This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000707 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS MD UP EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS KRAMER DISCUSSES RUSSIA, UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, 
AND BELARUS WITH EU OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On February 22, EUR DAS David Kramer held 
COEST Troika consultations with the EU on Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, and Belarus. On Russia, the EU agrees that a 
combative Russia feels it is in an increasingly strengthened 
position.  The European Commission viewed the "creeping 
reassertiveness" of Russia with concern but focused on 
potential areas of cooperation such as deeper economic 
engagement - once WTO accession has taken place - and on the 
four common spaces agreement the EU has with Russia.  On 
Belarus, the EU emphasized that Belarus is isolating itself 
with its revanchist behavior and, despite 
EU/US efforts to engage the Belarusian government, there is 
no reciprocal behavior from the authorities in Minsk.  Asset 
freezes and travel bans, in addition to revoking General 
System of Preferences (GSP), were discussed as possible 
post-election censures that could be carried out in the event 
of problematic presidential elections March 19.  On Ukraine, 
the Austrians (EU presidency) said they have told Kiev that 
standards will be high for upcoming parliamentary elections 
and that a government should be formed quickly.  There was 
broad disappointment at Ukraine's backsliding on its 
purported agreements on helping facilitate a settlement for 
Transnistria.  On Moldova, EU Special Representative (EUSR) 
for Moldova 
Adrian Jacobovits underlined that the Russian position on 
Transnistria is making it significantly harder to move 
forward; Moscow is getting "cocky."  The EC said it is 
looking at expanding the size of its Border Assistance 
Mission (BAM) in Moldova. End Summary. 
 
Russia 
------ 
 
¶2. (C)  In EUR/DAS Kramer's February 22 US-EU COEST Troika 
discussions with EU officials, there was broad consensus that 
dealing with Moscow is becoming increasingly difficult.  In a 
separate consultation, Fokion Fotiadis, Deputy Director 
General for European Neighborhood Policy in the Commission, 
told DAS Kramer that the EC sees Russia as "trending in the 
wrong direction" and that they would like to send a tough 
message to Moscow on energy security in the runup to the G-8 
Summit without making it look as if they are declaring war on 
Russia.  Russia should "get the message" on market-oriented 
policies - if Russia wants Europe to have market policies, 
then Russia will have to adapt to such principles on Europe's 
terms as well.  He expressed interest in sitting down with US 
officials to try to come to an agreement on how this message 
should be conveyed.  Expressing a broader concern with 
Moscow's 
political use of its energy companies, Fotiadis said that 
Russian energy companies operating in Europe will come under 
closer scrutiny by the European Commission competition 
commission.  Fotiadis agreed with DAS Kramer that much more 
support for Russia's neighbors is needed, particularly 
Ukraine, because of Russian behavior. 
 
¶3. (C)  EU Council officials shared the belief that a Russian 
Presidency of the G-8 is a challenge for everybody as we see 
that Russia does not share our view of what its G-8 
presidency should look like.  It looks as if the Russians see 
their G-8 presidency as a "window of opportunity" to assert 
more power and be more forceful, according to EU Council 
Russia policy official Carl Hallergard.  In response to a 
question on whether the Kremlin cares what the EU and US 
think anymore, Hallergard stated that, "to the extent that 
the Russians care, they think they can handle it - but it 
looks like they simply 
don't care anymore."  He went on to say that Foreign Minster 
Lavrov's recent message to the EU is that EU/Russia 
consultations only occur when there is a crisis and that the 
EU should consult with Russia earlier and more frequently. 
 
¶4. (C) While acknowledging the challenges that face the EU in 
dealing with Russia, EU officials also looked at areas of 
engagement that will be possible over the coming months. 
Petteri Vuoromaki of Finland, representing the incoming 
Finnish Presidency of the EU, said that Russia would be a 
priority of the Finnish tenure.  He stated that Finland would 
focus on discussing contractual obligations 
between the EU and Russia, reinvigorating the energy 
dialogue, stressing the importance of regional cooperation 
across external borders, developing the EU-Russia 
"four-spaces" agreement, and discussing the importance of 
human rights in Russia.  On human rights consultations, 
Vuoromaki and the Austrian Presidency said that they were not 
optimistic - but realistic - and nevertheless intended 
to bring up human rights during EU/Russia consultations the 
week of February 27.  The EC stressed that its willingness to 
engage Russia on stabilization of the North Caucasus remains 
but Russian obstinance is precluding fruitful consultations 
in this area.  The Commission also said its assistance budget 
for Russia is going down. 
 
¶5. (C) The EU took on board DAS Kramer's message that the US 
is becoming increasingly pragmatic when it comes to Russia. 
However, Kramer noted that Russia is much more cooperative on 
Iran than it was a few years ago - "we are now reading from 
the same book...perhaps even the same chapter...but we are 
not yet on the same page."  The Austrian Presidency responded 
favorably to this encouraging development. 
 
