VZCZCXRO2166
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #0955/01 0860709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270709Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2768
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000955 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  NON-HIZBALLAH SHIA PERSPECTIVE ON 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b). 
 
SUMMARY 
 ------- 
¶1.  (C)  Shia MP Ali Bazzi and MP Ali Osseiran view the 
on-going national dialogue as an important development whose 
long-term impact considerably outweighs any immediate 
results.  These independent Shia politicians believe that, 
although several formerly sensitive issues had already 
entered public discourse (Hizballah's arms, Lahoud's 
legitimacy, Palestinian militias), the dialogue was the first 
time these issues were being discussed by the principal 
protagonists face-to-face.  Bazzi, however, believes that 
regional involvement, specifically intermediation efforts by 
Saudi Arabia, will be necessary to resolve the thorniest 
issues, because they all involve the Syrian regime.  Shia MP 
Ali Osseiran, on the other hand, insists that US/Syrian and 
US/Iranian relations are the real key to progress in Lebanon. 
 Osseiran contends that Damascus and Tehran still call the 
shots for Hizballah and, with international pressure 
increasing on Iran, is certain that Tehran will prevent 
Nasrallah from moving too far -- especially with regard to 
Hizballah's arms.  Concerning the Palestinian militias 
located in Lebanon, Osseiran believes they are a spent force, 
remarking "certainly Nasrallah would prefer to keep them as a 
buffer against disarmament pressure, but few in the Shia 
community care for them, and Shia leaders have decided to let 
the government disarm them."  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  MP Ali Bazzi, an Amal ally of Nabih Berri who 
holds a US passport and represents a constituency in Bint 
Jubayl (a few miles north of the Blue Line), met with poloff 
on March 22 at his office in parliament.  MP Ali Osseiran, 
who comes from a long line of political leaders -- his father 
was Speaker of Parliament in the 1950s -- and represents the 
south Lebanon district of Zahrani, met with poloff the 
following day in south Beirut.  Both legislators are regarded 
as honest, dedicated public servants.  They share the 
characteristic of blunt conversation and neither believes 
Hizballah should be the only representative of the country's 
Shia community. 
 
ABOVE EXPECTATIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C)  MP Bazzi expressed modest surprise that the national 
dialogue's headstrong participants have been able to maintain 
relative comity during nearly three weeks of meetings.  When 
he first learned of Berri's plan for the conference, he did 
not give it much chance of success and felt that Jumblatt and 
Aoun in particular would use the forum to grandstand.  He now 
believes that despite the attendees apparent inability to 
resolve two core issues -- Lahoud's presidency and 
Hizballah's arms -- the fact that they have placed these 
issues on the table is significant and will set the stage for 
further discussion and resolution in the next few months, 
particularly regarding the presidency. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The chain-smoking delegate from Bint Jubayl 
acknowledged that the presidency issue had become more 
difficult in the past few days.  Whereas in the initial 
sessions, Hassan Nasrallah had indicated that a list of 
several presidential candidates would be acceptable -- as 
long as the candidates' intended policies regarding the 
"resistance" were presented up front -- now the Hizballah 
leader was insisting that only one candidate could be 
proposed by the Maronitecommunity.  This change of position 
resulted fro a realization that the country's electoral 
systm basically allows Hizballah/Amal an effective vet for 
only one round of parliamentary voting to select a president. 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  Bazzi felt that Nasrllah was seriously calculating 
the costs of stayng with Lahoud -- who he remarked that even 
in the Shia community was becoming something of a laugh line. 
 But being a cunning politician, Bazzi believed Nasrallah was 
patiently waiting for the best deal to switch his support. 
 
¶6.  (C)  With regard to how much the national dialogue would 
actually accomplish, Bazzi said the answer depended on Saudi 
Arabia's influence with the Asad regime, because nearly all 
the issues under consideration had a Syrian component. 
Although he was not aware of specific plans, he suspected 
that next week's Arab Summit in Khartoum would be the scene 
of concerted arm twisting for Syria to make concessions on 
diplomatic relations, demarcation of borders, and the Lahoud 
presidency. 
 
BEIRUT 00000955  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
ALI OSSEIRAN TAKES A BROADER VIEW 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  MP Osseiran, who last year was considered a leading 
candidate for Speaker before Nabih Berri seized the prize, 
predicted that Hizballah would faithfully obey its Iranian 
sponsors and jealously protect its arms for as long as 
possible.  In his opinion, Nasrallah had skillfully 
eliminated all opposition in the Shia community and had made 
Hizballah an important regional asset for the ambitious 
Iranian regime.  Osseiran strongly believed it was wishful 
thinking on the part of Hariri, Aoun and others that they 
could somehow moderate Hizballah and negotiate a near-term 
disarmament. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The veteran member of parliament said, like it or 
not, US relations with Syria and, more importantly Iran, were 
the key to resolving Lebanon's difficulties.  Osseiran said 
his evaluation envisions continued hostile relations between 
the US and the two regional powers over the difficult issues 
of Iraq and nuclear weapons, and as long as that conflict 
persists, Syria and Iran will keep as many proxies as 
possible in the region, specifically in Iraq, Lebanon, and 
the West Bank/Gaza.  He suggested that perhaps a deal could 
be made that would finish off the decaying Lahoud presidency, 
but the primary objectives of the international community as 
expressed in UNSCR 1559 were most likely not achievable in 
the current political environment.  Additionally, Osseiran 
was not optimistic regarding the establishment of normal 
diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon and plainly 
expected the Syrian regime to delay, obfuscate, and deny 
responsibility. 
 
PALESTINIAN ARMS 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Other than the status of Lahoud, the only other 
issue which was possible to resolve at this time was the 
disarmament of the Palestinian militias located outside the 
twelve established refugee camps and "better control" of the 
militias inside the camps.  Osseiran remarked that the 
Palestinian leadership in Lebanon was inept and had 
squandered considerable goodwill.  This mismanagement, along 
with residual Lebanese resentment over Palestinian actions 
during the long civil war, had put the community in a 
vulnerable political situation.  He commented on the relative 
ease with which the national dialogue members reached 
consensus on disarming/controlling the Palestinian militias, 
and said the door to this action had actually been opened by 
Abu Mazen several months ago when he stated that Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon were "guests" and had responsibilities as 
such. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Even with this success, however, the veteran 
politician expressed his regret that further progress on 
other issues, such as bilateral relations and offering the 
Shia community political alternatives, appeared unlikely for 
the foreseeable future. 
FELTMAN