VZCZCXRO4675
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHJL #0190/01 0871736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281736Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6519
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DAKAR PASS RAO, DAO, AND ODC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS CASC ASEC PHUM GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: POSSIBLE SENEGALESE ANGLE IN TELEVISED 
CONFESSIONS BY SUSPECTED COUP PLOTTERS 
 
REF: A. BANJUL 188 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. BANJUL 177 
 
BANJUL 00000190  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) On March 27, Amcit (dual national) Tamsir Jasseh and 
other suspects in the aborted March 21 coup attempt gave 
televised confessions of their involvement, and Jasseh's 
role, judging from his statement, was greater than he had 
previously indicated to Ambassador.  The statements by Jasseh 
and others contain suggestions of Senegalese involvement, 
although we are not aware of a "smoking gun" in this regard. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
TELEVISED CONFESSIONS BY DETAINED SUSPECTS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The evening of March 27, The Gambia's national 
television service (GRTS) ran footage of statements by 
various persons suspected of participation in the aborted 
coup attempt here March 21 (reftels)  Following are 
highlights of some of these statements, in which the suspects 
confess their involvement. (We will report further when full 
transcript of the statements are available.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) The first to appear in the footage was Amcit (dual 
U.S.-Gambian national), Tamsir Jasseh, who recounted in 
detail his contacts with the ringleader in the coup plot, 
then Chief of Defense Staff lt Col Ndure Cham.  Jasseh, who 
indicated that he had been  well aware of Cham's plotting, 
stated that the latter had assured him of widespread support 
within the armed forces for the planned coup.  Jasseh 
confessed to facilitating Cham's escape when the coup attempt 
was aborted March 21, saying he (Jasseh), using his personal 
vehicle, had taken Cham to Kujubeh, located in Senegal's 
Casamance region, and then returned to Banjul. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Jasseh recounted that he, accompanied by his family, 
had come to the Ambassador's residence the evening of March 
21, following the collapse of the coup plot, and that 
Ambassador had advised him to return home and cooperate with 
authorities. (COMMENT: Per ref b, in his discussion with 
Ambassador, Jasseh expressed concern for his and his family's 
safety, agreeing to return home when Ambassador advised him 
to do so based on Interior Minister's assurances that his 
rights in any investigation would be respected and that he 
was not a primary suspect at that juncture.  Judging from his 
televised statement, Jasseh's involvement in the plot was 
considerably greater than earlier indicated to the 
Ambassador; Jasseh had previously denied actively 
participating in the plot. 
 
A SENEGALESE ANGLE? 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The suggestion of a Senegalese angle surfaced in the 
statements by Jasseh and others.  Jasseh spoke of meeting 
with the Senegalese Ambassador here, Ndiouga Ndiaye, at 
Cham's request, to discuss the imperative of cooperation 
between the Gambian and Senegalese security services despite 
bilateral "political issues."  (COMMENT: Jasseh gave the 
impression that his meeting with the Senegalese Ambassador 
had occurred sometime during the August/October 2005 border 
and transport dispute between The Gambia and Senegal. END 
COMMENT)  Jasseh indicated that he was subsequently called by 
a Senegalese who identified himself as Pap Seck and stated 
that he was calling to establish contact and would be back in 
touch.  When Jasseh informed Cham of Seck's call, the former 
said that Seck was possibly a Senegalese Military 
Intelligence Officer and that he would provide money to Cham; 
when Jasseh asked about the purpose of the money, Cham 
responded that it would be paid to Gambian officers as 
compensation for not being allowed to serve in a post-coup 
government that Cham envisaged staffing with civilians only. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Following Jasseh's statement, there was footage of 
other suspects, both military and civilian. In his statement, 
Captain Wassa Camara, former military police commander, 
recounted ringleader Cham's telling him of Senegalese support 
for the plot.  According to Camara, Cham claimed that 
Senegalese troops in the Kaolack/Nioro area "would come 
through Farafenni (town in central Gambia and site of 
military barracks) and support us (those staging the coup) if 
necessary while the (Senegalese) troops in Casamance would 
 
BANJUL 00000190  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
take care of Kanilai (President Jammeh's native town)." 
Another suspect, Sargeant Major Alha Bah, recounted Cham's 
telling him that he had Senegalese support for his plot and 
that Cham "had asked his boys at Farafenni camp to allow the 
Senegalese soldiers to enter if it was necessary." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Notwithstanding suspects' claims of Senegalese support 
for ringleader Cham's plot (including Jasseh's murky account 
of Senegalese financial support), we are not aware of a 
"smoking gun" to indicate clearly a  Senegalese hand in the 
overthrow attempt.  Nonetheless, we note, per ref a, Jammeh's 
reference in his March 24 statement, to "possible outside 
influence" surrounding the overthrow attempt and have no 
basis for ruling out Senegalese involvement of some sort.  In 
any event, the extent of Dakar's cooperation in locating Cham 
and sending him back to The Gambia -- if indeed he remains in 
the Casamance region, as the GOTG believes -- should be a 
good indicator of possible fallout from the coup plot on the 
Senegalese/Gambian  relationship.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
STAFFORD