Belarus 
------- 
 
¶6. (C)  In wide ranging discussions on Belarus, EU officials 
presented a united front on encouraging a 
democratic outcome for Belarus in upcoming presidential 
elections but differed on possible post-election measures in 
the event of a problematic March 19 vote.  The Austrians 
recognize that the Belarusian government is isolating itself 
- it is not the US or the EU that is isolating Belarus. 
However, when it came to using targeted asset freezes and 
travel restrictions on Lukashenko and his regime after a 
possible flawed election, the Austrians were hesitant to make 
such a commitment.  DAS Kramer conveyed 
that it would not necessarily be a bad thing if word got out 
to Lukashenko that the EU and US were considering such steps 
because it would get Lukashenko, and those around him, 
thinking.  The Commission reported that the EU may withdraw 
GSP from Belarus later in March (as a result of ILO 
proceedings that are not linked to the elections).  The 
action would have an economic impact on Belarus (e.g. textile 
producers), and the GOB had already approached the EU on this 
issue. 
 
¶7. (C)  A Belarus Policy Dinner hosted by the Lithuanian 
Mission sharpened the discussion on strategies for Belarus. 
DAS Kramer stressed that we need to start acting now on what 
kind of messages we want to send to Minsk.  We want to get 
Lukashenko thinking - in this connection, the EU's possible 
withdrawal of GSP seems to have gotten the attention of 
Lukashenko - and turn the heat up on the Belarusian regime. 
A united EU and US policy would be more effective in forcing 
those around Lukashenko to decide on 
which side of a tightening "noose" they want to be.  The 
Lithuanian PSC Ambassador broached the idea of a longer-term 
strategy of reaching out to mid-level Belarusian officials 
after the election to send the message that certain 
Belarusians could still be welcomed in Europe.  DAS Kramer 
urged restraint in the initial post-election period, 
responding that we want mid-level officials to think they may 
be on a possible visa ban list which would make them think 
twice about continuing to support Lukashenko. 
 
¶8. (C)  Comment.  Follow-up discussions with EU officials and 
the Hungarian and Polish PSC Ambassadors yielded some 
reassuring comments that EU member states are likely to 
support a targeted expansion of the visa ban following the 
elections.  It will probably take about two weeks for the EU 
decision process to work its way through so we should not 
expect an ability to coordinate a response in days.  The 
Poles, in particular, will "insist" on expanding the visa 
ban.  The Polish PSC Ambassador told USEU on February 
24 that he fully expects Lukashenko to really crack down as 
the election date gets closer and he is confident member 
states will not need much persuading to support action beyond 
a statement. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment continued.  Gaining EU consensus to go beyond 
a limited visa ban extension could be somewhat more 
problematic and would depend on continued deterioration, if 
not use of violence, by Belarusian forces.  There appears to 
be strong EU consensus, however, to coordinate 
statements and actions on: 1) A possible pre-election 
statement urging restraint and cautioning against violence; 
2) Coordinating immediate post-election statements; 3) Taking 
steps such as extending the visa ban.  The Polish Ambassador 
noted that EU heads-of-state will be meeting March 23 in 
Brussels.  If there is significant violence or other 
developments warranting discussion at this level, they will 
have a perfectly timed public opportunity to comment on the 
elections. 
 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
¶10. (C)  In a limited discussion on Ukraine, all parties 
agreed that standards for the upcoming parliamentary 
elections will be high but that we expect the elections to go 
smoothly.  There is the hope and expectation from the EU that 
Ukraine will form a government quickly after the elections. 
Fokion Fotiadis agreed that support for Ukraine is essential 
in the face of Russian pressure but that the 
EU's two most promising areas of engagement - visa 
facilitation and closer EU economic integration - are not 
workable at this time.  The EU took on board the message that 
we should support Ukraine in the event it decides to revisit 
the January 4 gas deal with Russia, specifically the 
disturbing role of middleman company RosUkrEnergo. 
 
¶11. (C) There was broader disappointment at Ukraine's 
handling of the Transnistrian conflict.  After early signals 
that it wanted to play a constructive regional mediation 
role, Ukraine has not followed through on its commitment to 
begin enforcing the use of Moldovan customs seals on cargo 
coming from or transiting Transnistria. 
 
Moldova 
------- 
 
¶12. (C)  Focusing on resolution of the Transnistrian 
conflict, EUSR Jacobovits said that Russia's position on 
Transnistria is making it harder all the time to move 
forward; he commented that Russia was getting "cocky."  He 
outlined four points: 1) Insist on Ukrainian implementation 
of the customs declaration; 2) Democratization of 
Transnistria; 3) Change the peace stabilization force into a 
multinational force; 4) Insist on Russian withdrawal from 
ammunition bases.  DAS Kramer conveyed that we need to let 
the parties involved in settlement talks know that the status 
quo is unacceptable.  He noted that the Russian side has 
played an unhelpful role in this conflict, while the 
Transnistrians have demonstrated no seriousness toward the 
negotiations. 
 
¶13. (C) Commenting again on Transnistria, Carl Hallergard 
noted that Moldovan President Voronin's intransigence was 
creating a lot of enemies in Brussels.  Hallergard speculated 
that member states may soon run out of patience with Voronin 
and defer to Moscow's lead on resolving the issue.  On the 
issue of a PKO, Hallergard mentioned that Russia 
interestingly continues to broach the idea of a joint 
EU/Russia PKO to EU officials.  The EU would only be 
interested in a PKO as part of a settlement process. 
 
¶14. (C) The European Commission said that its Border 
Assistance Monitoring (BAM) Mission on the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border is in its third month of implementation, but that it 
is increasingly difficult to solicit Ukrainian cooperation. 
The EU is looking at increasing the size of the mission from 
the 69 that are presently there. 
 
¶15. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this cable. 
McKinley 
.