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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6509
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
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RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000184 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DAKAR PASS RAO, ODC, AND DAO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINS CASC ASEC PHUM GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: PROMINENT JOURNALIST'S COMMENTS ON 
COUP ATTEMPT 
 
REF: A. BANJUL 182 
     ¶B. BANJUL 178 
     ¶C. BANJUL 177 
     ¶D. STATE 45407 (TD-314/20413-06) 
     ¶E. 05 BANJUL 836 (ALL NOTAL) 
 
BANJUL 00000184  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Well-informed journalist, Pap Saine, expressed 
certainty that there had been a coup attempt foiled here 
March 21, asserting that the immediate cause was widespread 
discontent in the regular army over special benefits enjoyed 
by President Jammeh's guard force.  Saine indicated that the 
number of detainees -- largely military officers -- over the 
failed plot had risen to about 20.  He did not/not believe 
that Jammeh would react to the incident by staging a renewed 
crackdown on the opposition parties.  Saine  is no supporter 
of the Jammeh government, but made clear  his opposition to 
removing it by force.  Ambassador took the occasion to 
reiterate USG's firm opposition to any extra-constitutional 
change of government, whether in The Gambia or elsewhere. In 
the aftermath of the coup attempt, we are heartened by the 
presence of both ruling party and opposition representatives 
at a March 23 conference organized by UNDP on donor 
assistance for the 2006-7 Presidential and National Assembly 
elections here.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
SOURCE EXPRESSES CERTAINTY OVER REPORTED COUP ATTEMPT 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (C) In March 24 conversation with Ambassador and DCM, a 
well-informed Embassy contact, editor-in-chief of independent 
daily, "The Point," Pap Saine, said he was certain that there 
had actually been a plot within the military to overthrow 
President Jammeh uncovered the evening of March 21 (refs a,b, 
c, and d).  Saine stated that the ringleader, Chief of 
Defense Staff (CHOD) Lt Col Ndure Cham, and his fellow 
plotters were holding their final planning meeting when word 
of their scheme leaked to the now-Deputy CHOD, Lt Col Peter 
Singhateh, who informed the now-CHOD, Col Lang Tamba.  The 
latter, in turn, had the leading plotters arrested -- with 
the notable exception of Cham, who managed to escape -- 
before they could activate the coup plan by occupying the 
Presidential compound, national radio and television offices, 
and other sites.  Asked about rumors that Cham had been 
secretly killed, Saine was skeptical, saying he regarded as 
 
SIPDIS 
credible the GOTG's statement that Cham was currently hiding 
out in Senegal's Casamance region. 
 
¶3. (U) Ambassador took the occasion to underscore USG's firm 
opposition to any extra-constitutional attempt to change a 
government, whether in The Gambia or elsewhere.  Saine 
responded that he shared our view entirely, notwithstanding 
his differences with the Jammeh government. 
 
REASONS FOR THE COUP 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Saine said he was not at all surprised to learn of 
this latest attempt to overthrow Jammeh, noting previously 
unsuccessful coup attempts in 1994 (shortly after Jammeh's 
own successful coup earlier that year), 1995, and 2000. 
Saine stated that the immediate cause of this most recent 
plot was discontent throughout the regular army over the 
extra benefits enjoyed by the several hundred or so personnel 
assigned to the President's guard force.  Among these extra 
benefits, according to Saine, Jammeh, as a precaution against 
palace coups, provided the equivalent of ten thousand dollars 
in cash for distribution to the guards each time he travelled 
abroad.  In addition, Saine continued, Jammeh ensured that 
the guards received special food rations.  (NOTE: We find 
Saine's explanation plausible and have no basis for 
challenging it, although we note that, per ref b, a member of 
this guard force is on the list of those detained for 
suspected involvement in the failed plot.  END NOTE.)  Saine 
remarked that Jammeh himself evidently feared an overthrow 
attempt, asserting that "six months ago" the President had 
offered a reward of 500,000 dalasis (approx. Dols 18,000) to 
anyone in the military providing information on a coup plot. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Saine suggested that another factor in any coup 
plotting here could stem from The Gambia's possible oil 
wealth.  Those opposed to Jammeh, he argued, could well 
 
BANJUL 00000184  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
decide to remove him in order to prevent him from "usurping" 
the revenues from whatever oil ended up being extracted in 
The Gambia. At the same time, Saine indicated that he did not 
know whether oil actually figured in plotters' calculations 
in the March 21 incident. 
 
UPDATE ON DETAINEES 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Saine indicated that the number of persons picked up 
for suspected involvement in the coup plot continued to grow, 
putting the current number at around 20, the large majority 
of them military officers. (NOTE: In its March 24 issue, the 
local journal, "Independent," claimed that 23 persons had so 
far been detained. END NOTE)  He was skeptical of reports, 
per ref a, that the former National Intelligence head, Daba 
Marena, and his deputy would soon be released for lack of 
evidence, saying in fact they were probably involved.  He 
commented that Marena, in particular, may well have been 
inspired by the example of Mauritanian Presidential security 
chief Fal in ousting President Taya during the latter's 
absence in 2005. (NOTE: Unlike Fal, though, Marena was 
actually abroad with his President -- in Mauritania -- when 
the coup plot here was foiled.  END NOTE)  Saine confirmed 
the detention of the prominent former Mayor of a Banjul 
suburb, Abdoulie Conteh, noting that the latter had become a 
bitter political foe of Jammeh and, as a former senior 
military officer who retained links to the armed forces 
leadership, may well have been recruited for the plot. 
 
CRACKDOWN ON THE OPPOSITION IN THE OFFING? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Asked whether Conteh's detention could presage a 
crackdown on the opposition similar to that in November 2005 
(ref e), Saine responded in the negative.  He asserted that 
the March 21 incident was "essentially a military affair," 
and that there was no evidence of support for the plot on the 
part of the country's opposition parties.  Saine expected 
that authorities would allow the opposition to continue to 
hold public rallies and other gatherings in their campaigning 
for the 2006-7 Presidential and National Assembly elections. 
(NOTE: While the opposition parties themselves have so far 
been publicly silent over the coup, on March 23, two 
opposition-leaning journals, Saine's "The Point" and "The 
Independent," ran editorials denouncing the plot and 
asserting that such attempts at extra-constitutional 
replacement of governments had no place in the democratic 
society to which The Gambia aspired. END NOTE.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) As the dust settles over the coup attempt, the 
generally business-as-usual atmosphere here  persists. Saine 
is no supporter of the Jammeh government, but made clear his 
opposition to the overthrow attempt -- and left no doubt of 
his certainty that the coup plot was real.   We find 
noteworthy his expectation that the failed coup attempt will 
not prompt a renewed crackdown on the opposition by Jammeh, 
although of course the situation will warrant continued close 
monitoring.   We are heartened, in this regard, that 
representatves of both the ruling APRC party and the 
opposition attended a March 23 conference organized by the 
local UNDP office on donor assistance for the 2006-7 
elections; report follows via septel.   END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFFORD