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OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHJL #0194/01 0891838
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301838Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6525
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000194 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DAKAR PASS RAO, DAO,AND ODC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS CASC ASEC PHUM GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: CALM, BUT JITTERY ENVIRONMENT 
 
REF: A. BANJUL 190 ET AL 
     ¶B. BANJUL 188 
     ¶C. BANJUL 193 
 
BANJUL 00000194  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Amidst a calm, but jittery atmosphere, there have been 
additional televised statements by persons suspected of 
involvement in the March 21 coup attempt.  A senior police 
official noted the release of two military officers cleared 
of involvement and estimated the remaining number of 
detainees at around 28. He expressed certainty that elements 
in the Senegalese military and security services had been 
aware and supportive of the coup plot, but expressed doubt 
that Senegalese President Wade had been aware or that he 
would endorse Jammeh's overthrow.  Authorities' closure of 
the journal,"The Independent," and  detention of its general 
manager and editor-in-chief contribute to the jittery 
atmosphere. Another daily, "Daily Observer," gave lead 
coverage to Ambassador's March 29 statement of USG opposition 
to extra-constitutional attempts to change governments. 
Despite the jitters here, we have no sense at this point that 
Jammeh's hold on power is slipping or that the country's 
stability is in jeopardy.  END SUMMARY 
 
JITTERS IN AFTERMATH OF COUP ATTEMPT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The failed coup attempt March 21 continues to 
overshadow events in the Gambian capital (see ref a for 
background).  Amidst the prevailing calm and general 
normality, there is a sense of jitteriness in the air. The 
current shortage of fuel in the Banjul area is contributing 
to the nervousness, as are the televised confessions of those 
suspected of involvement in the failed overthrow attempt. 
While we believe that the GOTG is having these confessions 
aired in order to convince any doubters that the plot was 
real, sources indicate that the broadcasts are also 
instilling in some Gambians a sense of unease as to the 
country's stability and security. (NOTE: Since the failed 
coup attempt, we have detected no sign of threat to 
stability; e.g. the incident has generated no significant 
public gatherings, except for the show of mass support -- 
doubtlessly organized by the GOTG -- for President Jammeh 
when he appeared in public March 24 (ref B). 
 
TELEVISED CONFESSIONS 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ref a reported televised confessions by suspected 
plotters March 27; one suspect, Capt Bunja Darboe, read the 
statement that the plotters had planned to issue on toppling 
the Jammeh government.  In their statement, the plotters 
cited the country's "social  and economic degradation" as 
justification for their move and spoke of establishing an 
interim government within ten days. There were further 
televised confessions on March 29, when statements by two 
"marabouts" (traditional Muslim religious guides) were 
broadcast.  The pair acknowledged having prior awareness of 
the overthrow scheme through contact with plotters, but 
denied any actual involvement and proclaimed their loyalty to 
Jammeh (text being sent to AF/W).   The March 29 footage also 
featured a statement by a senior civilian official, General 
Accountant of the Treasury, Alieu Jobe, who had also appeared 
in the March 27 airing. Jobe, who has emerged as a major 
figure in the plot, recounted his belief that the ringleader, 
former Chief of Defense Staff Lt Col Ndure Cham, would select 
him to head a post-coup government. 
 
UPDATE ON DETENTIONS AND RELEASES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) A senior police officer familiar with the GOTG's 
ongoing investigation into the aborted plot told Ambassador 
March 30 that that coup ringleader Cham remained at large and 
was probably in the Casamance.  This source denied rumors 
that Senegalese authorities had located Cham and taken him 
into custody.  This source estimated the current number of 
detainees at around 28 and noted the release earlier this 
week of two military officers cleared of involvement in the 
plot,  Maj Ebrima Bah, commander of the First Infantry 
Battalion, and Captain Famara Jammeh, Deputy Commander of the 
State Guards (NOTE: Jammeh's release was particularly 
noteworthy, as he had been among suspects giving televised 
statements March 27; investigators evidently accepted his 
assertion that he learned of the plot only on the day it was 
 
BANJUL 00000194  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to occur, March 21, and played no part in it.  END NOTE)  Our 
police contact asserted that various civilians -- e.g., 
former Gambian Ports Authority head Adama Deen and former 
National Assembly member Ramzia Diab -- had been picked up on 
suspicion of supporting the coup, in some cases financially. 
Ambassador stressed the importance of authorities' respecting 
detainees' rights and avoiding abuses; the police officer 
responded that he was not aware of any detainees' being 
tortured or otherwise abused. 
 
SENEGALESE ANGLE 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Asked about a possible Senegalese hand in the failed 
overthrow attempt, the police contact expressed certainty 
that elements in the Senegalese military and security forces 
were aware of it, although he doubted that Senegalese 
President Wade was aware or that he would have approved of 
supporting a coup attempt. Noting  plotters' televised 
statements about ringleader Cham's assertions of Senegalese 
forces' readiness to assist coup plotters in securing Gambian 
military sites (ref A), our contact said he believed that 
Cham had indeed lined up such contingency support from 
Senegalese forces.   Asked why Senegalese forces would 
support Jammeh's overthrow, the source explained that the 
former were concerned that Jammeh, given his common Jolla 
ethnic background with the majority of Casamance residents, 
had supported Casamance rebels in the past and would continue 
to do so. (NOTE:  According to local press reports March 29, 
the Senegalese Embassy here declined to comment on 
allegations of Senegalese involvement. END NOTE) 
 
¶6. (C) According to an Amcit businessman who met March 30 
with Jammeh's senior adviser, Secretary General Mambury Njie, 
Jammeh was dissuaded, for the time being, from issuing an 
anti-GOS statement, but was convinced of Senegalese 
involvement in the plot.  Njie reportedly said that Jammeh 
had sent his Interior Minister to Dakar to discuss the 
allegations of Senegalese involvement. 
 
CLOSURE OF DAILY NEWSPAPER 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Authorities' March 28 closure of the offices of the 
newspaper "The Independent" and ongoing detention of its 
General Manager and Editor-in-Chief contribute to the jittery 
atmosphere (ref C). The precise reasons for the GOTG's action 
remain unclear, but the paper's March 27 articles replaying 
opposition concerns about Jammeh's wealth and containing 
critical references  to his own 1994 coup may well have 
prompted authorities to act. As in his March 29 conversation 
with the Interior Minister, Ambassador registered concern 
over this crackdown on "The Independent" in March 30 call to 
the Information Minister and has requested a meeting with her 
March 31. 
 
AMBASSADOR' STATEMENT CONDEMNING COUPS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Ambassador's March 29 interview with the 
journal,"Daily Observer," in which he stated the USG's firm 
opposition to any effort to change governments by 
extra-constitutional means such as coups, received lead 
coverage in the paper. In a March 30 editorial, the paper 
applauded the U.S. statement of opposition to coups and 
contrasted it with the Senegalese Embassy's failure to 
comment, as reported above. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Despite the jittery atmosphere as the GOTG's 
investigation of the failed coup continues, we have no sense 
that Jammeh risks losing his hold on power or that the 
country's stability is becoming shaky.  However, authorities' 
move against "The Independent," doubtless with Jammeh's 
knowledge if not at his instruction, suggests that, in the 
recent aftermath of the ovethrow attempt, his sensitivity to 
personal criticism is even greater than usual. END COMMENT. 
STAFFORD