This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000395 
 
SIPDIS 
 
VIENNA PLS PASS DAS DICARLO 
JUSTICE FOR ALEXANDRE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR ICTY
SUBJECT: REACTIONS, PLANS AFTER MILOSEVIC'S DEATH 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (c)  The Belgrade body politic is just in the initial 
throes of reacting to Milosevic,s death.  Current debate 
swirls around his funeral arrangements and increasing 
speculation that the former dictator was at best medically 
neglected, at worst actively poisoned during his 
incarceration in The Hague.  Milosevic,s death, coming on 
the heels of the Babic suicide and the unfettering of 
Haradinaj,s ability to engage in public life are leading to 
an increase ) even among some democrats ) in the belief 
that ICTY is anti-Serb.  The Radicals and Socialists will 
undoubtedly do what they can to use this to bolster their 
political standing and re-orient the government's ICTY 
policies.  End summary. 
 
SATURDAY 
 
¶2.  (u)  The initial cautious response by local networks to 
news of Milosevic,s death on March 11 gave way later in the 
day to more prominent coverage on Belgrade TV stations. 
There were interviews and commentary by the Radical and 
Socialist party ) mostly anti-Hague diatribes and unhelpful 
commentary on the bias of the court and its alleged role in 
the deaths of Milosevic and Milan Babic, who committed 
suicide in his cell on March 5.  Head of the DS caucus in 
parliament Dusan Petrovic gave a helpful interview on RTS 
rejecting any suggestions that there would be any change in 
the government's policy towards The Hague or any reason to 
reconsider its international legal obligations. CNN and other 
international coverage was perhaps more pervasive throughout 
the day, and included phone interviews with current and 
former regional leaders, but consisted mostly of empty 
speculation and commentary on the unreformed and unrepentant 
parts of Serbian society and the tragic events of the 
Milosevic era.   The Ambassador's statement was quickly 
picked up by local TV stations and aired prominently. 
 
SUNDAY 
 
¶3.  (u)  By Sunday, March 12, media attention had slackened 
considerably on local stations, with most channels showing 
regular programming for most or all of the day.  So far, 
there have been no large organized or spontaneous public 
gatherings related to the news, though Socialist Party 
headquarters announced over the weekend they would open a 
condolence book and would encourage placement of flowers 
outside the party's offices on Studentski Trg.  Over the 
weekend, a line of (mostly) pensioners numbering in the 
hundreds formed at the party headquarters, and moderate 
numbers also placed flowers or lit candles at the Studentski 
Trg location and in other party offices throughout Serbia and 
in The Hague. 
 
¶4.  (c)  The Ambassador spoke with President Tadic, Deputy PM 
Labus, and FONMIN Draskovic on the occasion of a 
commemoration of the third anniversary of the Djindjic 
assassination to prepare the path for discouraging any kind 
of official funeral or commemorative event.  Draskovic used 
the opportunity to push again his long-held belief that ICTY 
conditionality on PfP membership and the EU membership 
process  should cease, so that a Euro-Atlantic embrace could 
be used to counter Radical and Socialist opposition to 
Serbia's integration.  Tadic, Draskovic, and Labus firmly 
opposed any state funeral arrangements for Milosevic, while 
Tadic added that he would oppose any &pardon8 for Milosevic 
widow Mira Markovic in order for her to attend funeral events 
in Serbia. (Note:  Markovic faces arrest on an Interpol 
warrant on charges of inciting abuse of public office if she 
returns to Serbia.  It is unclear if, under current 
circumstances, GoS officials would be prepared to enforce 
that warrant.  The Milosevic family lawyer on Monday filed a 
motion in Belgrade district court to have the warrant 
rescinded and the charges dropped.  End note.) 
 
MONDAY 
 
¶5.  (u)  By Monday, March 13, all major print media were also 
carrying the news from the weekend, along with initial 
reactions from various political parties, including 
re-hashing of the SRS and SPS's predictable positions and 
expressions of regret by PM Kostunica, who promised that the 
government would ask for a full report from The Hague on the 
circumstances of his death.  He noted the political custom in 
Serbia at difficult times for Serbs to put all political 
differences aside.   Tadic's office expressed condolences for 
the family ) sources there have expressed their concern that 
there was no way to react without benefiting the Radicals. 
The most vitriolic response came from Draskovic, whose SPO 
party was a target of Milosevic.  Draskovic said any grief 
over Milosevic,s death shown by Serbian citizens was 
shameful in light of the pain Milosevic had inflicted on 
Serbia.  Also on Monday, the Supreme Defense Council of SaM 
met (by telephone) and rejected proffering any military 
honors on Milosevic if a funeral is held in Serbia. 
 
