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Viewing cable 06BANGKOK1546, DELPHIC ORACLES AND BLACK MAGIC - THAILAND UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BANGKOK1546 2006-03-14 00:01 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001546 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC TH TRT
SUBJECT: DELPHIC ORACLES AND BLACK MAGIC - THAILAND UPDATE 
MARCH 13 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 01537 (OPPOSITION SELLS) 
     B. BANGKOK 01445 (MORE CALLS FOR THAKSIN'S 
        RESIGNATION) 
     C. BANGKOK 01475 (THAI SNAP REGISTRATION ENDS) 
     D. BANGKOK 00959 (CONSTITUTIONAL COURT REJECTS 
        SENATORS' BID TO DISQUALIFY THAKSIN) 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex A. Arvizu, reason 1.4 (b) ( 
d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: All TV stations, at the request of the 
Palace, ran film of the King's May 1992 meeting with General 
Suchinda and protest leader Chamlong, in which the King 
called on them to avoid confrontation and find a peaceful 
solution.  In the wake of the Sunday evening broadcast, there 
have been renewed calls for resolution of the current 
conflict through negotiations, perhaps mediated by Privy 
Councillor Prem.  Last Friday, Thaksin made his case to the 
public in a TV interview, meeting with only moderate success. 
 Meanwhile, the exposure of fraudulent candidates and a 
technical problem with the TRT party list demonstrate that 
there may be problems seating all 500 members of the new 
Parliament if elections take place.  A Constitutional Court 
judge told us that his court was wrong not to have taken the 
Shin Corp case and reviewed the PM's involvement in the sale. 
 Pro-Thaksin farmers on tractors are heading for Government 
House for a possible confrontation with anti-Thaksin 
demonstrators; the demonstrators may head them off at the 
pass by holding their protest march earlier.   End summary. 
 
 
THE KING SPEAKS - SORT OF 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  By far the biggest recent development was the 
unannounced broadcast on all TV stations Sunday evening at 
8pm showing film of the iconic intervention of the King 
following the 1992 pro-democracy demonstrations.  A 
broadcaster announced that, "As the current situation has led 
to the existence of a large diversity of different 
conflicting opinions, several groups in the society are 
worried that this may lead to unrest in the country.  The TV 
Pool of Thailand deems it appropriate to present His Majesty 
the King's advice given on 20 May 1992 to serve as a reminder 
for consideration for all parties and individuals." There 
follows the King's advice to both General Suchinda and the 
protesters (led then, as they are today, by Chamlong 
Srimuang) to avoid confrontation and violence.  In 1992, the 
King offered the Privy Council and particularly General Prem 
Tinsulanonda as "senior figures ready to give advice with 
neutrality."  The clip was replayed on the Monday morning 
news on several channels as well. 
 
3. (C)  The King's principal private secretary, Asa Sarasin, 
told the Ambassador that the King himself ordered the film to 
be shown in order to encourage a peaceful resolution to the 
current political conflict. Although Asa says the intent of 
the broadcast was not to favor either side, the initial 
analysis is that it works against the Prime Minister, since 
everyone knows that part of the solution in 1992 was for the 
PM under siege to step down. This was the view expressed to 
DCM by a military aide of Privy Councillor General Suryayud 
Chulanont. 
 
4. (C)  In the wake of this broadcast, there have been 
renewed calls for both sides to agree to meet and talk, as 
well as calls for General Prem to act as mediator.  The 
latest idea circulating follows the outlines of the plan 
advocated by the National Police spokesman last week. 
Speaking in his personal capacity, the spokesman said that 
each side should take "one step back." Under this scenario, 
Thaksin would agree not to be PM in the next Parliament, no 
matter how the voting went, and the opposition parties would 
agree to participate in elections, which would be rescheduled 
to allow them to choose candidates and register. So far, 
however, there has been no sign of real progress in settling 
up a meeting. 
 
 
THAKSIN SPEAKS -- I AM NOT A CROOK 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Before the Palace's unexpected flashback, Thaksin's 
campaign was dominating the press.  On Friday, March 10, he 
gave an interview in which he justified the sale of Shin Corp 
and his decision to dissolve the Parliament, among other 
difficult questions.  The ABAC poll (considered to be as 
reliable a poll as Thailand has) reported an even split among 
viewers in response to several of the issues.  46 percent 
thought Thaksin's explanation of the share of Shin Corp was 
"very clear" as opposed to 42 percent who thought it wasn't. 
About 44 percent agreed with his explanation on his 
resignation, while 33 percent did not accept his arguments 
and 23 percent had no view.   68 percent agreed with 
Thaksin's explanation that he had set such a short term for 
the new elections in order to allow time for the new 
government to be set up before the King's celebration in 
June.  Several observers commented on how stressed the PM 
appeared to be during the interview. The grilling he got from 
the interviewer is further evidence of the increased openness 
of the broadcast media. (Ref A) 
 
6. (C) The PM also assembled civil servants on Friday, 
apparently to remind them of their duty to be neutral and 
implement the policies of the current administration until a 
new government is formed.  Several sources have confirmed 
that Thaksin referred to reports that his enemies were using 
voodoo and black magic against him, an interjection that one 
attendee described as "inappropriate." 
 
