Russia,s peacekeeping operation, (which the Georgian 
Parliament did in fact do); falsely dubbing a meeting in 
Moscow with the Ossetians a JCC (even though Amb. Kenyaikin 
assured Bryza this would be only an informal, preparatory 
meeting for a later JCC), and then claiming Georgia and the 
OSCE refused to attend the "JCC;" canceling Georgian Prime 
Minister Noghaideli,s meeting with Russian PM Fradkov, 
(which the Russians pledged to hold if the Georgian 
Parliament moderated its resolution); and reportedly 
conducting military over flights of Georgian territory.  EU 
interlocutors agreed such Russian behavior appeared designed 
to be provocative, and recognized that the Georgian side had 
indeed moderated its behavior in recent weeks, as requested 
by Moscow. 
 
Armenia/Azerbaijan 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Representing the incoming Finnish Presidency, Petteri 
Vuoromaki urged the continued work of OSCE 
co-chairs on N-K negotiations and believed that we needed to 
"rein in" both parties because the rhetoric is getting too 
aggressive.  He expressed concern that Azerbaijan may soon 
become bellicose on N-K as it begins to fortify its army from 
its oil windfall.  EUSR Talvitie conveyed that one high-level 
Azeri official expressed to him the desire for additional 
peace negotiations since the Rambouillet talks failed to make 
any progress.  The Austrian Presidency believed that we could 
see a Russian effort "to deliver" a solution for N-K by this 
summer's G-8 summit in order to portray itself as a 
peacemaking nation while continuing to forestall negotiations 
on South Ossetia. 
 
¶5. (C) DAS Bryza said that Rambouillet was not a complete 
failure, that Azerbaijani President Aliyev had made a 
significant offer, that the ball was now in the Armenian 
court, and that Moscow had a chance to deliver Yerevan. DAS 
Bryza expressed hope that Turkey would agree to open its 
border with Armenia should Armenia withdraw from territories 
it currently occupies in Azerbaijan as part of a broader deal 
on NK.   The Austrian Presidency said that it is interested 
in advancing Turkish/Armenian relations during its tenure and 
would work to achieve this end. 
 
¶6. (C) EUSR Talvitie said that we needed to approach 
democratization of Armenia and Azerbaijan in an 
"evolutionary" mindset.  He welcomed the U.S. statement 
following Azerbaijani elections in early November.  He 
believes transformation can happen there but that we will 
have to be patient.  In a humorous aside, EUSR said that when 
he goes to Baku and Yerevan to speak to their respective 
Parliaments, he gets standing ovations when he proclaims that 
the "EU is for evolution, not for revolution!"  However, he 
receives a standing ovation in Tbilisi when he propounds in 
Parliament that "the EU is for revolution, not for 
evolution!"  However, he believes that it is worthwhile to 
convince a tough crowd in Europe that the South Caucasus has 
a European identity and future; he thought this was common 
ground for the EU and US to work together.  Expressing 
optimism about President Aliyev, Talvitie said that Aliyev 
will need time to simultaneously shed the "dead-wood" from 
his father's entourage while building his 
own political base.  The EC said it will be opening offices 
in Azerbaijan in 2007. 
 
Kazakhstan 
---------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Commission said its goals for Kazakhstan are 
threefold: 1) Support democratic reforms; 2) Assist in WTO 
accession; 3) Engage on energy.  The EC believes that 
market-driven energy climate in Kazakhstan is important and 
it will work to achieve this; it supports the idea of 
multiple sources of energy through multiple pipelines.  DAS 
Bryza said that Kazakhstan is emerging as the key partner in 
the region and that the EU/US should work with Kazakhstan,s 
new Deputy Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, to  help him move 
reforms forward.  All agreed that Kazakhstan's bid for the 
2009 OSCE Chairman-in-Office is problematic, but we should 
not rule out future bids. 
 
Tajikistan 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Commission pointed out that Tajikistan is the most 
important and biggest recipient of the Commission's aid in 
Central Asia.  However, given the EU's limited representation 
in Dushanbe, efforts to channel this aid to effective use for 
poverty alleviation are hamstrung.  The EC expressed concern 
about President Rahmonov's systematic repression of political 
candidates and the Tajik Parliament's consideration of an NGO 
law that would require continued re-registration of foreign 
NGOs represented in 
the country; the EC considers this proposal misguided and 
would seriously impede their NGO operations. 
 
¶9. (C) All parties agreed on the importance of helping 
Tajikistan Bolster its traditions of tolerant faith and 
scientific learning to counter foreign missionaries, 
attempts to import extremist interpretations of  Islam.  DAS 
Bryza conveyed that this is an important area for EU/US 
cooperation and that together we can help remind Tajiks of 
the importance of their indigenous history and their 
deeply-held, moderate Islamic roots.  The Austrian Presidency 
believed that, together, the EU and US should convey to 
Rahmonov that having a moderate Islamic political party in 
his government is a positive sign.  DAS Bryza concurred and 
said that the USG has been trying to send this message but 
Rahmonov's 
mistrust of political opposition is hindering progress on 
this front. 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
---------- 
 
