VZCZCXRO6400
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHJL #0153/01 0701409
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111409Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6473
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KMCA GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: THE MALAISE EASES 
 
REF: A. 05 BANJUL 836 
 
     ¶B. BANJUL 63 
     ¶C. BANJUL 111 
 
BANJUL 00000153  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) The malaise gripping The Gambia's political and human 
rights arenas at the end of 2005 is easing somewhat, as 
Nigerian President Obasanjo's February 5-6 mediation visit 
was successful in bringing about improved dialog between 
mercurial, rough-hewn President Jammeh and the opposition. 
Besides the opposition, Jammeh has reached out to former 
President Jawara, removed in Jammeh's 1994 coup.  Most 
opposition contacts welcome Jammeh's moves, while diehard 
opponents dismiss them as a cynical attempt to improve his 
image in advance of The Gambia-hosted African Union Summit. 
There are positive developments in the GOTG/media 
relationship, but ample room for improvement remains.  The 
extent to which Jammeh's ruling APRC party adheres to the MOU 
with the opposition on election-related conduct will serve as 
an indicator of the Gambian President's commitment to 
credible elections in 2006-7.  USG pressure is among the 
factors behind Jammeh's greater forthcomingness of late 
toward the opposition, and we need to keep up the pressure in 
an effort to prevent backsliding.   END SUMMARY. 
 
OVERVIEW: MALAISE AT YEAR'S END 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) As 2005 ended, there were signs of malaise gripping 
The Gambia's political and human rights arenas, due in large 
part to actions by mercurial, rough-hewn President Yahya 
Jammeh and his government (ref a).  He provoked an 
acrimonious confrontation with the opposition coalition, the 
National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD), three 
of whose leaders were detained by authorities for almost a 
month in November/December on flimsy charges.  The December 
dismissals of two senior officials for reasons that remain 
unclear, Gambia Civil Aviation head Maimouna Taal and Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff Assan Sarr, added to the malaise.  The 
GOTG's strained relationship with the private media was 
underscored by a mid-December incident in which police 
prevented journalists from staging a memorial ceremony at the 
site of the still-unsolved December 2004 murder of prominent 
newspaper owner Deyda Hydara. 
 
GOTG'S GESTURES TO THE OPPOSITION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The subsequent months have witnessed some 
improvement in the Gambian political and human rights 
environments, highlighted by the GOTG's gestures to the 
opposition. Nigerian President Obasanjo's February 5-6 visit 
to mediate between Jammeh and the opposition proved 
successful (ref b). Obasanjo got Jammeh to agree to hold 
heretofore rare face-to-face discussions with NADD leaders 
that resulted in the agreement by Jammeh's ruling APRC party 
and NADD of a MOU setting forth a "code of good conduct" for 
the October 2006 Presidential election.  Jammeh also took the 
occasion to announce that authorities would drop the charges 
against the indicted NADD trio, sparing them further 
prosecution. In the aftermath of Obasanjo's visit, Jammeh has 
mounted an unprecedented outreach effort toward the 
opposition, receiving various NADD and other opposition 
figures and, in his public statements, assuring his visitors 
of his good will and commitment to including the opposition 
in The Gambia's "nation building." 
 
REACHING OUT TO THE FORMER GOVERNMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOTG leadership has also directed its outreach 
effort at former President Dawda Jawara, overthrown in 
Jammeh's 1994 coup.  Absent from February 18 National Day 
events since his return from exile a few years ago, Jawara 
figured prominently in this year's activities.  He was seated 
next to Jammeh on the reviewing stand at the National Day 
parade and at the state dinner.  Along with opposition 
politicians, Jammeh has met in recent weeks with assorted 
former members of the Jawara government and appointed one, 
Lamin Kiti Jabang,.Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. 
 
REACTIONS TO JAMMEH'S GESTURES 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Our sources' reactions to the GOTG's moves are 
mixed; predictably, most opposition contacts react 
cautiously, welcoming Jammeh's gestures, but expressing 
varying degrees of doubt as to whether they represent a 
significant change in his attitude toward the opposition. 
Some anti-Jammeh diehards dismiss the outreach effort as a 
 
BANJUL 00000153  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
temporary "charm offensive" designed to improve Jammeh's 
image with an eye to the AU Summit scheduled to be held here 
in early July.  More neutral sources acknowledge the positive 
trend of late in Jammeh's actions, but are careful to add 
that the international community needs to keep the pressure 
on him in an effort to prevent backsliding. 
 
THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Signs that the year-end malaise is easing somewhat 
are evident in the media environment. In the aftermath of the 
Information Minister's February 14 give-and-take session with 
media reps (ref c), the country's independent journals, 
largely anti-government in orientation, enjoy greater access 
to senior GOTG officials.   Meanwhile, the government-owned 
electronic media are providing increased coverage of the 
opposition, as reflected in publicity for a recent NADD rally 
in the evening television news broadcast and the national 
radio service's interview with a NADD leader.  Indicative of 
the improved media environment, the privately owned paper, 
"The Point," recently expanded from thrice-weekly to daily 
publication.   And, despite most privately owned journals' 
anti-government bent, they continue to receive ample 
advertising from GOTG agencies and state enterprises (e.g., 
project announcements, tenders, position vacancies, etc.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Of course, there remains ample room for improvement 
in the GOTG/media relationship.  The  Senegalese-owned SUD FM 
radio station, closed by authorities in Octoberr 2004, has 
yet to resume operation, despite persisting rumors that it 
will be allowed to do so. (NOTE: Per ref c, the Information 
Minister recently informed us that the GOTG was awaiting a 
written request from SUD FM to resume broadcasting.  END 
NOTE.)  While there have been no reports of late of GOTG's 
arrest or harassment of journalists, authorities' failure to 
date to bring anyone to account for the Hydara murder -- 
amidst persistent allegations of possible official 
involvement -- remains a source of grievance within the media 
community. 
 
CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) We see various factors behind Jammeh's 
forthcomingness of late.  One is pressure from the 
international community, including the USG; the Millenium 
Challenge Account (MCA) program is an important source of 
leverage in this respect.  Another is doubtless Jammeh's 
desire to improve his image in the run-up to the AU Summit. 
A third factor centers on the 2006-7 Presidential and 
National Assembly elections; our sense is that Jammeh's 
recent flurry of meetings with opposition and Jawara-era 
figures is aimed in part at wooing them for the APRC -- at a 
time of fragmentation in NADD.  (Septel reports on NADD's 
fragmentation and on recent "defections" from the opposition 
to the APRC with de-facto election campaigning underway.) 
Against the backdrop of these factors, we believe it would be 
premature to join some of Jammeh's detractors in writing off 
his moves as nothing more than a temporary "charm offensive." 
  However, we do believe that the extent of Jammeh's personal 
attachment to democratic norms is uncertain and that, hence, 
continued pressure on him on behalf of democratization and 
human rights is in order.   A  final point: the extent to 
which Jammeh's APRC party adheres to the MOU with the 
opposition on election-related conduct will serve as a test 
of his professed commitment to free and fair contests in 
2006-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAFFORD