VZCZCXRO9656
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0032/01 0651718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061718Z MAR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0266
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0284

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/6/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: FAULT LINES IN SOUTHERN SHIA PARTIES 
 
REF: A) 05 BAGHDAD 4329, B) BASRAH 13, C) 05 BASRAH 140, D) BASRAH 27, E) BASRAH 29, F) 05 BASRAH 77, G) 05 BASRAH 68, H) BASRAH 19 
 
BASRAH 00000032  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Deputy REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO 
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In Basrah, the Shia parties of the Unified 
Iraqi Coalition (UIC) of List 555 show signs of splitting, with 
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) lining up against the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and Badr 
Organization.  Fadillah and Da'awa parties exhibit signs of 
waning influence.  The Fadillah party and OMS usually act in 
concert in the south, and Da'awa party is losing its voters to 
SCIRI and Badr.  SCIRI and Badr's electoral population is aging, 
while OMS appeals to the growing population of unemployed and 
disaffected youth.  End Summary. 
 
Unified Iraqi Coalition Not Unified 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  In Basrah, the main political parties that made up the 
UIC- List 555 show signs of splitting, with OMS lining up 
against SCIRI and Badr.  Able to campaign effectively as a 
unified political list in the December 15, 2005 elections, 555 
parties secured an overwhelming victory in all four of the 
southernmost Iraqi provinces.  However, with its mission of 
winning a National Assembly majority accomplished, the Coalition 
no longer presents a unified front to Basrah residents. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The most significant rift in the Shia parties is 
between OMS and SCIRI/Badr. 
In all four of the southernmost provinces, Jayish al Mahdi 
(JAM), the militant branch of OMS, and Badr Corps, the military 
wing of SCIRI, vie for control on the streets.  Before the 
December 15 elections, the REO received regular reports of JAM 
and Badr skirmishes in Maysan and Basrah provinces; fighting 
among all militias has intensified since the December 15 
election.  In the post-electoral period, JAM has made headway 
into the SCIRI stronghold of Muthanna province, which previously 
had the reputation of being one of the most peaceful provinces 
in Iraq.  Similar turf wars are now taking place in Dhi Qar 
province. 
 
Lines between Fadillah and OMS Blurred 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4.  (C)  In the post-December 15 election period, Fadillah party 
leadership in Basrah has colluded more with OMS and JAM.  An REO 
journalist contact even reported that, "JAM and Fadillah are the 
same party.  They work together, support each other."  He said 
that at Basrah Provincial Council meetings, only about half of 
the forty-one members attend meetings, and those who attend are 
of the OMS/Fadillah block, along with a few independents. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Basrah Fadillah party appears to diverge from the 
Baghdad Fadillah party.  The BPC and the Basrah Governor have 
called for boycotting relations with Coalition forces three 
times in the past six months, and as much as the Governor has 
tried to pass the boycott off as a creation of the BPC, it is 
clear that he has stood behind the suspension of communications 
with the Coalition each time (reftels A, B).  Where the Baghdad 
Fadillah party espouses open relations with the Coalition and 
other political parties, such as the secular Iraqi National 
Accord (INA), the Basrah Fadillah party has made no appreciable 
efforts to engage non-Shia, non-555 parties.  Following the 
growing trend of "Islamification" in Basrah (reftel C), Fadillah 
party members in Basrah have aligned themselves more and more 
closely with the conservative party line of the 555 List 
parties.  It is now difficult to discern any significant 
differences in the actions and stances of Fadillah party leaders 
and those of OMS in Basrah. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Fadillah party, although technically the 
front-running political party in Basrah, has more closely 
aligned its party platform to that of OMS.  The events of the 
past two months in Basrah have demonstrated the ineffectuality 
of the current local government, while OMS has upped its public 
image as that of a security provider.  Basrah Governor Mohammed 
Waeli of the Fadillah party is an unpopular figure and continues 
to lose support.  Since the December 15 elections, he has sought 
to distance himself from the BPC, led by Chairman Muhammed 
Sa'adoon al-Abaadi (Da'awa).  During the days of chaos that 
followed the Samarra mosque destruction, JAM militia patrolled 
the streets of Basrah while the Iraqi police were mostly absent 
(reftel D).  During the February 25 visit of Moqtada al Sadr to 
Basrah, Governor Waeli appeared on television standing directly 
behind Moqtada (reftel E). 
 
¶7.  (C)  The prevalence of OMS members at Fadillah party 
meetings in Basrah further blurs the lines between the two 
 
BASRAH 00000032  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
parties.  The current BPC coordinator for OMS in Basrah, Aqeel 
Kadhim described himself as a Fadillah party member with OMS 
links (reftel F).  OMS leader Sheikh Asaad Al Basri said that 
OMS received enough support from the Fadillah party that it did 
not need to run its own candidates in the last provincial 
elections in Basrah (reftel G). 
 
Da'awa Weakening, Losing Voters to Badr, SCIRI 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  A National Democratic Institute (NDI) contact described 
the Da'awa Party in Basrah as a "wrinkled, wizened raisin of a 
political party."  Unable to adapt and change its political 
message to appeal to younger voters, Da'awa is losing votes to 
the stronger Badr Organization.  BPC Chairman Abaadi has angered 
many BPC members by his increasing authoritarianism, requiring 
each BPC decision to be signed by him.  Chairman Abaadi's 
decision to suspend communications with the British and Danish 
(reftel H) has further isolated him from other council members. 
 
Electoral fault Lines: Age and Federalism 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Da'awa, SCIRI, and Badr all draw from the same 
electorate in the south:  Iraqis in the 35-60 age range who 
suffered greatly under the Saddam regime, many of whom have 
close ties to Iran, and who support federalism as a way to 
ensure that the south retains control over its own resources. 
Leaders of these political parties tend to be war heroes from 
the resistance to Saddam, sport battle wounds, and are well 
known as having been imprisoned or had family members killed or 
imprisoned by Saddam.  As Da'awa loses support from its 
electorate, voters turn toward SCIRI and Badr, parties that 
uphold the same principles of protecting the rights of Shia 
Muslims through federalism.  However, this electoral population 
is aging.  The political messages of SCIRI, Badr, and Da'awa do 
little to address the economic concerns of younger Iraqis. 
 
¶10.  (C)  In contrast, OMS appeals to the younger Iraqi age 
group of 18-30 that faces economic uncertainty and high 
unemployment and that did not develop the strong ties to Iran 
that the previous generation of Shia in the south did.  This 
population distrusts the idea of federalism.  Wary of SCIRI and 
Badr because of these parties' links to the Iranian government, 
this electorate is susceptible to Moqtada al-Sadr's national 
unity message, as well as anti-Coalition sentiment. 
 
Electorate Favors OMS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Comment:  The most significant rift in the Shia 
parties in the southernmost provinces is between OMS and 
SCIRI/Badr.  The Fadillah party in the south has demonstrated 
that it is unwilling to take a position that opposes OMS.  On 
the other side, Da'awa is losing voters to SCIRI and Badr.  The 
polarization of the political playing field between SCIRI-Badr 
and OMS has intensified in Basrah since the December 15 
election, and the electoral division favors OMS over the long 
term.  The younger population shows increasing support for the 
OMS party because of its messages on economic conditions, 
independence from outside influence, and distrust of federalism. 
 The older generation supports the SCIRI/Badr parties, with 
their emphasis on securing control over resources and 
independence from the Baghdad government.  Unless SCIRI and Badr 
are able to adapt their political message to appeal to younger 
voters, they risk losing ground in the upcoming provincial 
elections.  End Comment. 
GROSS