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O 231215Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9941
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T BAKU 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR PM A/S HILLEN FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR MASS MOPS PBTS AJ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 29 US-AZERBAIJAN 
POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: A. BAKU 347 
     ¶B. BAKU 348 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Reno L. Harnish III per 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  The March 29 political-military 
consultations are an important opportunity to broaden our 
strong security relationship.  Strategically located in the 
heart of the Greater Middle East, Azerbaijan provides 
excellent cooperation on security issues and looks for 
opportunities to do still more.  As President Aliyev has told 
us many times, however, the GOAJ looks to the USG to take the 
lead on these issues; the pol-mil talks are an opportunity to 
do just that.  Key issues that should be addressed in the 
talks include upgrades to Nasosnoya Air Base and Azerbaijan's 
national security strategy, both of which are required under 
Azerbaijan's NATO IPAP and essential to our own security 
goals for the region.  The Caspian Sea WMD interdiction 
programs are at a critical juncture, dependent on still 
pending GOAJ decisions to bring the navy into the programs 
and establish a Joint Command and Control Center.  Your 
involvement could help resolve these long-standing issues, 
permitting the USG to move forward on phase 3 (USD 16 
million) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 
Regional issues factor prominently in Azerbaijan's pol-mil 
calculus, and the GOAJ will want an update on U.S. policy on 
Iran.  Azerbaijan also is eager to discuss the 
political-military aspects of a possible Nagorno-Karabakh 
peace deal, and seeks USG views on possible demining and 
reconstruction assistance, as well the structure of a 
possible peacekeeping force.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The March 29 political-military consultations -- the 
first since 2004 -- are an important opportunity to broaden 
the bilateral relationship.  EUR A/S Fried highlighted the 
talks in his March 14 meeting with President Aliyev and, as 
demonstrated by the GOAJ's robust delegation, it is clear the 
GOAJ also views the talks as an important opportunity.  Led 
by Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, the delegation will 
also include Deputy Minister of National Security Fuad 
Iskenderov, Deputy Chief of the State Border Service Major 
General Farhad Tagizade, and Admiral Shahin Sultanov, 
Commander of the Naval Forces.  The delegation's emphasis on 
Border Guards and Naval Forces reflect the important role 
that the Caspian Guard Initiative plays in our bilateral 
security relationship; it also provides an excellent 
opportunity to press for more inter-ministerial cooperation 
on our Caspian WMD interdiction programs. 
 
NATO IPAP ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, who is leading 
the GOAJ delegation, will arrive in Washington fresh from 
consultations with NATO on Azerbaijan's IPAP.  While the 
specifics of IPAP implementation are not on the agenda for 
the March 29 talks, the issues that Azimov will have 
discussed in Brussels are central to the continuing reform of 
Azerbaijan's military and to the future of our bilateral 
relationship.  In our view, the pol-mil consultations present 
an invaluable opportunity to present our views and press the 
GOAJ for greater progress on Nasosnoya Air Base, the National 
Security Strategy, and development of a non-commissioned 
officer corps. 
 
¶4.  (S) On March 17, Ambassador Harnish presented the U.S. 
feasibility study of Nasosnoya Air Base to Minister of 
Defense Safar Abiyev.  Upgrade of the air base to NATO 
standards is an integral part of Azerbaijan's IPAP, and also 
would greatly enhance our ability to provide gas-and-go 
services for NATO aircraft bound for Afghanistan.  Military 
flight volumes are increasing with over 30 landings since the 
beginning of the year.  We ultimately will need to switch 
from our current operations at Baku's Heydar Aliyev 
International Airport to a more secure and discreet location 
at the Nasosnoya Air Base outside Baku.  While President 
Aliyev will be the ultimate decision-maker on this issue, the 
pol-mil consultations provide an invaluable opportunity to 
brief Azimov -- a key advisor on this issue -- on 
Washington's latest thinking on Nasosnoya.  We were pleased 
when we learned March 23 that the MOD had named a project 
officer and expert staff for the project.  Now, we should 
encourage the delegation to set aside funding. 
 
