This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: FEBRUARY VISIT TO FAR SOUTH 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 826 (AN EMERGING REALITY ON THE GROUND) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 296 (INSIDE THE REEDUCATION PROGRAM) 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY: During a February 15-16 visit to the far 
southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Songkhla 
poloffs discussed the influence of radical Islam and other 
factors behind the violence.  They heard continued concern 
over divisions between the Buddhist and Muslim communities 
and criticism of the government's "reeducation" program and 
overall lack of coordination between agencies.  They also 
heard pessimistic assessments of the National Reconciliation 
Commission's (NRC) progress and discussed the militants' 
operational structure in Narathiwat. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  On February 15-16, poloffs visited the far southern 
provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Songkhla meeting with: 
Narathiwat Governor Pracha Terat; Narathiwat Islamic 
Committee Chairman Abdulrozak Gali; a panel of Islamic 
studies professors from Prince of Songkhla University (PSU); 
Dr. Phetdao Tomina, a National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC) member and member of one of Pattani's most prominent 
(and controversial) families; Dr. Ratiya Salae, NRC member 
and prominent Malay academic; senior executives from the Bank 
of Thailand's southern office; and Dr. Duncan McCargo, a 
British academic conducting research out of PSU. 
 
RADICAL INFLUENCE... 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  We heard mixed assessment about the role of radical 
Islam in the southern conflict.  Generally our interlocutors 
were cautious not to overemphasize the role of radical Islam 
related to the violence.  Narathiwat Governor Pracha said the 
provincial government was attempting to counter the religious 
propaganda of the separatists.  To accomplish this they would 
focus on education reforms.  Recently elected Narathiwat 
Islamic Committee Chairman Abdulrozak Gali, who assumed 
office in November 2004, said he would focus his tenure on 
promoting moderate Islam in Narathiwat.  The Committee was 
working closely with the province's Islamic schools and 
mosques to establish uniform and "correct" interpretations of 
the Koran. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Teachers and schools promoting extremist messages 
appear to be well known within the Muslim community. 
Chairman Abdulrozak said the Islamic committee had identified 
"extremist" teachers in some of the Pondoks but were 
reluctant to provide these names to authorities because they 
feared that innocent Muslims would also be arrested.  Dr. 
Ibrahem Narongrakasket from PSU said that there were 
identifiable extremist Islamic schools in the region. 
However, they were also reluctant to pass this information to 
authorities because of fear of a community-wide crackdown. 
The College of Islamic Studies worked to counter extremist 
ideology on campus. 
 
...AND OTHER FACTORS BEHIND THE VIOLENCE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)   While concerned over the influence of extremism, 
most of our interlocutors highlighted other factors behind 
the violence.  PSU professor Sarfee Ardam discounted radical 
Islam as being the prime factor for the violence.  He and 
other PSU professors said the committed militants have a 
strong separatist agenda, based on historic grievances.  NRC 
member Phetdao Tomina agreed that historic factors and 
grievances were behind the resurgence of violence.  However, 
she dismissed the importance of the separatists, saying they 
did not form a cohesive movement.  (NOTE: Phetdao is the 
daughter of Senator Den Tomina, who has been accused of 
having separatist sympathies and the granddaughter of Haji 
Sulong Tomina, who is considered to be "the father of Pattani 
separatism."  END NOTE) 
 
¶6.  (C)  Governor Pracha Terat and PSU Professor Ibrahem said 
militants often paid youths or criminal gangs -- who were not 
ideologically motivated -- to carry out attacks.  Pracha 
believed the militants wanted to keep the violence at a 
steady level in order to create the sense that the government 
did not control territory in the South.  In several of our 
meetings we were reminded that a certain amount of the 
violence involved criminal activities that had no connection 
to separatist violence -- but were often labeled as such. 
Overall, our contacts agreed the violence in the South 
remains a domestic Thai problem. 
 
WIDENING DIVISIONS BETWEEN BUDDHISTS AND MUSLIMS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶7.  (C)  We continued to hear concerns that militants are 
deliberately trying to create conflict between the Buddhist 
and Muslim communities.  Narathiwat Islamic Committee Chair 
Abdulrozak said that there is increasing fear between the 
Buddhist and Muslim communities, and that both sides were 
pulling away from each other.  Governor Pracha confirmed that 
large numbers of Buddhist teachers from public schools had 
requested transfers from the province.  NRC member Phetdao 
said the transfer of teachers from government schools was a 
serious problem as they were being replaced by soldiers. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Again we heard anecdotal evidence of Buddhist flight 
from the region (reftel A).  NRC member Phetdao Tomina said 
she believed that a significant number of Buddhists were 
leaving the far South or were sending their children north to 
study.  Parnpis Lekhakul and Chairot Thavarorit, senior 
executives from the Bank of Thailand, noted that real estate 
prices remain high in Songkhla province due to the continued 
influx of Buddhists moving from Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala. 
 
