VZCZCXRO0464
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBJ #4216/01 0661011
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071011Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9529
INFO RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 4313
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 004216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CH BM
SUBJECT: PRC/BURMA: MORE ON SOE WIN VISIT AND BEIJING'S 
RELATIONS WITH RANGOON 
 
 
Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan. Reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) PRC Premier Wen Jiabao told Burmese PM Soe Win that 
China hopes Burma will move forward with national, political 
and ethnic reconciliation, according to MFA Asian Affairs 
Department Division Director for Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam and 
Laos Chen Dehai.  Chen first denied that this was a new 
message before acknowledging that it marked the first time 
Beijing referred to the need for national and political 
reconciliation in such direct terms, though he was unsure 
whether Soe really understood the message.  China wants Burma 
to quickly achieve real progress on national reconciliation 
and economic development but is firm that this should be done 
internally.  Chen admitted that besides Beijing's interest in 
stable borders, China has important strategic concerns in 
Burma.  Contacts at the Malaysia, Singapore and Philippine 
Embassies agreed, with Singapore particularly concerned about 
China using Burma as a staging ground to project military 
power.  Our Malaysian Embassy contact said ASEAN is 
considering expelling Burma but is concerned about China's 
reaction.  Citing the lack of consensus within ASEAN, Chen 
downplayed the possibility of ASEAN taking serious action 
against Burma while admitting to being perplexed at Rangoon's 
refusal to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit.  Chen also 
discussed VFM Wu's management style and personality, saying 
Wu is willing to take risks because he is planning on 
retiring at the end of 2006.  End Summary. 
 
Consultations with EAP/MLS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On March 3 Poloffs met over a working lunch with MFA 
Asian Affairs Department Division Director Chen Dehai who is 
responsible Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.  Poloff 
expressed appreciation for the MFA agreeing to the February 
13 consultations on Burma with EAP/MLS Deputy Director 
Rapson.  Recognizing that the discussions were frank and 
positive, Chen reported that it had been difficult for the 
MFA to reach a decision on the meeting, citing Premier Soe 
Win's arrival on the following day and the unprecedented 
nature of the consultations.  Our request quickly climbed up 
the MFA chain, Chen continued, finally reaching VFM Wu Dawei, 
who immediately gave his blessing.  Chen said the PRC did not 
tell Premier Soe Win about the consultations, but would not 
hesitate to brief the Burmese government if asked. 
 
Premier Wen's Message to Premier Soe Win 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Chen at first rejected the idea that the Premier 
Wen's public usage of "national reconciliation" was new, 
saying Premier Wen had used this wording as well as "ethnic 
reconciliation" in the past.  When pressed, however, Chen 
admitted that Premier Wen referred to "political 
reconciliation" in addition to "national and ethnic 
reconciliation" during his meetings with Premier Soe Win, 
though the PRC official media only reported the latter two. 
He went on to say that PRC officials have been moving to this 
language over the past few years but that Soe's visit may 
have been the first time that Beijing publicized these 
comments.  Chen was unsure whether PM Soe actually noticed 
the subtle shift in China's stance or message in any case. 
 
More Details on Premier Soe Win's Visit 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Chen said it was noteworthy that Senior General Than 
Shwe and various ministers saw Premier Soe Win off at the 
airport and welcomed him when he returned from China, showing 
the importance of the trip and the bilateral relationsip to 
Burma. The trips to Xi'an, the capital or twelve Chinese 
dynasties, and Shenzhen, a booming city just twenty five 
years old, were purposely planned to show Burma China's 5000 
year history as well as its modern economic achievements as a 
result of economic reform and opening. 
 
Different Paths to Same Goal 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Chen contended that the China, the United States and 
most of the world share similar goals for Burma, with the 
 
BEIJING 00004216  002 OF 004 
 
 
main disagreement being over the path to the objectives. 
China wants Burma to move quickly down the seven-step road 
map, make real progress on national reconciliation and 
achieve economic development in order to build a stable and 
prosperous society.  Burma's neighbors and the international 
community should encourage Burma and create an environment 
conducive for Burma to internally solve its problems and 
achieve these goals, argued Chen. 
 
¶6.  (C) Chen contended that the situation in Burma is not a 
major pressing issue for Burma's neighbors, who feel the 
issues will be solved with time.  This is not the case for 
the United States whose main goal is to spread democracy now, 
Chen claimed.  Poloffs pointed out that ASEAN, India and 
other nations can see that the lives of the Burmese people 
are getting worse while those in all nations in the region 
are improving.  Cross-border issues of narcotics trade, 
infectious diseases and trafficking in person originating in 
Burma have a regional and global impact.  A democratic Burma 
that incorporates the various sectors of society and ethnic 
groups into the government would be better far better 
equipped to establish stable and peaceful political control 
over the whole country, generate economic growth and make 
progress in solving the problems that spill over beyond 
Burma's borders. 
 
NLD Gets No Respect and ASSK Has No Experience 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  (C) Commenting on the February 12 proposal by the NLD to 
acknowledge the junta as the transitional government if the 
junta agrees to convene the People's Parliament according to 
the results of the 1990 election, Chen said there is no 
chance that the regime will ever take any NLD proposal 
seriously because the ruling regime has no respect for the 
NLD or ASSK.   Contrasting ASSK to former Indonesian 
President Megawati and current Philippines President Arroyo, 
all daughters of former national leaders, Chen said ASSK was 
only three or four years old when her father General Aung San 
died and therefore does not have the same experience growing 
up in the "halls of power."  No one in Burma believes she has 
the ability to govern the country, Chen claimed.  Poloffs 
pointed out that the United States is not demanding ASSK 
become President but does consider her continued detainment a 
clear symbol of the lack of political and human rights in 
Burma.  Releasing ASSK from house arrest would allow the 
regime to show that it is serious about addressing the 
political issues facing Burma. 
 
