VZCZCXRO0933
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #0948/01 0831428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241428Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2748
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0508
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000948 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV KISL IR LE SY AA
SUBJECT: MGLE01--KATAEB PARTY LEADER SEES NO WAY AROUND 
SYRIA, NO WAY TO APPROACH AOUN 
 
BEIRUT 00000948  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: JEFFREY FELTMAN, AMBASSADOR.  REASONS SECTION 1.4(B) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Former President and Kataeb (Phalange) party leader 
Amin Gemayel told the Ambassador that Syria remains the key 
to resolving the political impasse in Lebanon.  Gemayel left 
the dialogue sessions convinced that the participants had 
divided into two groups: 1) Hizballah and its apologists 
(including Michel Aoun), and 2) March 14 and its supporters. 
The atmosphere in the room was pleasant, but there was no 
will to compromise across those groups on the presidency or 
Hizballah's arms.  Gemayel said that Syria was the key to 
solving the presidency issue.  He said rumors were 
circulating of international efforts to reach the Syrians 
through the U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Libya.  All of 
these efforts were aimed at convincing Damascus to allow 
Emile Lahoud to leave office without exacting too high a 
price from Lebanon.  Gemayel warned that the disarmament of 
Hizballah would be a long, slow process achieved in carefully 
plotted stages.  Hizballah will negotiate hard, Gemayel said. 
 The Shia group is not interested in simple face-saving 
measures; they want control of their future.  Gemayel 
despaired that Aoun was not clever enough to escape his own 
wishful thinking concerning Hizballah's support, the Syrian 
designs on Lebanon, and Aoun's own chances to become 
president.  His own party is in contact with Aoun's Free 
Patriotic Movement, (FPM) but he could not foresee an 
alliance with Aoun.   Gemayel is working closely with his 
March 14 allies.  He shared with the Ambassador the story of 
his own recent, surprise visit from Samir Ja'ja'.  End 
summary. 
 
SYRIA STILL THE KEY TO THE PRESIDENCY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On March 23, Amin Gemayel met with the Ambassador 
and PolChief in his Beirut offices at the Kataeb party 
headquarters.  Gemayel appeared anxious as he discussed the 
recent events at the national dialogue.  He said that the 
dialogue discussions centered on the presidency and 
Hizballah's weapons.  The key to the political situation was 
Syria.  Before discussing disarmament, Hizballah wishes to 
come to the table to talk about the new national defense 
strategy in which they would presumably be included.  But 
March 14 is not prepared to accept Hizballah's right to 
exercise sovereignty over Lebanon's defense options.  The 
process leading to disarmament will be a long one.  Hizballah 
will want to keep some role in the south.  Gemayel and his 
allies were prepared to offer Hizballah some face-saving 
measures that allow them to keep a role in the south as part 
of a nation solution.  But Hizballah is not interested in 
face saving, Gemayel warned.  They want real authority in the 
south.  The process would be helped if the Lebanese 
leadership could agree on a credible president who would be 
part of the negotiations.  The key to the presidency is 
Syria.  The Syrians do not trust the Lebanese.  They want 
assurances before a new President takes office.  Gemayel said 
Syrians greatest fear is an anti-Syrian president and prime 
minister in Lebanon. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Gemayel said that he had heard that Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Qatar and Libya, were all interested in encouraging 
Syria to solve the Lebanon-Syria relations problem.  He 
thought the Arabs were acting on a perceived shared interest 
in stability in the region.  With this encouragement, the 
Syrian government must be induced into telling Emile Lahoud 
to leave office early.  The parliamentary majority did not 
have the votes to dislodge Lahoud.  Aoun and Hizballah were 
not prepared to compromise and vote with Hariri and March 14 
to oust the President.  It would take word from Damascus to 
end the political stalemate in Beirut.  The problem was 
finding a way to limit the cost of Syrian cooperation.  In 
Gemayel's analysis, Asad is stronger in Lebanon and more 
confident at this time than he had been one month earlier. 
In this mood, the Syrian President would almost certainly 
attempt to impose a "compromise" presidential candidate on 
the Lebanese.  Gemayel thought Asad, under pressure at home, 
would have three demands for his cooperation: 1) the Lebanese 
presidency, 2) relief from western pressure on the regime, 3) 
economic assistance for Syria.  The Ambassador asked if Iran 
cares as deelpy as Syria about the Lebanese presidency. 
Gemayel said Iran works through Syria in Lebanon, and added 
that the Iranian Ambassador has asked for a meeting with him 
recently. 
 