(AND THE DAYS AHEAD 
 
¶6.  (c)  Speculation now has turned to where and under what 
circumstances Milosevic will be buried.  Tadic has said 
publicly that a state funeral would be out of the question, a 
position publicly shared by ruling coalition partners G-17 
Plus and SPO.  Kostunica,s DSS and the government have so 
far been silent on the issue, while SPS and SRS seem to be 
pressing hard for Milosevic to receive full head of state 
honors.  UK Ambassador Gowan raised the funeral issue with 
Kostunica's Foreign Affairs Advisor Vladeta Jankovic and 
received an icy response and a comment about interference in 
internal affairs.  Jankovic refused to pass along Gowan's 
concerns absent a formal written demarche.  Meanwhile, 
Markovic is rumored to have argued alternately for Milosevic 
to be buried in Moscow or in his hometown of Pozarevac. 
 
¶7.  (c)  There is some confusion regarding who has final 
authority to grant Head of State honors and interment in the 
special section of the Belgrade Central Cemetery reserved for 
historically important figures and former presidents.  The 
city council (run by DS Mayor Bogdanovic), which has a role 
in the approval process, has already balked at approving 
Milosevic,s burial in the special section, and absent a 
specific request form the family for such treatment (we 
understand none has been made yet) to force the question, it 
would appear a Belgrade funeral with full honors is unlikely. 
 Furthermore, the Supreme Defense Council's decision would, 
on the face of it, preclude the possibility of a state 
funeral in any location in Serbia, as such an event would 
include a color guard, caisson procession, fusillade, and/or 
similar honors that the military now will not provide. 
However, funeral plans are still in the wildly speculative 
stages, so it may be a few days before this all plays out. 
 
¶8.  (c)  We understand from reliable sources that the 
Radicals and Socialists are already cooperating on plans for 
public events and commemorations aimed at touching off 
another round of anti-Hague fury.  It is not clear how well 
such demonstrations (or the funeral) might be attended -- the 
SRS rally in support of Seselj several weeks ago was a dud -- 
but there is likely to be more support for any protest 
against the ICTY following Milosevic,s death.  Indeed, 
despite the low opinion of Milosevic and his regime, recent 
events in The Hague ) a more permissive attitude towards 
Haradinaj,s public life, the Babic suicide (under what 
locally are considered suspicious circumstances), the 
interpretation of Chief Prosecutor del Ponte's recent 
comments that the tribunal is sensitive to political 
pressure, and the recent assertions by Milosevic himself that 
he was given improper medication (which Monday reprints of 
Dutch TV reports of the autopsy did nothing to dispel) -- 
have intensified a local perception of anti-Serb bias in the 
tribunal.  Even pro-Western Serb politicians, most 
prominently former PM Zivkovic, have criticized the recent 
series of unfortunate events in The Hague as a disgrace to 
the tribunal. 
 
IMPACT 
 
¶9.  (c)  There is a good chance that this chain of recent 
events, and their locally scandalous nature, will, in this 
fertile ground for conspiracy theorists, lend support to 
those looking to stall any more cooperation with the Hague 
Tribunal.  The government will face real pressure -- at the 
very least on humanitarian and medical grounds -- to review 
its ICTY policy and to reconsider domestic prosecution for 
indictees who have not been turned over or are in pre-trial 
release, to ease any kind of efforts on delivering Mladic 
(not rumored to be in the best of health) or cooperating with 
The Hague in general.  There are several Serb indictees on 
pre-trial release (e.g., Simatovic, Pavkovic and Stanisic, 
the latter two with their own serious health problems) and we 
expect they will use their influence and connections to 
encourage this debate.  The government may try and make the 
case for de-linking EU accession from the Hague issue to 
avoid any "political instability."  At the very least, we 
should expect SPS to use its position as "kingmaker" for this 
minority coalition government to extract maximum political 
gain from the situation ) to include a rehabilitation of 
Mira Markovic and a hard push for full state honors for the 
deceased dictator.  We are engaging with the PM's office to 
elicit their plans for the coming days and to encourage them 
to stand with SPO, G-17 Plus, DS, and most average Serbs to 
oppose a state funeral for Milosevic. 
 
POLT