¶10. (C) EU officials expressed worry about Kyrgyzstan 
trending "from bad to worse."  Political discussions between 
the EU and the Kyrgyz government have been disappointing, 
Council officials said, and the economy is not only slowing, 
but contracting.  The Commission made reference to a 
cooperation agreement that was signed on February 3 between 
Turkish Cypriots and Kyrgyzstan; the EC believes that Moscow 
might have encouraged this deal to be signed as a way to 
drive a wedge between Brussels and 
Bishkek.  Further enshrouding this situation was when the EU 
asked the Kyrgyz government for the substance of the 
agreement, the Kyrgyz declined saying the agreement is 
confidential.  Furthermore, the EC thought it was odd that 
 
SIPDIS 
the Turkish Prime Minister recently received the Kyrgyz 
Foreign Minister.  DAS Bryza believed that the pull from 
Moscow is  strong right now in Bishkek (as it is in Dushanbe) 
and therefore we have to work extra hard to advance 
democratization in these two countries.  We have a 
real interest in seeing Kyrgyzstan succeed - therefore, we 
have to promote democracy.  Stability comes 
legitimacy, which derives from democracy.  EU officials 
agreed with DAS Bryza that the GOK risked prompting a 
resurgence of civil unrest if it failed to advance democratic 
and constitutional reform and fight corruption.  Civil 
society (fortunately) remained vibrant in Kyrgyzstan, and 
expected President Bakiyev to deliver on his promises to 
provide justice and prosperity. 
 
Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Austrian Presidency conveyed that there have been 
no improvements in the EU's relationship with Tashkent. 
There is little incentive for the EU to cooperate with 
Uzbekistan as the Karimov government says it wants to be able 
to choose which EU NGOs can operate in the country; if the EU 
does not allow this, the Commission said, the government has 
said it will make life extremely difficult 
for NGOs there.  Citing no improvement in US-Uzbek relations, 
DAS Bryza said the U.S. aimed to sustain its current - albeit 
modest - level of engagement with Uzbekistan.  The U.S. had 
made a conscious decision to criticize the GOU,s 
indiscriminate use of force in Andijan, in full recognition 
that this would likely cost us access to the air base at 
Karshi Khanabad. Karimov was uncomfortable in the 
position he is in right now being wholly dependent on Beijing 
and Moscow.  Perhaps he would come to his senses and realize 
the only way to end the descending spiral of 
repression-extremism-repression-extremism was to embrace 
reform rather than repression.  In the long run, the United 
States and the people of Uzbekistan would hopefully be able 
to work together to help the people of Uzbekistan embrace the 
moderate traditions of Classical Islam that were born a 
millennium ago in what is today Uzbekistan.  This was perhaps 
the most effective way to counter the extremist threat that 
Hizb-U-Tahir poses to Uzbekistan. 
 
¶12. (C) On Turkmenistan, DAS Bryza called on  the EU/US to 
explore whether a trans-Caspian gas pipeline might bolster 
European energy security.  DAS Bryza explained that   Niyazov 
was indicating interest in a Trans-Caspian Pipeline to 
provide him some leverage in dealing with Gazprom, thereby 
allowing him to negotiate a gas sales price that Gazprom 
could no longer dictate and which was closer to prices in the 
European market.  The Austrian Presidency shared these 
opinions but also pushed to have 
human rights conversations with Turkmen officials in Ashgabat 
(where, they said, a lot of government officials actually 
show up for these meetings).  DAS Bryza agreed, recounting 
how he told President Niyazov in January that securing the 
participation of U.S. companies and/or export finance 
organizations like OPIC in a trans-Caspian pipeline would 
require progress on democracy and human rights. 
 
Energy Security 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (C) DAS Bryza discussed the broader issue of European 
energy security with EU officials.  The U.S. sought to 
enhance European energy security because the more secure 
Europe is, the more secure the U.S. will be, and because U.S. 
interests are served when markets function well.  While we do 
not want confrontation with Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom, we 
share an interest with our European friends in Europe 
diversifying Europe,s gas supplies away from Gazprom.  We 
could do so by relying on market mechanisms.  Our goal is to 
accelerate upstream investment by private companies in gas 
production in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Iraq, which in 
turn will provide Europe confidence that it can negotiate 
more firmly with Gazprom on pricing without locking itself 
into long-term deals that increase its dependence on a singly 
supplier of gas.  But convincing upstream producers to 
accelerate their investments would require Europeans to 
provide requisite regulatory reforms and pipeline 
infrastructure to receive Central Asian gas.  Turkmenistan 
figures prominently in this strategy, since its gas reserves 
are the largest currently in play for delivery to Europe via 
either the Gazprom network or a new corridor running across 
the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, then through Georgia and 
Turkey to Greece and Italy,  and/or to Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Austria.  As such a "Southern Corridor" emerges, 
the large split between Central Asian and European gas prices 
would gradually diminish, thereby eliminating the enormous 
rents that fuel organized crime and lack of energy sector 
reform along pipeline routes.  Moreover, as Gazprom lost the 
ability to force Central Asian countries to sell it cheap 
gas, it would need to reform itself internally to attract 
foreign investors required to develop gas fields in Russia. 
This was the only way to channel Gazprom toward more 
market-based and therefore, constructive behavior.  EU 
officials took on board this message.  They agreed on the 
need to eliminate the price differentials between gas bought 
in Central Asia and Europe and agreed commercial competition 
was the best and perhaps only way to channel Gazprom toward 
reform rather than acquisition of European energy assets. 
EUSR said that the EU will play an important role in 
advancing energy security in its dialogue with Turkey.  The 
EU said a green paper on European energy security would be 
forthcoming in the spring. 
 
¶14. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable. 
McKinley 
.