Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BANGKOK1472, EAP DAS JOHN MEETS WITH THAKSIN'S BRAIN TRUST

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BANGKOK1472.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BANGKOK1472 2006-03-09 10:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

091006Z Mar 06
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001472 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH TRT SNAP
SUBJECT: EAP DAS JOHN MEETS WITH THAKSIN'S BRAIN TRUST 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE.  REASON 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary. In a March 3 meeting with visiting EAP DAS 
Eric John and the Ambassador, principal advisor to the Prime 
Minister Pansak Vinyaratn brushed aside rumors that Thaksin 
could yet resign, that the ruling Thai Rak Thai party could 
have problems in the April 2 snap election, or that military 
or royal intervention in the political crisis was likely. 
Pansak instead outlined his own colorful analysis of the 
situation, calling the current challenge to Thaksin the "last 
hurrah of the old wealthy class."  Thaksin and his party, 
meanwhile, are preparing to expand their efforts to reform 
the Thai political system to include more direct 
participation following the April 2 vote.  Pansak even hopes 
to export this new "custom of democracy" to Burma and China. 
End Summary. 
 
THAKSIN STILL HOLDS ALL THE CARDS 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In a meeting with DAS John and the Ambassador on March 
3, Pansak Vinyaratn--one of Thaksin's closest advisers and 
strategists--brimmed with fatigued confidence.  Replete with 
profanity-laced riffs which are his trademark, Pansak 
dismissed rumors that the PM may resign, or that Thaksin's 
Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) would have technical difficulty 
filling enough seats to form a new government following the 
April 2 snap election.  The Army remains "balanced" and a 
military coup improbable.  According to Pansak, the King has 
signaled that he is not currently interested in intervening; 
"why should he want to be a hero at the wrong time?"  When 
asked if Thaksin and TRT still hold all the cards in the 
current crisis, Pansak responded "absolutely."  That said, 
the situation remains fluid and Pansak did not completely 
rule out a scenario where Thaksin loses power.  "Worst case? 
I (get some) rest." 
 
"THE LAST HURRAH OF THE OLD WEALTHY CLASS" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) The current political crisis is the "last hurrah of 
the old wealthy class," according to Pansak.  This cabal of 
political and economic elite who have dominated modern Thai 
society are "absolutely, deeply resentful" of Thaksin, who 
Pansak suggests is a new type of businessman and politician. 
Pansak said he told Thaksin, "all of these people who have 
lost their role in society, who have lost their shirts 
because of arrogance, want to come back (and defeat 
Thaksin.)"  This "unholy alliance" of big business, the 
Democrat Party and "some people close to the palace" remain 
feckless.  They have no specific programs or platforms and 
lack even the leadership to defeat Thaksin, according to 
Pansak.  They had to get media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul "out 
of the grave" to lead their cause.  They "keep losing at the 
polls because they never follow through on their promises." 
After decades of dominance under both military and civilian 
rule they have been pushed aside by Thaksin, "someone who 
actually does what he says he'll do." 
 
4. (C) According to Pansak, these elite "dream that pre-97 
(the era predating the current constitution, which was marked 
by unstable political coalitions prone to party switching) 
can come back...they are dreaming."  Shifts in the regional 
economy were also contributing to the waning influence of the 
traditional elite.  "Is it really possible to have the 
commodity-peer-competitor mercantile group (from) the cold 
war era now?" As an example, Pansak stated that a recent deal 
with a major Chinese corporation to build and operate a 
massive motorbike factory in Thailand was the first time that 
such a deal had been completed without the participation of 
one of the elite Thai mega-corporations as a middle man.  The 
Chinese had made the deal directly with local contractors and 
suppliers.  According to Pansak, "the Chinese dynamo affects 
Thai politics" and the old elite don't even know it. 
 
5. (C) Pansak also denounced the "arrogance" of the political 
opposition.  According to Pansak, the King's personal private 
secretary Arsa Sarasin had called Democrat Party Chief 
 
SIPDIS 
Abhisit Vejjahiva to ask him if he would like to meet Thaksin 
at the palace to discuss the current crisis.  Abhisit 
refused, saying that if the palace would like him to meet 
with the PM, they would have to submit a list of subjects for 
discussion first.  (Comment.  Abhisit told the press on 
Thursday that he had been invited to meet with Thaksin at the 
palace, but would only palaver with the PM if a neutral 
witness was present. End Comment.) 
 