THE MONK SPEAKS - I AM NOT A CANDIDATE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  The Thai constitution and electoral law were meant 
for genuine multi-party contests.  The current election is 
not quite a one horse race -- more like one horse and seven 
gerbils.  Thai Rak Thai's goal is to avoid various landmines 
in the law that might leave some seats unfilled and, for all 
practical purposes, unfillable. It is generally assumed that 
all 500 seats must be filled before the new Parliament can 
sit and elect a new government. Various technical problems 
now cropping up are introducing additional speculation and 
intrigue (Ref C). 
 
8. (C) Number 93 on the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party list of 100 
has resigned from the party and entered the monastery.  The 
(former) candidate told the press that he had done this to 
"unlock the political gridlock and cause the April 2 election 
to be canceled, so that everyone would negotiate."  Dr. 
Premsak, now Phra (Monk) Premsak, intends to achieve this by 
leaving TRT with only 99 people on its "party list."  TRT is 
widely expected to win all 100 seats awarded on the basis of 
the party list vote; the other parties running cannot be 
expected to get the required 5 percent of the vote 
nationwide, even under the current circumstances, and thus 
would not get any of the 100 party list seats.  Therefore, 
according to Monk Premsak and some other analysts, there will 
be an unavoidable deadlock if elections take place, as TRT 
will not have 100 bodies to fill its 100 seats. 
 
9.  (C)  Comment: We're not certain that Monk Premsak's 
analysis is correct.  Since the Electoral Commission (EC) 
does not finish its vetting of candidates until Wednesday, we 
are not certain that TRT wouldn't get a last chance to 
replace the disqualified candidate under these circumstances. 
 The Electoral Commission is also hinting that it might need 
to find some way to resolve the various "incomplete 
Parliament" scenarios.   However, this very public defection 
by yet another TRT member is more sobering news for PM 
Thaksin.  End Comment. 
 
10.  (SBU)  There are also numerous press reports of 
fraudulent candidates in the constituency races.  Three of 
these candidates came forward over the weekend and admitted 
that they had been paid 30,000 baht each to claim to be 
members of the Democratic Progressive Party and run in the 
contest in the mid-South province of Trang. They said that 
they did not know the party affiliation of the person who 
paid them to run.  They reportedly came forward when they 
became concerned that they might be breaking the law. 
 
THE JUDGE SPEAKS -- COURT WHIFFED ON SHIN CORP 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (C) We spoke to one of the Constitutional Court judges 
who voted against Thaksin in the case submitted by 28 
senators requesting review the legality of the Shin Corp sale 
(ref D).  Judge Apai said that the six judges who voted to 
accept the petition against the PM felt strongly that the 
Court should have taken the case and used its authority to 
investigate the allegations that Thaksin had maintained 
improper control over Shin Corp and was involved in its sale. 
 The judge denied, however, that any of the justices on the 
court had been bribed or otherwise subject to undue 
influence.  The judge said that this case came under the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and no other court 
would be able to accept this case. (Note: we believe that 
this restriction applies primarily to the issue he mentioned 
-- whether Thaksin controlled the Shin Corp shares sold, 
which would have violated Article 209 of the Constitution. 
Other aspects of the sale could conceivably be examined by 
other courts.  However, the Constitutional Court's decision 
to take a pass on the case was the final straw for many of 
the protesters, who decided that there was no legal recourse 
possible to hold the PM accountable to the law. End note.) 
MEANWHILE, ON SANAM LUANG 
------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Press reports say that at least several hundred 
farmers from TRT strongholds in northeast Thailand are riding 
on their tractors to Bangkok, planning to surround Government 
House and confront the anti-Thaksin demonstrators.  The 
protesters on Sanam Luang planned to march on Government 
House at 7:00 Tuesday morning.  The protesters are 
considering moving up the time of their march and going this 
evening, in order to complete the protest there before the 
tractors arrive.  Thaksin has already announced he won't be 
at Government House Tuesday morning for the Cabinet meeting 
-- he'll be traveling in the northeast and will 
teleconference with the cabinet. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (C) The Palace's tentative intervention is being widely 
viewed mainly as a call for negotiations and moderation. 
Thaksin supporters can claim that the message is aimed 
primarily at protest leader Chamlong, whereas others 
interpret the broadcast as a call for Thaksin to step down 
(i.e., the "whisper in the ear.")  The broadcast message is 
very much the King's preferred style, vague enough to be 
interpreted in different ways by different audiences.  Many 
observers see recent developments such as this ratcheting up 
the pressure on Thaksin to be more forthcoming in trying to 
negotiate a way out the impasse. He believes he's doing 
plenty, but it doesn't seem to be enough.  End comment. 
 
 
 
BOYCE