¶5.  (C) As part of the NATO IPAP, Azerbaijan has committed to 
developing a national security strategy and a national 
 
military strategy.  Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov is 
leading the charge but has encountered some resistance within 
the GOAJ.  Rivalry is fierce between Azimov and the Ministry 
of Defense over the strategies, particularly as NATO 
integration will force the uniformed leadership at the MOD to 
relinquish control to civilian authorities.  Azerbaijan has 
promised to complete its National Security Strategy by 2006; 
some encouragement from Washington on this critical subject 
would be very helpful.  The U.S. has offered a great deal of 
assistance in Azerbaijan's development of the strategies; you 
should ask Azimov whether further assistance is needed. 
Similarly, U.S. encouragement on GOAJ plans to develop a 
noncommissioned officers corps would be equally helpful.  FMF 
funds and our cooperation with the Oklahoma National Guard 
are developing an NCO academy.  Now, the MOD needs to rethink 
the role of officers and the NCO's leadership of soldiers. 
The Azerbaijani military's lack of working-level expertise is 
a serious impediment to defense reform and the GOAJ's ability 
to attain NATO interoperability, a key US policy goal. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Azerbaijan has been a steadfast partner in the 
Global War on Terror, contributing peacekeeping troops in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and pledging to stay in Iraq as 
long as US troops remain there.  The pol-mil consultations 
are an excellent opportunity to reaffirm our gratitude to 
Azerbaijan for its support.  Counterterrorism cooperation is 
at an all-time high, including the arrest and rendition of 
several terrorists with links to Al-Qaida.  The GOAJ's very 
capable Ministry of National Security (represented by Deputy 
Minister Iskenderov looks to deepen this cooperation. 
 
WMD NON-PROLIFERATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) With funding from CTR, DTRA, EXBS and the Department 
of Energy, the USG has made great strides in improving 
Azerbaijan's ability to detect and interdict weapons of mass 
destruction.  Under the rubric of the Proliferation 
Prevention Initiative (PPI), we have established an Interim 
Command and Control Center which has greatly enhanced the 
GOAJ's ability to interdict WMD on the Caspian.  Further 
progress on WMD non-proliferation depends on the GOAJ taking 
action to bring the Navy into the operations (which currently 
include only the Maritime Border Guard), and establishing a 
Joint Command and Control Center (JC3) under the Caspian 
Guard Initiative framework.  If the GOAJ implements these two 
steps, the USG is ready to follow through with an additional 
USD 16 million in funding for the third phase of the program. 
 The Ambassador raised this in a March 2 meeting with 
President Aliyev (ref a) but the GOAJ bureaucracy has been 
slow to take the necessary steps. Your reiteration of the 
importance of bringing the navy into WMD interdiction efforts 
and moving forward quickly on the JC3 would be very helpful. 
You could also remind the delegation that despite the GOAJ's 
deep cooperation on counter-proliferation, it has not yet 
signed up for the PSI, a fact that could leave them in the 
cold for the June summit. 
 
THE REGIONAL CHALLENGES 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Azerbaijan's views on political-military issues are 
colored by what GOAJ officials aptly describe as their 
"difficult neighborhood."  Since independence, the GOAJ has 
pursued a strategic policy that safeguards its independence 
by tying Azerbaijan to the Euro-Atlantic structure.  It also 
has played a leading role in GUAM, an organization that was 
created as a counterbalance to Russia's influence in the 
region.  We are mystified by regular reports of Azerbaijani 
footdragging on GUAM and believe they stem from differences 
with Georgian and Ukraine over the "Democratic Choice" 
initiative proposed by those two countries.  It would be 
useful to ask Azimov for his views on GUAM.  Azerbaijan keeps 
a constant, wary eye on Russia and Iran and is careful not to 
do anything that would provoke its more powerful neighbors. 
For this reason, although senior GOAJ officials privately 
tell us they are worried about Iran's nuclear programs, they 
never have publicly condemned Iran's nuclear ambitions.  The 
GOAJ relies instead on carefully crafted languae that 
supports all nations' rights to pursue peceful nuclear 
programs while upholding internatinal commitments.  The GOAJ 
is anxious about the international community's growing moves 
against Iran's nuclear programs and fears the repercussions 
 
of any actions -- whether economic or military -- against 
Azerbaijan. 
 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Azimov has also asked that the political-military 
aspects of a possible Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement be 
added to the agenda (ref b).  While the details of a possible 
settlement are being considered by EUR Senior Advisor Steve 
Mann and the other OSCE Minsk Group Chairs, the pol-mil 
consultations present an important opportunity to hear 
Azerbaijan's perspectives on possible post-settlement needs. 
Azimov is interested specifically in hearing US views on a 
post-settlement assessment of the demining and reconstruction 
needs in the Occupied Territories, as well as the possible 
options for a peacekeeping force. 
HARNISH