PSU BECOMING AN "ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY" 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  A measurable example of "Buddhist Flight" can be 
seen at Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani.  The 
university is part of the national system and in the past had 
attracted students from all over Thailand.  In 2002 there 
were twice as many Buddhists students as Muslims at the 
campus.  By 2005 that had changed dramatically -- Buddhists 
made up only a third of the student body.  Duncan McCargo, a 
visiting professor at PSU from the University of Leeds, said 
the change around the campus had been dramatic.  Since the 
renewed violence in January 2004 the number of new Buddhist 
students enrolling has dropped to almost zero.  PSU was 
increasingly feeling like an "Islamic" university.  After the 
current class of junior and seniors graduated, the student 
body at this state university would be almost exclusively 
Muslim. 
 
REEDUCATION PROGRAM 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  In December 2005 the government unveiled a new 
program to publicly identify individuals suspected of 
involvement in the insurgency and then "invite" them to 
attend "reeducation" camps (reftel B).  During our visit we 
heard a great deal of concern over this program from Muslims. 
 Islamic Committee Chair Abdulrozak claimed innocent people 
were being put on the reeducation lists.  NRC member Phetdao 
shared these concerns, warning that personal scores were 
being settled through the lists.  The use of lists to summon 
individuals to reeducation camps or to arrest them was 
another source of anger and was increasing the already high 
levels of mistrust between local Muslims and the government. 
 
 
¶11.  (C)  Predictably, Narathiwat Governor Pracha praised the 
reeducation program.  Pracha said that so far there had been 
an 80 percent participation rate when suspected individuals 
were summoned for "reeducation."  Arrest warrants were issued 
for those who failed to appear as that was considered prima 
facie evidence of involvement in the insurgency.  Most of the 
names on the list come from anonymous tips to local police, 
Ministry of Interior officials or the Army. 
 
FEWER SECURITY FORCES...BETTER COORDINATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Discussions on how to address the violence focused 
on "hearts and minds" approaches rather than those involving 
security forces.  Narathiwat Governor Pracha said he did not 
want additional security forces in his province.  He was 
worried that leaders in Bangkok were overemphasizing a 
military approach.  "Tell Bangkok to keep quiet because they 
don't understand local conditions."  A strategy focused on 
development of the region was going to pay more dividends in 
the end. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Many of our interlocutors believed poorly 
coordinated government efforts had contributed to the 
situation.  NRC member Phetdao, echoing the often heard 
criticism, blamed the Thaksin administration for worsening 
the situation by disbanding the joint operational commands in 
2002, which took away one of the only outlets people had to 
air grievances to the government.  Several of our contacts 
blamed the government's fragmented and disjointed efforts for 
failing to ease the crisis. 
PROGRESS OF THE NRC 
------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  The overall sense in the South, as in Bangkok, is 
that the government would largely ignore the findings of the 
NRC and that the report's release in March would have minimal 
impact on the situation.  The NRC members themselves were 
particularly pessimistic.  Phetdao said that the feeling 
among the majority of NRC members was that the government was 
unlikely to implement their recommendations.  They had 
resigned themselves that there work would be a historic 
document that would provide guidance for future 
governments/generations. 
 
NARATHIWAT "RED ZONES" 
--------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  Narathiwat Governor Pracha gave us his assessment 
on how the militants were operationally organized in his 
province.  He said that the militants had divided the 
province into three zones with operational cells in each. 
Cell members were disciplined, and maintained good 
operational secrecy.  The government had identified seven key 
villages believed to be under direct militant "influence," 
including Tayong Limo in Range district, Choko in Choirong 
district, Ibatu in Sungai Padi district, and Tiko in Changae. 
 Pracha believed that the militant leaders were in Malaysia. 
Describing relations with Malaysia he said, "Officially we 
say they are good, but off the record, they are not."  He 
said that the Malaysian government did not really want peace 
in the South and blamed the PAS party in Kelantan in 
particular for encouraging violence in southern Thailand. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶16.  (C)  Gauging the influence on radical Islam on the 
violence in the South is difficult.  Our on-the-ground 
observations strengthens our view that radical Islam is not 
the driving force behind the violence.  The overall sense 
from ethnic Malays is that the main factors provoking anger 
and violence are much more personal -- such as daily slights 
or insults from police or memories of government abuse of 
Muslims at places like Tak Bai -- rather than religious. 
Committed separatists are manipulating these feelings, and 
religion, to achieve their objectives.  The concerns about 
the "reeducation" program were predictable.  While we heard 
no indications of abuse from the program, the implementation 
is clearly adding to the accumulated grievances felt by 
ethnic Malay-Muslims. END COMMENT 
BOYCE