P 280843Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3246
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 
AMEMBASSY DOHA 
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T  BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000167 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2031 
TAGS: PREL BX IR
SUBJECT: DISCOURAGING VISIT TO IRAN BY SULTAN OF BRUNEI 
 
REF: A. (A) BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 149 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. (B) STATE 45316 (NOTAL) 
     ¶C. (C) STATE 47920 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, Reasons 1.4 (b, d, and h) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  As a result of our demarches about the 
inadvisability of the Sultan accepting an Iranian government 
invitation to visit Iran, it now appears less likely that any 
such invitation will be accepted.  The British will reinforce 
our position in their own contacts with the Government of 
Brunei (GOB).  While the GOB does not want to lend support to 
Teheran in its dispute with the international community over 
Iran's nuclear program, neither is it eager to join in 
pushing a fellow OIC member to comply with what it still 
perceives to be largely "western" demands.  The Sultan may 
seek Arab views on the issue during a visit to Qatar and the 
UAE tentatively scheduled for April.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) Ambassador delivered ref B demarche on March 27 to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Director for 
Americas, Europe, and Africa Pengiran Alihashim.  Ambassador 
stressed USG belief that Iranian nuclear issue could be 
resolved diplomatically, but only if Iran's leaders 
understood that the international community was united in its 
determination to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear 
weapons capability.  Acceptance of an invitation to visit 
Iran by the Sultan of Brunei would be perceived by the 
Iranians as a breach of that united front, and so feed their 
intransigence and lessen the likelihood of a diplomatic 
solution. 
 
¶3.  (S) In response, Alihashim spoke much more warily about 
Brunei's relations with Iran than he had in his last 
conversation with Ambassador on this topic (ref A), and 
walked back some of his previous statements.  He said that it 
was no longer Iranian Foreign Minister Motaki who was hoping 
to visit Brunei in May, but rather his Deputy Foreign 
Minister.  While Alihashim cautioned that he could not speak 
for the palace, he said MFAT officials had discussed the 
issue internally and were "not eager" to recommend any royal 
visit to Iran in response to an invitation that the Deputy 
ForMin might convey.  Alihashim hinted that the MFAT might 
even discourage Iran's Deputy ForMin from coming to Brunei. 
He explained that the proximate reason for his trip would be 
to hold a technical meeting of the Brunei-Iran joint working 
committee on bilateral relations, but it was possible that 
schedule conflicts would not allow the appropriate MFAT 
officials to attend such a meeting at the time the Iranians 
were suggesting. 
 
¶4.  (S) Turning to the broader issue of the dispute over 
Iran's covert nuclear weapons programs, Alihashim said the 
GOB was still sorting out the charges and counter-charges 
from all sides.  The MFAT had been "shocked" that the 
Iranians had rejected the Russian enrichment offer -- why 
turn that down if their only goal was to develop a civilian 
nuclear energy program?  On the other hand, he continued, the 
Arab states did not appear to be joining the public chorus of 
criticism of Iran, and the GOB had to wonder why the nations 
that potentially were most threatened by Iranian nuclear 
weapons were not speaking out.  A planned trip by the Sultan 
of Brunei to Qatar and the UAE in April might be an 
opportunity to hear directly from other Islamic leaders their 
views on the charge by western states that Iran was pursuing 
a nuclear weapons capability.  Given the above, for now the 
GOB would confine itself to the position that the dispute 
should be settled peacefully through multilateral 
organizations. 
 
¶5.  (S) Ambassador advised Alihashim that the GOB should not 
view this issue as "Iran against the West."  Rather, it 
should consider the broad range of countries that had 
supported Iran's referral to the UNSC and the global security 
threats that would accrue from any Iranian acquisition of 
nuclear weapons.  He also recommended the GOB objectively 
assess Iran's record of non-cooperation and reach its own 
conclusion about the credibility of Teheran's claims that it 
was only pursuing a civilian nuclear program.  Alihashim took 
these points and asked about the implications of the 
U.S.-India nuclear agreement for the NPT and global 
nonproliferation efforts in general.  Ambassador drew from 
ref C points in response, emphasizing the different behaviors 
of India and Iran, and promised to forward more detailed 
talking points on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
Initiative to the MFAT. 
 
¶6.  (S) As instructed ref B, Ambassador also briefed UK High 
Commissioner Saville on the possibility that an Iranian 
Foreign Ministry official would visit Brunei soon and deliver 
an invitation for the Sultan to visit Teheran.  Saville, who 
was about to leave for consultations in London, said his stay 
there might be extended if Foreign Minister II Lim Jock Seng 
managed to arrange appropriate meetings at the FCO while on 
his own visit to the UK.  Saville said that if such meetings 
were scheduled he would recommend that the FCO use the 
occasion to discourage any royal trip to Teheran. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comment:  The risk-averse MFAT is seeking to avoid 
having the GOB become involved in a conflict it does not 
fully understand and still views primarily as one between a 
fellow OIC member and "The West."  By making clear that any 
visit to Iran by the Sultan of Brunei would be portrayed as 
tacit support for the Iranian position, we have at least made 
MFAT think twice about the advisability of accepting such an 
invitation and may have killed the idea altogether for the 
time being.  While that helps ensure that the GOB will not 
inadvertently lend support to the Iranians, getting it to 
speak out against Iranian intransigence is a different 
proposition and will remain an uphill struggle.  End Comment. 
 
 
SKODON