This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM KN TH DPRK
SUBJECT: THAI RESPONSE ON NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 
 
REF: STATE 33786 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR BOYCE, REASONS 1.4 (B, D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  During March 3 conversations, Thai FM 
Kantathi and NSC Chief Winai said that the North Korean 
refugee issue was sensitive for Thailand.  However, they 
indicated that the RTG was willing to work with the USG on 
discreet, case-by-case processing of North Korean refugees 
for U.S. resettlement.  This represents a welcome shift of 
the Thai position, but one that needs to be treated with some 
caution given the uncertain political future of the Thaksin 
government.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Per reftel, Ambassador met March 3 with Foreign 
Minister Kantathi on North Korean refugees.  Ambassador also 
took the opportunity to raise the issue of the missing Hmong 
minors (septel).  Prior to the meeting, and per reftel, 
Refcoord contacted ROK Embassy Counselor Hong-Kyun Kim and 
stated that the Embassy had received instructions to approach 
the RTG on North Korean refugees and hoped the ROK Embassy 
would inform the RTG, if approached, that it had no ojections 
to the planned U.S. strategy on this issue. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador told Kantathi that the North Korea Human 
Rights Act requires the USG to facilitate the resettlement of 
qualified North Korean refugees to the United States.  The 
United States recognized that this issue was sensitive for 
Thailand and appreciated that the Thai had done a good job of 
quietly facilitating the movement of North Koreans to South 
Korea.  The United States did not want to do anything that 
might negatively affect the current situation.  At the same 
time, the United States thought there might be cases for 
which U.S. resettlement would be appropriate.  The United 
States did not know of any such cases now, but if one arose 
would cooperate with UNHCR and the ROK in determining bona 
fides and carrying out the other usual steps of U.S. refugee 
processing.  If the United States found that a refugee was 
ineligible for U.S. resettlement, the ROK had said that it 
would nevertheless accept the person.  The Ambassador urged 
the Foreign Minister to permit U.S. processing of North 
Korean refugees and allow them to depart for the United 
States if found eligible. 
 
¶4. (C) Kantathi responded that Thailand permits South Korea 
to process and resettle North Koreans quietly.  The Thai had 
also worked successfully with the ROK when some North Koreans 
had entered the Thai Embassy in Hanoi.  He said that he had 
heard that North Korean refugees had found it hard to 
integrate into South Korea.  It seemed the United States was 
now prepared to give the "green light."  Kantathi asked if 
the United States was most interested in getting access.  The 
Ambassador replied that we wanted to process North Korean 
refugees for resettlement to the United States and briefly 
described the steps of the process.  The Ambassador again 
urged Kantathi to allow the U.S. to move ahead with this 
initiative. 
 
¶5. (C) Kantathi said this issue was sensitive for Thailand. 
He noted that the North Koreans had targetted Embassies in 
Beijing but the Chinese had been successful in cutting off 
that option by strengthening security in the diplomatic 
quarter.  Now the North Koreans followed a route that took 
them through Yunnan Province and down the Mekong River. 
Thailand had heard that there were 30,000-40,000 North 
Koreans around the region outside of their country.  The Thai 
government was worried about a pull factor and did not want 
to encourage the North Koreans to come to Thailand.  It would 
be best if North Koreans could be processed for resettlement 
with UNHCR assistance in China.  Kantathi also stated that 
Thailand's relations with North Korea were sensitive.  He 
cited the issue of the Thai woman who had apparently been 
abducted many years ago by the North Koreans and whose case 
came to light after Robert Jenkins left North Korea.  The 
Thai government had raised her case, unsuccessfully so far, 
with the DPRK.  It would continue to pursue the issue, 
however, and might work with the Japanese and Chinese to 
achieve a satisfactory result.  The North Korean government 
was very difficult, Kantathi said. 
 
¶6. (C) Kantathi then said that, personally speaking, the RTG 
could work with the USG on the U.S. resettlement of North 
Koreans on a discreet, case-by-case basis.  He emphasized 
that the process must be discreet.  He also requested that 
the USG explore the possibility of resettlement processing 
with the PRC.  The Ambassador thanked Kantathi for this 
response. 
 
¶7. (C) Following the discussion with Kantathi, the Ambassador 
telephoned General Winai Phattiyakul, the head of the Thai 
National Security Council.  The Ambassador made similar 
points to Winai about U.S. intentions and strong desire to 
process North Korean refugees for U.S. resettlement.  The 
Ambassador relayed the response of FM Kantathi and asked if 
Winai had the same position.  Winai responded that the normal 
Thai practice was to send North Korean refugees to South 
Korea.  Then moving off the stance he had previously taken, 
Winai responded that if the USG was willing and able to 
process North Korean refugees, it would probably be possible 
to work something out. 
¶8. (C) Comment.  This is a welcome response from the Thai 
government and a shift of the previous Thai position.  The 
current uncertain political situation and the possibility 
that Thaksin may not remain in power means that the Thai 
response should be taken with some caution.  End comment. 
 
BOYCE