VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0889/01 0901456
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311456Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2370
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0551
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7356

S E C R E T BERLIN 000889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 
TAGS: PTER EFIN KCRM PINR PREL FR GM
SUBJECT: SHUTTING DOWN THE PKK IN FRANCE AND GERMANY: 
EMBASSY BERLIN STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. STATE 35685 
 
     ¶B. FEB 16 KOUMANS - SNOW/HUNT/FISHER EMAIL 
     ¶C. 05 BERLIN 3168 
     ¶D. 05 BERLIN 3506 
     ¶E. 05 BERLIN 3796 
     ¶F. 05 BERLIN 4162 
     ¶G. MARCH 16 KOUMANS - SNOW/HUNT/FISHER EMAIL 
 
Classified By: DCM John A. Cloud for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Upon receipt of Ref A, DCM chaired a meeting of 
relevant members of the country team and post raised the 
issue of PKK support in Germany with the Turkish DCM and 
senior members of the German government.  German officials 
state an awareness of the threats posed by the PKK and a 
readiness to do more to combat them, but express some 
frustration at Turkish efforts to date regarding requests for 
extradition and other assistance, and note resource 
constraints and obstacles posed by German courts.  The 
Turkish Embassy, while angry over PKK activity in Germany and 
eager for more German action, did not appear heavily engaged 
in dialogue or other efforts with German officials to improve 
the status quo.  Post will continue to engage and push German 
officials on the PKK, particularly in the context of overall 
cooperation in fighting terrorism, but it may be necessary 
for the Turkish government to energize further its embassy 
and to ensure they take an active lead. 
Country Team Meeting 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) The DCM and EMIN chaired an interagency meeting March 
7 with Legat and others to discuss the requests in ref A, to 
examine what German law enforcement and other authorities are 
currently doing, and to map out a strategy for working with 
the Turkish Embassy here as well as with the Germans to 
ratchet up the efforts.  An integral part of the effort would 
be raising the PKK in discussions regarding fighting other 
terrorist groups as well as direct approaches to German 
authorities to achieve specific steps regarding the PKK. 
Some of the agencies present noted it would be useful if they 
received specific instructions from their headquarters as 
well regarding the higher USG focus on the PKK. 
 
Interior Ministry 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (S) EMIN raised the PKK issue with Interior Ministry State 
Secretary August Hanning March 14.  Hanning in reply referred 
 
SIPDIS 
to ongoing German efforts to prosecute PKK ringleaders (refs 
C-F) and said Germany takes a "hard line" with the PKK. 
Hanning noted the Interior Ministry's ban on E. Xani 
Publishing (publisher of Ozgur Politika, which the Interior 
Ministry said was tied to the PKK when the MOI moved to ban 
it in late 2005; refs E and F).  Hanning regretted the German 
court's decision to block the ban, but stressed E. Xani 
remains under close surveillance by German authorities and 
that the investigation continues.  "We are watching money 
collection and transfer," said Hanning and elaborated that 
the PKK raised money -- sometimes forcibly -- in Germany and 
moved it to Turkey.  Interior Ministry staff told emboffs the 
German government is still deliberating whether and how to 
reinstate the ban by redrafting the law. 
 
Turkish Embassy, Part One 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) EMIN met with Turkish DCM Adnan Basaga March 16 (ref 
G) on the issue and the need to coordinate approaches to the 
Germans.  Basaga, who is serving for the third time in 
Germany, described a prior tour when he was assigned to a 
Turkish Consulate in Germany during a period of PKK attacks 
on Turkish missions.  He recounted coming to work after the 
PKK had attacked and burned his office.  Basaga said Germany 
at the time had cited the PKK's social and political goals 
and had remained ambivalent until the early 1990s, when the 
PKK attacked German law enforcement personnel.  In 1994 came 
the German ban on the PKK.  Basaga blamed the PKK for "the 
majority of drug smuggling and sales in Germany" (NOTE: DEA 
at post cannot confirm the allegation, but notes Turkish 
nationals, whether PKK members or not, are important players 
in heroin imports into Germany, as are Russians and nationals 
of other countries.  End Note.)  Basaga also stated the PKK 
is engaged in extortion and other fundraising among the 2.5 
million Turks and other individuals in Germany.  He estimates 
the PKK raises 40 million Euros a year here and said the 
organization's "brains" are in Germany.  Reiterating some of 
the points Counselor Kemal Tuzun made previously (para 6 
below; ref B) Basaga said the PKK also recruits fighters and 
trains them in northern Iraq.  Basaga provided EMIN with a 
copy of Ozgur Politika, which is written in Turkish and 
 
Kurdish, and pointed to advertisements he says are 
inflammatory, including one showing the PKK flag and calling 
for Kurds to participate in a March 18 demonstration in 
Frankfurt.  Basaga showed his frustration when he claimed 
Kurdish demonstrators in Germany openly wear T-shirts and 
carry signs featuring the PKK flag and imprisoned leader 
Ocalan, but alleged that "surely" German authorities would 
not let demonstrators wear Usama Bin Laden T-shirts. 
 