Frustration Over the Move to Pyinmana 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Chen said the move of the capital continues to be an 
annoyance.  The PRC Ambassador to Rangoon recently objected 
to an instruction to meet with the Burmese Foreign Minister 
in Pyinmana because "he did not want to spend a over a full 
day of travel and an overnight stay just to have a ten minute 
meeting."  China has no plans to shift its Embassy to 
Pyinmana until it is clearer whether the move will really be 
permanent, according to Chen.  Instead, Beijing is planning 
to open eventually a small office in Pyinmana, although Chen 
lamented that it is difficult to find anyone at the minister 
or minister-counselor level who is available and willing to 
be posted there. 
 
Burma's Strategic Position 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Chen acknowledged that besides the interest in 
maintaining stability on its border, China also sees Burma's 
energy resources and Andaman Sea ports as strategically 
important.  Chen said Burma recognizes this as well, saying 
that Premier Soe Win called attention to Burma's position 
between India and China during his dinner with Premier Wen. 
As for the proposed pipeline from Yunnan through Burma to the 
gas reserves off Burma's west coast, Chen discounted this as 
an agreement between Yunnan Province and Burma and noted that 
China is not pushing for action because of concerns about 
political, security and economic instability in Burma.  China 
does not consider India to be a competitor in Burma or in the 
region, declared Chen, saying China is actively seeking 
better relations with India. 
 
¶10.  (C) During a separate meeting, Singapore Embassy 
Political Officer Patrick Lim agreed that Burma is important 
 
BEIJING 00004216  003 OF 004 
 
 
economically to China as a potential source of energy and a 
key trading partner with Yunnan Province.  The pipeline, 
however, has become a bit of a "pipedream" since in reality 
there are many obstacles, including difficlt terrain, 
political an economic instability and expensive adjustments 
to China's domestic pipeline network to accommodate a feed 
from Burma.  Strategically, China wants access to ports on 
the Andaman Sea, Lim continued, not only for trade, but also 
as a possible staging ground and basing location for 
aircraft, warships and troops.  If a road and railway were 
built alongside the pipeline it would allow China to base 
troops along the road and deliver supplies to Chinese naval 
vessels using Burmese west coast ports.  Lim said this 
potential increase in China's ability to project power in the 
region is a key concern in Singapore's long-term strategic 
thinking. 
 
ASEAN and Burma: Perspective from Beijing Embassies 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Malaysian Embassy Counselor Shublee Othman told 
Poloff that there has been no progress on the planned 
Malaysia FM-led ASEAN delegation visit to Burma.  If there is 
no movement soon, Malaysia will invite the Burmese Prime 
Minister to Malaysia and convey a clear message of ASEAN's 
displeasure.  Calling the ouster of former Premier Khen Nyut 
"a last straw," Shublee said ASEAN is "fed-up" with Burma and 
is seriously considering expelling Burma from ASEAN because 
of the lack of positive change.  While noting that expelling 
Burma would take a long time, partially due to ASEAN's need 
to "save face," Shublee said ASEAN is very concerned about 
how China would react to an ASEAN expulsion of Burma is 
beginning to test the waters in with Beijing. 
 
¶12.  (C) Embassy contacts at the Philippines and Singapore 
embassies say there is no serious movement to expel ASEAN. 
Philippines Embassy Minister and Consul General Jaime Ledda 
said the stronger voice of ASEAN as a whole during the 2005 
ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lampur and the Chairman's Statement 
expressing concern about the situation in Burma has satisfied 
those that were most vocal behind the scenes in calling for 
expulsion.  Singapore Political Officer Lim said ASEAN would 
be loath to lose the Burma's strategic position between China 
and India, though ASEAN is clearly losing patience with Burma 
and will continue to send strong messages of displeasure at 
the lack of real political change and economic development. 
Both Lim and Ledda agreed that even if ASEAN were to take 
some steps against Burma, China would not come out forcefully 
against ASEAN consensus, although Beijing would probably 
publicly support Burma. 
 
¶13.  (C) Chen was not surprised by the inclusion of a 
statement critical of Burma in the ASEAN Chairman's statement 
since ASEAN has been voicing frustration with the slow pace 
of change in Burma.  ASEAN is unlikely to expel Burma, Chen 
said, citing the lack of consensus within ASEAN, with the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia advocating a 
harder line towards Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam being 
more sympathetic and Thailand and Brunei fence-sitting.  Chen 
said Burma's refusal to receive the ASEAN delegation to be 
lead by Malaysia FM Hamid is perplexing.  One reason might be 
that the delegation composition is unclear, with Burma 
probably ready to accept a delegation from a single country 
but not one consisting of members from multiple ASEAN states 
because it would seem like ASEAN was lecturing Burma, which 
would make the regime "not feel very good." 
 
Chen on VFM Wu 
-------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Chen called VFM Wu a "crazy" man because he is so 
active and aggressive, but is not hard to work for.  Chen 
claimed to have a very good relationship with Wu, saying he 
freely challenges the VFM, whether in the office or on the 
golf course, which Wu appreciates.  Wu is serious about 
encouraging dialogue with the United States on any topic, 
telling his subordinates that it is important for China to be 
able to explain its position with confidence.  Chen said Wu 
calls himself "a rabbit's tail" (i.e. about to disappear) 
because he is retiring at the end of 2006.  Wu is therefore 
unconstrained by career aspirations or what others think and 
just wants to move the ball down the road, according to Chen. 
 Noting Wu's role in the Six-Party Talks, Chen reported Wu as 
saying that he had been given "extra power" by the central 
authorities during the September 2005 round "in order to get 
 
BEIJING 00004216  004 OF 004 
 
 
the job done." 
 
Sedney