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P 230529Z MAR 06
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM KJUS PGOV KMDR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (OR THE LACK THEREOF) 
 
 
 ¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The issue of judicial independence in 
the Kyrgyz Republic continues to be problematic, with the 
judiciary little more than a tool of the executive branch. 
Even with the ouster of President Akayev in March 2005 and 
the guarded optimism that judicial reforms might follow, 
little has changed to improve the situation of the judiciary 
in terms of its actual independence.  Salaries remain 
woefully low, training insufficient, and corruption rampant 
) all resulting in a Kyrgyz public deeply distrustful of the 
judiciary.  End Summary. 
 
Soviet Legacy Continues 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) As in most post-Soviet states, the legal system in 
Kyrgyzstan is still based largely on Soviet and, to a lesser 
extent, Tsarist Russian civil law.  During Soviet times, of 
course, there was no concept of judicial independence, as the 
Communist Party controlled the court system.  When the Soviet 
Union collapsed, this lack of judicial independence continued 
in the Kyrgyz Republic, with the executive branch stepping in 
to take over the role that the Communist Party had in 
directing the judiciary, influencing decisions, and 
appointing and removing judges.  Even with the changes that 
have taken place since independence, the judiciary in the 
Kyrgyz Republic still bears a striking resemblance to the 
Soviet system, especially as regards judicial independence. 
 
¶3.  (U) Under the current constitution, the judiciary is 
divided between two main bodies at the national level ) the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court (the High Court of 
Arbitration was abolished in 2003, with jurisdiction 
reverting to the Supreme Court).  The Supreme Court acts as 
the highest appeals court for both civil and criminal cases, 
while the Constitutional Court oversees only cases involving 
constitutional interpretation and presidential elections. 
Lower courts include first-tier district or municipal (rayon) 
courts and second-tier regional (oblast) courts.  Original 
jurisdiction rests only with district-level courts, with 
regional courts acting only as appellate courts.  Separate 
courts also exist for commercial and military matters. 
 
Appointment and Training of Judges 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The appointment and removal of judges is another 
area firmly under the control of the executive, with the 
President responsible for nominations to the Supreme Court 
and Constitutional Court and responsible for appointments to 
the lower courts.  The removal of judges, except from the 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts, continues to be at the 
discretion of the President.  Although structures are now in 
place for the President's appointments to be confirmed by the 
Parliament, much remains to be done.  In addition to the 
problem of judicial appointments, the issue of training is 
also quite problematic. Qualifications for judges are rather 
low (in general, simply a law degree and 5-10 years' 
experience "in the field of law" depending on which court the 
judge is appointed) and training provided to new judges is 
non-existent. 
 
Judicial Changes under Akayev 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) There have been numerous changes to the judicial 
system since independence, culminating in the constitutional 
amendments of February 2003, which introduced numerous 
structural changes to the judicial system, such as new legal 
codes, jurisdiction restructuring and formal establishment of 
the independence of the judiciary.  The 2003 version of the 
constitution stripped the Constitutional Court of most of its 
power.  It now hears only a small handful of cases each year. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Even where changes have been made to bring the 
Kyrgyz judiciary more in line with internationally accepted 
legal norms, these changes have routinely been ignored, as 
the judicial system remains firmly under the control of the 
executive branch despite constitutional guarantees of 
 
BISHKEK 00000385  002 OF 003 
 
 
independence.  Under the current constitution, the judicial 
branch is guaranteed independence, and transparent rules for 
appointing and removing judges are in place, although in 
practice these guarantees are routinely violated.  Under 
President Akayev, little of substance changed with regards to 
the issue of judicial independence, with the executive still 
retaining significant control over the judiciary at every 
level. 
 
Optimism after March Events 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) After the events of last March, and the subsequent 
election of a new government, there was reason for some 
optimism with regards to the expansion of the judiciary's 
role, and even a stated commitment from the government itself 
that this issue would be addressed.  While advances in the 
role and independence of the Parliament have been quite 
obvious; similar advances in the role and independence of the 
judiciary have not been forthcoming.  As with many reforms 
initially proposed by the new government, little of substance 
has actually developed.  The overall result is that the 
judiciary still has not incorporated many basic protections 
afforded in Western jurisprudence; and in cases where these 
protections are present on paper, such as the presumption of 
innocence for the accused, they are often ignored. 
 
Payment of Judges and the Issue of Corruption 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) It is widely held that the judiciary itself is 
plagued by corruption and inconsistency.  Even if judges were 
not under the control of the executive with regards to 
certain decisions, the issue of bribery, stemming in part 
from the woefully low salaries for judges, would add another 
very serious impediment to judicial independence.  The 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Court said publicly that 
while an average judge in Kazakhstan makes $2,000 per month, 
her salary is only $200 per month.  According to Freedom 
House's "Countries at the Crossroads 2004", "court decisions 
often reflect the interest first of the executive and second 
of those who pay bribes."  Given the present system, the 
level of judicial independence in the Kyrgyz Republic is 
extremely low. 
 
¶9.  (U) In a recent survey of 60 judges who attended a 
workshop entitled, "Making the Judicial System an Effective 
Branch of Government," 98 percent responded that lack of 
judicial independence was either, "a serious problem" (20 
percent) or "a very serious problem" (78 percent) hampering 
the work of the judicial system in Kyrgyzstan.  While judges 
themselves are certainly part of the problem, until 
substantial reforms are undertaken and enforced, little 
improvement can be expected. 
 
The Future of Judicial Independence 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) The Millennium Challenge Corporation, which has 
recently decided to grant the Kyrgyz Republic Threshold 
Status, identified judicial independence as one area in which 
improvement needs to be made before funding can be given. 
Currently, two important draft laws are under consideration 
that could affect both the independence of the judiciary and 
the status of MCA threshold program funding:  one draft law 
addresses the status of judges and the other the status of 
the Supreme Court.  The outcome of both draft laws is being 
carefully watched, especially in terms of how judicial 
independence may be affected. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Comment:  The past year has been a tumultuous one 
for the Kyrgyz Republic.  Often lost in the shuffle is the 
role of the judiciary )- Kyrgyzstan's third and least 
visible branch of government.  While we have witnessed the 
growth of parliamentary independence to some extent over the 
past year, we have not witnessed a similar expansion of the 
independence of the judiciary.  It remains largely under the 
influence of the executive branch, and thus not an 
independent third branch of government providing much needed 
 
BISHKEK 00000385  003 OF 003 
 
 
checks and balances in government. 
YOVANOVITCH