VZCZCXRO3899
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1861/01 0870906
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280906Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7495
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1558
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001861 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EB, AND EB/ESC/IEC/ENR 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR BWEISEL 
ENERGY FOR IN AND PI 
COMMERCE FOR JKELLY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016 
TAGS: EINV EPWR ENRG KPRV TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT QUASHES 
POWER PRODUCER EGAT LISTING 
 
REF: A. 05 BANGKOK 7124 
     ¶B. 06 BANGKOK 538 
     ¶C. 05 BANGKOK 6761 
 
BANGKOK 00001861  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On March 23, the Supreme Administrative Court 
(SAC) ruled that the procedure by which the Royal Thai 
Government (RTG) privatized state power producer EGAT Plc was 
illegitimate.  This ruling quashes plans for an initial 
public offering of shares anytime soon. One of the few 
institutions that has demonstrated independence from the 
government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the SAC 
issued the decision after considering a petition against 
privatization and listing filed by consumer advocacy groups. 
Petitioners argued that privatization benefits a few close to 
the PM rather than the nation as a whole, a message that 
resonates with consumers facing rising electricity bills 
resulting from high fuel prices. 
 
¶2. (U) While the court's decision was worded to reflect 
specific problems with the EGAT privatization process, the 
decision is a blow to the RTG,s plans for privatization in 
general. Due to the opposition's using privatization and 
other market liberalizing policies of the PM as additional 
tools with which to attack Thaksin has turned these issues 
into highly-charged political questions. The ability of any 
government to pursue privatization is doubtful until 
sufficient time passes to let the heat out and people regain 
confidence in the ability of independent institutions to 
protect the interests of the general public.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE RULING 
 
¶3. (U)  On March 23 the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) 
ruled in favor of petitioners seeking to block the partial 
privatization of state-owned electric power producer EGAT Plc 
(EGAT).  The SAC annulled the two royal decrees that 
transformed the state agency into a public company.  The 
ruling is retroactive to June 24, 2005, when the two decrees 
came into effect. 
 
¶4. (U)  The most important issue was the transfer of state 
assets to a public company.  In its prior status as the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, EGAT had 
expropriated large tracts of villagers, lands, for example, 
to build dams and other facilities.  The SAC ruled that the 
two royal decrees facilitating the corporatization process 
were &illegitimate8 because they transferred public assets 
into the hands of a private company.  Even though the Royal 
Thai Government (RTG) planned to sell only a 25-percent stake 
in EGAT, partial privatization of a public company that held 
public assets as a state enterprise was nevertheless ruled 
inappropriate because the RTG's majority share could be 
diluted should more shares be sold in the future. 
 
¶5. (U)  Other aspects of the decision announced pointed to 
conflicts of interest and missteps in preparing for 
privatization: 
 
--A board member of Shin Corporation and member of the RTG 
privatization committee was not suitable to sit on the 
committee because EGAT had plans to expand into telecom 
services.  Note:  Shin Corporation subsidiary AIS is the 
leading provider of mobile phone services in Thailand. End 
note. 
 
--The chair of the public hearing panel on the EGAT listing 
is also assistant to the Minister of Natural Resources and 
Environment. 
 
--The public hearing procedure was incomplete because the RTG 
announced the venue, date, and time in the newspapers for 
fewer than the three days required by law.  Details of the 
decrees were not disclosed and the hearing involved only 3.87 
percent of EGAT employees. 
 
--Consolidation of EGAT assets required for the privatization 
was not completed before the decrees went into effect. 
 
¶6. (U)  The SAC, which has made previous rulings contrary to 
 
BANGKOK 00001861  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Thaksin administration policies, had ordered the suspension 
of EGAT,s initial public offering (IPO) on November 15, 
2005, the day before the IPO subscription began (REF A).  The 
purpose was to consider the petition filed by the Federation 
of Consumer Organizations (FCO) and other representatives of 
consumer groups.  That suspension is now final until such 
time as the government devises a plan that takes into account 
the substance of the court decision. 
 
CRITICISMS OF EGAT PRIVATIZATION PLANS 
 
¶7. (U)  The FCO and other opponents of the EGAT IPO have 
raised several concerns in what has been a highly public 
campaign against a basic policy of the Thaksin government. 
Their general argument is that privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) is not in the national interest because it 
benefits PM Thaksin and those connected to him rather than 
the Thai people as a whole.  They point to the huge profits 
made by investors who received share allotments of previous 
IPOs of former SOEs such as the petroleum company PTT Plc. 
Critics have also raised questions about national security 
and pricing policies for key public services.  In February, 
after the Temasek buyout of Shin Corporation (REF B), 
Chai-anan Samudavanija resigned as the chairman of the EGAT 
board, citing fears that "EGAT could fall under foreign 
control" in the future.  Note:  Chai-anan is closely 
associated with media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul, a leader of 
the current campaign to oust PM Thaksin. End note. 
 