THAKSIN HASN'T WEAKENED DEMOCRACY 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) While acknowledging the conventional wisdom that 
Thaksin was the first politician to master the changes of the 
1997 constitution in building his electoral juggernaught, 
Pansak rejected the assertion that the PM has undercut the 
independent institutions designed to check his office. Using 
a colorful and unprintable metaphor to support his point, 
Pansak explained that TRT was not about to undercut the 
public perception that Thaksin is very strong.  The facts, 
however, belie this assertion, according to Pansak. Thaksin 
has failed to push through several big-ticket programs, such 
as public utility privatization. 
 
7. (C)  Indeed, the independent institutions formed under the 
1997 constitution remain robust if not openly opposed to the 
PM, according to Pansak.  The head of the constitutional 
court is the owner of former PM and Democrat Party senior 
adviser Chuan Leekpai's rental house.  Pansak also denied 
that Thaksin had manipulated the consitutional court.  (In 
2001, the court, in a 8-7 vote, acquitted the PM of failing 
to disclose assets in 1997.  In 2006, the court, again in a 
close vote, denied a request by a group of senators to 
investigate his sale of Shin Corp.) "If Thaksin was so good, 
do you think the court would have accepted either case?  If 
he's a dictator...(the vote to acquit) should be 14-0." 
 
 
A NEW MODEL FOR THAI DEMOCRACY 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Thaksin, in fact, has strengthened democracy, 
according to Pansak, and TRT will continue to consolidate 
these gains after their certain victory in the April 2 vote. 
"Everyone thinks that Thaksin came from the Thai elite, 
meaning the system is not completely democratic yet...that's 
not reality."  Thaksin's power base "is the people." Quoting 
another Thai intellectual, Pansak said, "It took the 
communists forty years to try and divide Thai society, but 
TRT took only five years to capture the hearts and minds of 
the people." 
 
9. (C) Pansak envisions a better balance between 
representational democracy and direct, popular democracy.  In 
Pansak's analysis, the Thai elite who have dominated the 
country for so long have focused too much on a form of 
representative democracy that meets their needs and minimizes 
the voices of the masses.  The success of more direct 
democracy will depend in large part on the ability of the 
people to exercise their rights. The current crisis "shows 
that the political elite are still fairly immature."  Pansak, 
who is currently involved in a project to develop a world 
class public library system in Thailand, wants to build a 
custom or culture of democracy in Thailand, "where people 
exercise their rights." Example: "if you want to protest go 
ahead, but then go ahead and participate in the election." 
In the past, journalists were thrown in jail.  "Now, we sue 
them, because we believe in the custom of democracy." 
 
10. (C) Pansak was less clear in explaining how he and TRT 
intend to formalize this mix of democracy, but he appears to 
support Thaksin's public intentions to reform the 
constitution.  "I have never accepted the (1997) 
constitution...it's crap, not democracy...how can you write 
in the amount of national spending that each province is 
supposed to get?  That's not even written in the newly 
independent African states' constitutions." 
 
BUT WHAT ROLE FOR THE MONARCHY? 
------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Absent from Pansak's "big-think" analysis was any 
explicit mention of a role for the monarchy in a new Thai 
democracy.  However, Pansak did diverge from a discussion 
about the political opposition with a cryptic sentence or two 
that seemed to suggest a preference for a respected but 
politically uninvolved monarch.  "To revere the King in the 
correct manner is to allow him to be in the palace with 
happiness and his eunuchs only come out of the palace to go 
to the supermarket.  So always fund beautiful roads for 
eunuchs to go back to the palace...the situation now is, 
build beautiful roads for eunuchs to go back to the palace." 
 
 
THAILAND'S NEW EXPORT...DEMOCRACY TO BURMA/CHINA? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
12. (C) Pansak hopes to take his idea of a "custom of 
democracy" on the road.  "If we can finish this (current 
crisis) I'll tell Thaksin to go to Rangoon and tell the 
(military leadership), see?  Democracy means you have 
insurance...you can feel safe about giving up some powers. 
After Rangoon, we go to Beijing...if successful, we can 
export to your guys in Latin America...I should get a Nobel 
Prize for this!" 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (C) Pansak is one of Thaksin's closest advisers and the 
source of much TRT strategy.  His unmistakable confidence 
that the PM will weather the current political storm could be 
taken as further evidence that the conventional wisdom among 
much of the Bangkok elite--that Thaksin's days are 
numbered--remains wishful thinking and that TRT is prepared 
to overcome any technical challenges in the April 2 vote.  On 
the other hand, it could simply represent misplaced TRT 
hubris.  Pansak's predictions (and humorous efforts to paint 
Thaksin as a man of the people) aside, his analysis of the 
structural battles between the old elite and the new rings 
true.  Either way, Pansak's colorful commentary, in addition 
to being supremely entertaining, offered a persuasive 
explication of what the Thaksin phenomena is all about and 
why it may have yet to run its course. 
BOYCE