¶5. (C) Basaga asked EMIN to wait before contacting German 
authorities; he said their instructions from Ankara are that 
"they go first."  EMIN replied the two Embassies should stay 
in close touch, but we were reluctant to change an 
appointment with MFA Counterterrorism Commissioner Georg 
Witschel (para 7 below).  EMIN agreed, however, to delay 
talking further to the MOI until the Turkish Embassy had a 
chance.  We provided the Turks with the names of some key 
people they might meet, and designated Tuzun and Acting 
Global Affairs Counselor as our working points of contact 
(NOTE: Basaga and Tuzun gave the impression they were not in 
regular contact with German CT officials; they were 
unfamiliar with names and titles.  END NOTE). 
 
¶6. (C) On the subject of German legal assistance, in an 
earlier meeting February 15 with Global Affairs Acting 
Counselor, Tuzun complained German courts reject nearly all 
Turkish extradition requests.  He admitted some requests had 
thin documentation, but not all; some he said were well 
documented.  Tuzun said Turkey gave Germany a "four page 
proposal" on a German-Turkish exchange program for CT 
scholars, prosecutors and judges to try to address this 
problem. 
 
Foreign Ministry 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (S) EMIN met MFA Counterterrorism Commissioner Georg 
Witschel and a member of his staff March 20 to continue to 
press USG concerns.  Witschel noted the size of the Turkish 
population and its dispersal in Germany.  He said the German 
police had a surprising shortage of Turkish, let alone 
Kurdish, speaking personnel.  They nevertheless, he said, 
watched carefully for possible violent acts, including by PKK 
youth and splinter groups.  Germany sees demonstrations, fund 
raising, propaganda and "low level violence," but no serious 
violence or killings.  The PKK was still suffering in the 
aftermath of the Ocalan capture, Witschel stated; 
organizationally it was not as strong as it had been.  That 
said, Witschel believes a new leadership was emerging as the 
recent violence in Turkey suggested.  According to Witschel, 
the PKK has a well-organized system of about 14 subgroups 
with a European, German, and regional hierarchical 
military-style structure.  Several thousand PKK members in 
Germany are involved in fund raising, but a smaller number 
are in the leadership, he said.  There are tens of thousands 
of PKK supporters in Germany, Witschel said, some voluntary 
and some forced.  It would overwhelm German law enforcement 
to target all PKK supporters, so it targeted the leadership. 
Witschel claimed French, Belgian, and Dutch authorities faced 
the same problem.  Witschel referred to the September 2005 
arrest (ref E) of PKK leader Halil Dalkilic in Germany.  EMIN 
provided Witschel with information about Sakine Cansiz. 
 
¶8. (S) Turning to international cooperation, Witschel said 
Germany and Turkey had an annual counterterrorism dialogue, 
the next meeting of which is scheduled to take place in late 
summer or early autumn in Ankara.  Turkish extradition 
requests, he said, were "spotty," with some merely containing 
transcripts of newspapers articles.  Witschel discussed 
possible ways the Germans might move the issue to the front 
burner in the EU, e.g., raising it in the context of the 
international counterterrorism conference the Germans are 
planning in June, raising it in EU fora and meetings of the 
Schengen countries.  He also proposed law enforcement 
agencies from key countries -- e.g., France, Germany and the 
Benelux -- meet to consider a better way forward.  Witschel 
agreed to discuss these ideas with the Interior Ministry. 
 
¶9. (C) Witschel followed up the meeting with a call to EMIN 
March 24 reporting that he had looked into the situation 
regarding Sakine Cansiz with the Interior Ministry and others 
and found out that German authorities are concerned about her 
and regard her as dangerous.  The Turkish government has 
requested her extradition from Germany and the Federal Office 
of Criminal Investigation (BKA) has a detention order on file 
for Cansiz dated November 2002.  Witschel said German 
authorities continue to be on the look out for her, but could 
provide no further information at this juncture. 
 
Turkish Embassy, March 31 Update 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Tuzun responded March 31 to emails and phone calls 
from Acting Global Affairs Counselor.  He said he met with 
MFA Counterterrorism Acting Office Director Suzanne Welter 
March 29 and DCM Basaga met MOI Counterterrorism Gerhard 
Schindler on March 30 to convey "talking points agreed to 
between Ankara and Washington."  Tuzun outlined German 
responses (which were similar to those in para 7 and 8). 
Both ministries had also stressed German intentions to renew 
the ban on Ozgur Politika / E. Xani via a change to the law; 
but that the process of drafting the law and obtaining its 
approval would take time.  (Note: Tuzun seemed somewhat 
surprised and encouraged by this news.  End Note.)  Tuzun 
also noted the German Justice Ministry March 28 sent the 
Turkish Embassy a one sentence rejection to the Turkish 
Justice Ministry's extradition requests for 26 PKK leaders 
resident in or located in Germany.  Asked about the strength 
of the cases, Tuzun said he had to check.  Tuzun said he used 
the opportunity to renew and refine the Turkish proposal for 
intensified bilateral dialogue between the Turkish and German 
Ministries of Justice; he awaits the German reply. 
TIMKEN JR