¶8. (U)  Public interest in plans for EGAT privatization has 
been particularly pronounced in part because rising fuel 
prices have recently led to increases in retail electricity 
prices (tariffs).  There is widespread suspicion that a 
private entity seeking to maximize shareholder value would 
boost tariff rates.  Arguments that privatization amounts to 
the sale of national assets for the benefit of a few thus 
carry special weight. 
 
¶9. (U)  Experts such as Dr. Deunden Nikomborirak, Research 
Director for Economic Governance, Sectoral Economics Program, 
at the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), have 
also emphasized that a critical weakness of RTG plans for 
EGAT privatization is the failure to establish an independent 
regulator beforehand (REF C).  The power sector is currently 
regulated by the National Energy Policy Committee, officially 
chaired by the Prime Minister and delegated to a Deputy PM. 
Its two component bodies are the Power Generation Commission 
and the Electricity Review Board (ERB).  Parliamentary 
passage of a basic law establishing a regulator for the 
sector is not imminent.  Dr. Vichit Lorchirachoonkul, head of 
the ERB, told Econoff that he expects a wait of 2-3 years. 
In the interim, there is no entity separate from the 
government with the authority to regulate the sector. 
 
A BLOW TO THE GOVERNMENT 
 
¶10. (U)  The Thai press immediately billed the EGAT ruling 
&a blow to the government8 at a time full of setbacks for 
PM Thaksin.  The EGAT IPO would have been the largest in Thai 
history*1.245 billion shares floated at 25 to 28 baht each, 
expected to boost the overall capitalization of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) by 300 billion baht (US$7.7 
billion). Much of the proceeds were to be used by EGAT to 
build new power generating facilities and invest in nearby 
countries. 
 
¶11. (U)  Government Spokesman Surapong Suebwonglee accurately 
responded that &the court,s ruling did not say that 
privatization was illegal, only that in EGAT,s case it was 
done improperly.8  Other RTG officials noted that the EGAT 
privatization process was overseen by former Chairman (lately 
Thaksin foe) Chai-anan.  He reaffirmed the RTG,s basic 
policy of pursuing privatization of SOEs and cited the postal 
service as a successful example.  PM Thaksin said that his 
government respected the court ruling but shrugged off the 
setback as a &technical blunder.8  The PM charged the 
Ministry of Energy with considering next steps, but said that 
he had not yet decided whether to press on with EGAT 
privatization if re-elected in the election scheduled for 
April 2. 
 
 
BANGKOK 00001861  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶12. (U) In the context of the ongoing standoff between the PM 
and his opponents led by Maj. Gen. Chamlong Srimuang and the 
People,s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the EGAT ruling 
provided another issue for PAD and others to bash the PM. 
Unsurprisingly, Chamlong called for Thaksin to resign, an 
appeal which the PM promptly rebuffed. 
 
IMPACT ON PRIVATIZATION 
 
¶13. (U) Potentially more significant than the momentary 
impact on the immediate political climate, the SAC ruling has 
influenced the thinking of SOE union leaders, some of whom 
see in the decision an opportunity to resist other plans for 
privatization of state enterprises.  The Port Authority of 
Thailand union's leader, for example, has called for the 
review of all previous privatizations of state enterprises, 
including Thai Airways and PTT Plc.  The union leader at the 
state-owned Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) -- who 
is also President of the Anti-Privatization Network -- has 
likewise called for reassessing previous privatizations. 
 
¶14. (U) The likely impact on future privatization of SOEs is 
difficult to assess at this point, but outside of the energy 
area it is likely to depend on the overall political strength 
of the Thaksin government.  Industry observers expect delay 
in privatizing EGAT,s sister organizations ) The Provincial 
Electricity Authority (PEA) and the MEA*because the issues 
are similar to those that tripped up the EGAT privatization. 
The caretaker status of the Thaksin government has itself put 
all major policy initiatives on hold, thereby delaying the 
IPOs of other SOEs, particularly the state-owned telecom 
firms TOT Plc and CAT Telecom Plc. 
 
COMMENT: 
 
¶15. (C) The SAC decision is a setback for EGAT privatization, 
forcing the RTG to go back and put the IPO preparations on 
firmer legal ground.  At the same time, it provides an 
opportunity to address concerns that have fueled popular 
opposition to privatization, including the creation of an 
independent regulator and transparency regarding the issuance 
of shares.  The delay also provides the opportunity for the 
RTG and others to make the case for how efficient management 
offers a way to keep a lid on prices, points conspicuous for 
their absence in recent debate.  One of the ironies of the 
current situation is the spectacle of popular reform groups 
lobbying for maintaining the status quo of EGAT, widely 
viewed here as being among the most corrupt and inefficient 
of Thailand's large number of SOEs which have traditionally 
provided cushy sinecures for the politically well-connected. 
Whether any government in the near term will be willing or 
able to press for privatization of EGAT or any other SOE 
remains an open question.  Privatization of other non-energy 
SOEs is not necessarily on hold, but owing to RTG weakness it 
is likely that sectoral liberalization has hit a rough patch 
that will last for a while, with all of the implications that 
has for the stock market, competitiveness of certain economic 
sectors, and the opportunities for foreign companies to 
invest in Thailand. 
BOYCE