This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TH BURMA US
SUBJECT: EAP DAS JOHN'S MEETING WITH MFA PERMSEC KRIT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  During a March 8 meeting with MFA 
Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, EAP DAS Eric 
John countered the perception that the U.S. was not 
sufficiently engaged in Southeast Asia.  Krit indicated that 
a 505 Agreement on Excess Defense Articles could be concluded 
prior to March 15.  He observed that the current political 
situation in Thailand is unique in Thai history.  Krit 
described Indonesian and Malaysian attempts to engage with 
Burma and suggested continued coordination on Burma between 
ASEAN members, the U.S., and other regional powers. END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C)  On March 8 EAP DAS Eric John, accompanied by the 
Ambassador, met over lunch with Thai Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn. 
Krit was accompanied by Director General of American Affairs 
Nongnuth Phetcharatana and East Asian Director General 
Nopadol Gunavibool. 
 
THE IMAGE OF THE U.S. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  DAS John -- noting recent suggestions from Singapore 
and elsewhere that the U.S. was not fully engaged in the 
region -- highlighted the upcoming visit of Secretary Rice, 
which would be followed by the President's visit in November 
for APEC, as evidence of positive and dynamic U.S. engagement 
in Southeast Asia.  The re-emergence of China is not a zero 
sum game for the U.S.  Krit agreed, however, he cautioned 
that the U.S. image in the region had suffered because the 
U.S. appeared to only discuss Southeast Asia in a negative 
context, citing the Human Rights Report and Burma as 
examples.  He indicated that a positive message from the 
Secretary during her visit would resonate. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
505 AGREEMENT 
------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Ambassador asked about the status of our request 
that Thailand modify an existing agreement to allow the 
continued transfer of Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to the 
Thai military (505 Agreement), which needed to be concluded 
by March 15 in order to allow the handing over of EDA 
helicopters to the Thai Army.  Krit said the agreement had 
been held up by an ongoing bureaucratic struggle between MFA, 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Cabinet over whether 
agreements such as this required Cabinet consultation.  MFA 
was waiting for Cabinet notification before proceeding with 
the diplomatic note approving the agreement.  Krit suggested 
that, although he favored approaching the cabinet on this 
issue, he would consider releasing a diplomatic note if MOD 
sent MFA a letter formally requesting it do so.  Such a 
letter would provide MFA with the political cover it needed 
to issue the diplomatic note approving the agreement. 
 
CURRENT POLITICAL TURMOIL 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Krit described the current political situation as 
unique in Thai history.  He highlighted the restraint of the 
police and military and the overall lack of violence as 
symbols of Thailand's political maturity.  "In the old days 
it would have been resolved by now because people would have 
come to blows."  Thaksin had not anticipated that the sale of 
Shin Corp. would create such a backlash since in his mind the 
deal was only a business transaction.  Despite the appearance 
of impropriety the opposition had not been able to make any 
of their charges stick and notwithstanding the protests in 
Bangkok the Prime Minister still was very popular in the 
countryside. 
 
BURMA: MULTI-NATIONAL COORDINATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Krit agreed that under President Yudhoyono, 
Indonesia was on the way to re-assuming its "rightful and 
positive" leadership position in ASEAN.  Yudhoyono's February 
visit to Burma had gone well because he had the credibility 
to deliver a message to the junta about the need for change. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Krit said that Foreign Minister Kantathi was working 
hard to facilitate a visit by Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed 
Hamid to Burma to meet with the regime leadership.  However, 
the RTG had had very limited contact with the SPDC over the 
last few months.  Krit noted that even military-to-military 
contact had not been taking place recently.  The Burmese were 
using the move to Pyinmana as an excuse to avoid meeting with 
FM Hamid.  The Ambassador said that FM Hamid should not agree 
to go to Burma without permission to visit Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Krit believed that the Burmese would not allow a Hamid visit 
if seeing ASSK was a precondition.  He suggested such a 
request be handled in a more "ASEAN" manner because dealing 
with the Burmese publicly only caused a defensive reaction. 
While a tougher stance towards the junta had strengthened 
ASEAN to a degree, it had failed to produce results.  Krit 
encouraged continued high-level U.S. engagement with India 
and China over Burma, agreeing that common language among the 
major powers was beneficial. 
 
¶8.  (U)  DAS John did not have the opportunity to clear this 
message. 
BOYCE