This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SNAP
SUBJECT: THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS:  WHAT IT'S ABOUT, AND 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 1208 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 0959 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 0538 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reasons 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  We are not likely to see an early resolution of the 
political confrontation between Prime Minister Thaksin and 
his opponents.  To facilitate better understanding of 
possible outcomes and the significance of these events for 
the U.S.-Thai relationship, and to contemplate the best way 
to position the USG vis--vis these unfolding events in 
Thailand, we offer the following analysis and suggestions. 
 
WHAT'S NOT HAPPENING 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  What we are witnessing is not a power struggle 
between the boycotting opposition parties and the Prime 
Minister.  The three boycotting parties are not leading the 
opposition to the Prime Minister, rather, they are being 
dragged in its wake.  They decided on the boycott strategy 
with great reluctance, and only when it became clear that 
they would be severely criticized by the activist groups 
leading the anti-Thaksin demonstrations if they participated 
in the polls.  Until Thaksin dissolved parliament, the 
opposition Democrats were still trying to use more 
conventional legal mechanisms to uncover Thaksin's unethical 
or illegal dealings and to hold him accountable in that way. 
 
¶3.  (C) This is not about reducing Thai Rak Thai's majority 
in the Parliament.  The opposition movement -- NGOs and civil 
society groups --  raises no objection per se to another TRT 
leader taking over as Prime Minister.  Many people who oppose 
Thaksin personally, even vehemently, nonetheless support many 
of the TRT policies. The leaders of the protest movement 
have, for the most part, no strong ties to any political 
party. 
 
¶4. (C) The opposition boycott is neither unconstitutional nor 
illegal.  The Democrats point out that this is not the first 
time they have used this tool: they boycotted the elections 
of 1952 to protest military rule.  The boycott may prove to 
be unpopular (public opinion polls present a mixed picture so 
far) and the opposition parties know it may cost them in the 
polls during subsequent elections, but they made their 
calculation and decided it was a political gamble worth 
taking. 
 
¶5.  (C) This impasse will not last forever.  Thailand will 
host dozens of VIP visitors, including many of the crowned 
heads of Europe, beginning in early June to celebrate the 
King's 60th anniversary on the throne. The significance of 
this anniversary for the Thai people cannot be overstated. 
Our contacts are virtually unanimous in predicting that the 
crisis will be resolved before the anniversary gets underway. 
 
¶6. (C) Are the "elite" in Bangkok taking an undemocratic 
stance in trying to oust a popularly-elected leader?  There 
is an element of truth to this accusation, but it is not the 
whole story.  The Bangkok elite never really warmed to what 
they see as the nouveau-riche, upstart, know-it-all Prime 
Minister and his very un-Thai abrasiveness.  Initial support 
from some who liked Thaksin's "fresh" thinking on the economy 
and his appeal to Thai nationalism faded as questions about 
his ethics and his effectiveness as national leader grew. 
Many Bangkok residents are convinced that although government 
corruption across-the-board is no worse than with previous 
administrations, corruption at the top is the worst it has 
ever been.  Following the promulgation of the 1997 
constitution, the Thai Senate and a variety of independent 
institutions were supposed to play an important 
checks-and-balances role, but Thaksin has neutralized almost 
all of them. In the opposition view, with no viable legal 
venues left to hold Thaksin accountable for anything, there 
was little recourse but to take the argument to the street 
(ref A). 
 
WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT? 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) This struggle is to ensure that Thailand is a genuine 
democracy, with checks and balances on power that work in a 
Thai context.  It is the second act of the story which 
started with the 1992 pro-democracy demonstrations, followed 
by the efforts to put in place a new constitution to ensure 
civilian government that was both effective and democratic. 
The 1997 constitution is a good document, but, like a new 
roof, it sprang leaks in some places. Thaksin, with steely 
efficiency, exploited these leaks to his political advantage 
over the past 5 years.  While most of Thaksin's current 
critics castigate him for a wide variety of reasons, 
including their personal self-interest, the controversy over 
the Shin Corp sale  (ref C) turned out to be the last straw, 
the single issue around which a fractious array of Thaksin 
opponents could galvanize.  Tellingly, many of his old allies 
turned against him.  In this conflict, Thai society is 
sorting out some important questions:  how much corruption is 
just too much?  How do you balance the right of the citizens 
to elect whomever they choose with the need of society to 
have respect for the rule of law?  What kinds of checks and 
balances are necessary to keep society just, and how do you 
make them work? 
¶8.  (C) Thaksin has been accused throughout his term of 
office of a variety of illegal or unethical actions in 
connection with his family's Shin Corp.  When he was first 
accused of concealing his assets, the Constitutional Court 
issued a controversial acquittal in 2001.  It is widely 
believed that Thaksin paid off judges in order to secure this 
8-7 decision.  When a journalist wrote about the degree to 
which Shin Corp had benefited from the Thaksin government's 
policies, the company sued her for libel, and she is facing a 
possible fine of usdols 10 million and two years in prison. 
Frustration over the PM's impunity in relationship to Shin 
Corp dealings reached a head in February, when the 
Constitutional Court refused to consider the petition from 28 
Senators to review the Shin Corp deal and examine whether the 
PM had violated Thai law.  Ironically, it is possible that 
this controversial sale was at least technically legal. But, 
just as there is no institution in this country that has the 
power to convict Thaksin, there also appears to be no 
institution that has the moral authority to acquit him. 
 
WHAT ABOUT THE U.S.? 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  As in other places around the world, Thais tend 
either to look to the US for leadership or blame the US for 
what goes wrong.   In 1992, reports that the US believed the 
leading civilian candidate for PM was involved in drug 
trafficking circulated widely.  Our opposition to that 
candidate was the opening utilized by junta leader General 
Suchinda to claim the top job, the act that led to the 
prodemocracy demonstrations and the violence that accompanied 
them.  During this past year, opposition elements seized on 
our FTA negotiations as a club with which to beat the PM. 
 
¶10. (C) That said, it is particularly striking that neither 
side is asking for the US to take their part in the ongoing 
struggle.  We have regular contacts with the protest 
movement, the opposition parties, the military and with 
leaders in the TRT, including the embattled PM himself.  We 
talk to journalists and academics.  As rumors fly, everyone 
wants to know what we know -- but no one has asked us what to 
do.  The Thai seem prepared to work this out themselves, in 
the context of their constitution (with all its quirks).  The 
US does have a role to play: emphasizing the need for all 
parties to use peaceful means and to find a just solution. 
If either side begins to use violence or improper means 
(vote-buying, intimidation, etc. then we will want to use 
public statements and private channels to voice our concern. 
For the time being, respecting the collective Thai ability to 
sort their way through the current impasse is the best thing 
we can do for Thai democracy and our bilateral relationship. 
BOYCE