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RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 7764
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RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002063 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CO
SUBJECT: LIBERAL PARTY CANDIDATE RIVERA ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CHANCES 


Classified By: Political Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis.
Reasons: 1.4 (b,d) 

------- 
Summary 
------- 

¶1. (C) Liberal party presidential candidate and Senator 
Rodrigo Rivera Salazar, in a March 3 breakfast with poloffs, 
reviewed his campaign strategy, forecast the future of his 
party, and discussed how he would improve Colombia's role in 
the region.  Rivera predicted that he would he would win the 
March 12 primary for the Liberal Party (PLC) nomination and 
go on to defeat President Uribe in the May 28 election. 
Rivera characterized himself as in the mold of President 
Clinton, a "moderate outsider" who planned to surprise 
everyone with a "David and Goliath-like" type victory.  He 
said the Liberals had not yet developed a party line on the 
FTA, but he personally viewed the FTA as predominately 
positive, with a few reservations on how it might affect 
displaced farmers and anti-narcotic efforts.  Rivera is 
highly unlikely to win the PLC primary, but is a future 
presidential contender, particularly popular with young 
voters.  He is likely to finish behind HoracioSerpa but 
should make a strong enough showing to be considered a 
serious Liberal option in 2010.  End summary. 

--------------------- 
Climbing in the Polls 
--------------------- 

¶2. (C) Rivera told Poloffs March 3 that he was confident of 
victory in the March 12 primary despite trailing in the 
polls.  He acknowledged that he trailed both HoracioSerpa
and Rafael Pardo in some polls, but claimed there were others 
that had him in the lead.  On March 5, a poll in "El Tiempo," 
Colombia's most widely-circulated newspaper, showed Rivera in 
second place with 9 percent, behind Serpa's 57 percent, and 
ahead of Pardo's 8 percent.  In most previous polls, he has 
trailedPardo.  The poll showed 22 percent of voters were 
still undecided.  (Note: all eligible voters are permitted to 
vote in the Liberal Party primary, not just PLC members.) 
Assistant Secretary of the PLC Boris Zapata, responsible for 
PLC internal polling, told Poloff on March 7 that internal 
party information showed Rivera doing even better.  Zapata 
saidSerpa was expected to garner 45-50 percent, Rivera 15-20 
percent, Pardo 10-12 percent, and Andres Gonzalez 3-4 percent 
of the vote.  Of the two promising candidates expected to 
finish behind Serpa, Zapata predicted that Rivera would be 
the stronger candidate for the Liberals in 2010. 

------------------------- 
Making a Name for Himself 
------------------------- 

¶3. (C) Rivera said his strategy to employ television as a 
means of securing votes nationally would lead him to victory. 
 He claimed that Serpa and Pardo dominated exposure in 
leading newspapers and magazines such as "El Tiempo" and "La 
Semana," due to "family connections."  He was convinced that 
19 million television viewers, from all parts of the nation, 
would far outweigh the few who follow the "biased" 
print-media.  He predicted that his strong performances in 
televised debates and interviews would translate into votes 
on election day.  Serpa and Pardo's weakness, he claimed, was 
focusing too heavily on the Bogota electorate.  Rivera 
calculated he would need 1.5 million votes to win the primary. 

-------------------------- 
Trying to Not Make Enemies 
-------------------------- 

¶4. (C) Rivera said he was good friends with two his main 
challengers, Serpa and Pardo, and was determined not to 
engage in personal attacks or negative campaigning (Note: 
Pardo and Rivera reportedly had a brief shoving match last 
week.  End Note).  He claimed that if Serpa won, it would be 
disastrous for the PLC, since Colombians had "turned the page 
onSerpa," who has lost twice already in presidential 
elections.  Rivera believed Pardo had a much better chance 
against Uribe, but despite his being an excellent politician, 
he was "about politics," while Rivera was "about issues." 
Rivera expressed frustration at the lack of issues being 
discussed, but said it was Colombian tradition to focus more 
on personalities than platforms.  He claimed that Uribe won 
in 2002 on the sole issue of security, whereas Rivera 
championed a platform of reducing corruption, universal 
health care, and mandatory education, in addition to security. 

--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Liberals On the Rise; Number of Parties Declining 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

¶5. (C) Rivera said the future of the Liberal party was 
excellent and the PLC would be in extraordinary shape if 
Serpa lost the primary.  He predicted that the PLC would gain 
the most seats overall in the House and the Senate, but that 
parties supporting Uribe would have slight control in both 
houses by forming a tenuous coalition.  Rivera said if he did 
win, he would be inclusive, and work with Uribistas, 
particularly since many were former PLC members.  Rivera 
foresaw the number of parties in Colombia declining 
dramatically following elections as a result of new electoral 
rules dictating that a party must garner 2 percent of votes 
cast for either House or Senate to maintain its official 
party status (ref A).  He said eight parties would remain 
from the current 59.  According to Rivera, the eight parties 
weretheLiberals, Cambio Radical, Partido Conservador, 
Partido de la "U," Polo Democratico Alternativo, Colombia 
Democratico, Colombia Viva, and Convergencia Ciudadana, (Ref
B). (Note: Embassy predicts that 8-12 recognized parties will 
remain following the election). 

--------------------------------------- 
Colombia's Foreign Policy in the Region 
--------------------------------------- 

¶6. (C) Rivera criticized Uribe for distancing himself from 
the region's leaders and said regional cooperation on 
anti-terrorism and anti-nacotrafficking had suffered as a 
result.  He pointed to Colombia's growing importance in the 
region, and said that as President, he would ensure Colombia 
served as a "bridge of confidence" between the United States 
and countries like Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.  In 
Rivera's view, Uribe had chosen an adversarial approach with 
leaders in the region, whom he believed had the potential to 
assist Colombia in defeating the FARC, a group he styled the 
"Al-Qaida of the region."  On the topic of the FTA with the 
United States, he said he saw the benefits, but worried that 
the farmers who lost their jobs would turn to coca 
cultivation if the government did not develop an alternative 
plan for crop diversification.  He admitted that the PLC had 
not yet established a party line on the FTA, but if they were 
to support it, the Government needed to offer more economic 
support for Colombian farmers. 

----------------------------- 
Comment and Biographical Note 
----------------------------- 

¶7. (C) Rivera, a 14-year Congressional veteran, has no shot 
at winning the PLC primary.  He is popular, however, among 
younger voters, who view him as articulate and knowledgeable. 
 He might be able to build on that support in 2010 or beyond. 
 Rivera (along with Pardo and Gonzalez) placed himself at 
personal risk by taking a strongly anti-paramilitary stand in 
the national debate on the Justice and Peace Law.  He is also 
a leading supporter of the U.S.-Colombian extradition 
relationship.  A former IVP grantee, Rivera has been open to 
dealing with us on major issues. 
WOOD