BEIRUT 00000948  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
THE DIALOGUE IS GOING WELL WITH LIMITATIONS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Gemayel was working, during the pause in the 
dialogue, to close ranks with his March 14 comrades.  He had 
a private dinner with Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamade on 
March 22.   He cautioned that the March 14 group must close 
ranks and find a means of dealing with Syria.  Gemayel said 
that his son, MP Pierre Gemayel, was close to Saad Hariri and 
was in regular contact with him.   Gemayel gave Hariri good 
grades for his performance at the national dialogue.  While 
saying that Hariri needs experience, Gemayel seemed satisfied 
that Hariri is not making any major mistakes in his political 
activities.  " When you look at him," Gemayel said, "you 
think he is his father.  But he is not.  It is not easy 
facing these challenges, but he is doing a good job."  The 
Ambassador relayed to Gemayel praise from Samir Ja'ja' for 
Gemayel's constructive role in the national dialogue.  When 
the Ambassador told the story of Samir Ja'ja's surprise visit 
to the embassy (SEPTEL), Gemayel looked amused and asked, 
"What time was that?"  Then he told the Ambassador that he 
had been surprised at his home at about 19:30 on the same day 
by the appearance, at his residence, of an unfamiliar 
bodyguard.  His own security staff told him that Samir Ja'ja' 
had arrived unexpectedly to speak with him.  (Note: Ja'ja' 
appeared at the Embassy first at about 7 p.m.  When he 
discovered the Ambassador was not there, he left, apparently 
to surprise Gemayel.  Ja'ja' several hours later then 
returned on another unexpected visit to the Embassy, where he 
met with the Ambassador.)  Gemayel speculated that, perhaps, 
Ja'ja was exercising his still unfamiliar, freedom of 
movement. 
 
AOUN STRATEGY IS SELF-DEFEATING 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Gemayel said that his party had created a committee 
to meet with Aoun's people to discuss common issues.  But, 
responding to the Ambassador's comments that the Aoun group 
claims him as an ally, he insisted that he is not considering 
moving into Aoun's camp.  "Can you see me allied with Michel 
Aoun," Gemayel asked incredulously.  Michel Aoun will only 
support Michel Aoun for president, Gemayel said.  He 
described Aoun as a dupe, used by Hizballah and Amal to do 
their dirty work.  Both Shia parties will only submit 
Syrian-supported candidates for the presidency; they have no 
room to maneuver.  Aoun will be strung along as long as he is 
useful.  Explaining his take on the Syrians, Gemayel said 
that for Syria the Lebanese presidency is not a question of 
personalities.  It is a balance of power issue.  He recalled 
that the Syrians supported his own presidency despite is 
anti-Syrian reputation.  The Former General is lost in a 
world of his own imagining, according to Gemayel.  Although 
neither Amal nor Hizballah have announced support for Aoun, 
he still believes by being close to them, he can gain their 
support.  "Aoun is a Trojan horse" whose presence protects 
Lahoud's position and shows disunity among Christians. 
Gemayel recounted a bit of his own history with the Syrians 
and Aoun.  He had spent much of his presidency avoiding 
Aoun's attempts on his life.  In those days, the Syrians 
lured Aoun into a fight with Samir Ja'ja's Lebanese Forces 
with the prospect of support for his presidency.  Now, 
Gemayel said, they are using the same bait.  Gemayel 
attributes Aoun's initial popularity among Christians to his 
positions upon his return to Lebanon.  Aoun used the 
symbolism and language of a forceful Christian leader 
initially. After his understanding with Hizballah, Gemayel 
sees Aoun losing popularity among his old supporters. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Aoun's tactics are against his own interests, 
Gemayel said.  If the stalemate continues, Lahoud will remain 
in office for the remainder of his term.  Once that term is 
ended the power of March 14 will have diminished, but the 
balance in the parliament will be the same.  Christian 
disunity would have created an open field for the presidency 
and Aoun would have lost his support and momentum among 
Christians, exhausted and disillusioned at the lack of 
progress.  "By then any election will be a non-event.  It 
would be impossible for Aoun to be elected," Gemayel said. 
The resulting economic malaise, and apathy would certainly 
cause the international community to lose interest in 
Lebanon. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
BEIRUT 00000948  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Gemayel was convincing in his denial of complicity 
with Aoun.  Some people close to Kataeb have been floating 
the rumor that Gemayel, angered over the potential ascension 
of Nassib Lahoud as a March 14 presidential candidate, 
planned to throw his support to Aoun.  In light of the rumors 
of conflict in March 14, Gemayel's dinner with Jumblatt (who 
is apparently also moving around town more these days) and 
Hamadeh, as well as his private meeting with Ja'ja', are 
significant signs of cooperation. 
 
 
FELTMAN