VZCZCXRO3659
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0377/01 0681441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091441Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9829
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1529
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0288
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0199
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 1233
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA SZ PRIORITY 0153

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND EUR/PGI, ALSO OES 
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR GLOBAL HEALTH MURRAY TROSTLE 
ANKARA FOR AGRICULTURAL COUNSELOR 
ROME FOR FAO REPRESENTATIVE 
GENEVA FOR HEALTH ATTACHE 
TBILISI FOR USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016 
TAGS: ECON EAID PGOV PREL EAGR KFLU CASC AJ
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA IN AZERBAIJAN: NEED FOR MORE 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS ON THE GROUND 
 
REF: A. BAKU 356 
 
     ¶B. BAKU 329 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RENO L. HARNISH III; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Despite significant and 
prolonged intervention by Post, the GOAJ continues to react 
poorly to the threat of avian influenza.  The GOAJ's 
extremely poor veterinary response appears to have largely 
destroyed the commercial poultry industry, in addition to an 
unknown number of domestic birds.  Post is also aware of as 
many as 14 suspicious human illness cases within the past 
week, including three deaths, but lacks information necessary 
for a diagnosis.  Post believes that the visits of several 
assessment teams, including a very effective USG team, over 
the past two months have left a clear picture of the GOAJ's 
policy and laboratory capabilities.  However, based on our 
experience and the present situation, Post has little 
confidence in the GOAJ's ability to engage in the basic, 
field-level operations needed to manage this crisis.  What 
has been successful to date has been direct involvement by 
visiting experts and U.S. Embassy staff to encourage positive 
action, and to gain knowledge at the source.  Post requests 
Department's immediate engagement with FAO, WHO, and other 
international donors aimed in the first instance at getting 
WHO and FAO to establish a robust and permanent presence on 
the ground, as well as supporting the fielding of multiple 
teams of experts to Azerbaijan for field-level work.  We also 
welcome, and strongly encourage, continued technical-level 
visits by American experts on both the veterinary and human 
health aspects of this issue.  In our view, only field teams 
and hands-on support and guidance will provide the 
information needed to ensure an appropriate response.  END 
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. 
 
Transparency Appalling 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Since October 2005, Post has repeatedly engaged the 
GOAJ, at every level from laboratory technicians to President 
Aliyev, seeking rapid action on avian influenza.  Instead, we 
have found the going very slow.  Only through direct and 
forceful intervention by Post were we able to send avian 
samples to the internationally recognized laboratory at 
Weybridge, UK, on February 6.  When the GOAJ would not 
contact the lab directly, Post was forced to act as 
intermediary, delivering word to the GOAJ that H5N1 was 
confirmed in Azerbaijan.  Rather than act prudentially, as 
many other countries have done, the GOAJ has done practically 
nothing to contain the spread of the virus.  In fact, the 
GOAJ's ineptitude has almost certainly allowed the virus to 
spread to many regions in the country and into the commercial 
poultry industry.  Even now, the vet authorities often 
misinform the public. 
 
¶3. (C) The past week has seen human health issues move to the 
fore.  As we have pressed our case at increasingly senior 
levels of government, all of whom have assured us the GOAJ is 
taking active measures, local press reported suspicious human 
illnesses, raising the possibility of human H5N1 infection. 
In total, Post has now counted as many as 14 separate cases 
of suspicious respiratory illness in which patients have been 
hospitalized.  All the cases are from the same village in 
rural Azerbaijan; all are relatives.  Three of these 14 
patients have died.  As reported to Embassy medical 
personnel, who examined two of the patients at the hospital 
March 6, symptoms in all cases are at least partially 
consistent with avian influenza.  Only analysis of samples by 
an internationally-recognized reference laboratory, such as 
at Mill Hill in the UK, will give a clear answer.  Rather 
than a focused message to the public, the press is now awash 
in contradictory reports, nearly all of which cite Health 
Ministry officials.  A USAID prepared public service 
announcement, which was distributed to Azerbaijani television 
stations, is the most widely disseminated accurate public 
information on AI currently available.  We have also 
distributed thousands of pamphlets in Azerbaijani about AI 
through the Ministry of Education, and directly to farmers 
 
BAKU 00000377  002 OF 002 
 
 
and other groups. 
 
GOAJ Field Efforts Lacking 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) In both the veterinary and human health areas, the 
GOAJ's attempts at surveillance and monitoring have been 
sorely lacking.  For example, the GOAJ still lacks any plans 
for active surveillance of poultry.  Since the February 6 
sample shipment facilitated by the Embassy, the Vet Service 
has sent samples to an OIE lab only once.  This latest batch 
of 12 samples arrived in the UK on March 7.  In the interim, 
well over 100,000 poultry died in various commercial 
operations.  In human health, while the GOAJ has taken 
samples from the patients referenced above, it has yet to 
send samples for WHO lab testing.  Instead, the GOAJ 
continues to trust in equipment and testing that the 
international community -- including USG experts -- has 
flagged repeatedly to the GOAJ as deficient for identifying 
H5N1. 
 
¶5. (C) Through the efforts of Post's medical team, Post has 
more information on the suspect human cases than virtually 
any other group in Azerbaijan.  Yet, based on the information 
we have, we cannot ascertain whether the suspect human cases 
are H5N1 avian influenza.  As of March 9, the GOAJ has sent 
no samples to a WHO reference lab.  Sadly, Post is once again 
in the position of refereeing the WHO's unprepared and 
ineffectual attempts to send samples.  Given the GOAJ's lack 
of ability to carry out rigorous veterinary and 
epidemiological investigation in the field, only multiple 
teams of experts in both of these areas can give the 
international community the information we need to meet this 
challenge head-on. 
 
ACTION REQUEST: More International Experts on the Ground 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6. (C) We expected that once avian influenza was identified 
in Azerbaijan, WHO and FAO would establish a significant 
presence on the ground and lead the international response. 
This has not happened.  It is telling that even with hundreds 
of thousands of poultry dying and humans taking ill under 
suspicious circumstances, FAO has no permanent presence 
(expert or otherwise).  WHO has no permanent country 
representative in Azerbaijan.  We would appreciate 
Department's continued pressure on WHO and FAO to field 
robust permanent teams to Azerbaijan that can both act at the 
technical level as well as engage directly with the GOAJ at 
the senior level. 
 
¶7. (C) Separately, what is needed now are international teams 
of veterinary and health professionals, from international 
organizations, the donor community, and the USG, to deploy to 
the regions operationally.  These teams should assist the 
GOAJ in direct operational ways, such as sample collection 
and shipment, culling, or epidemiological research.  We would 
welcome and strongly encourage continued technical-level 
visits by American experts on both the veterinary and human 
health aspects of the issue, and appreciate the support 
received to date.  A strong international expert presence on 
the ground is the best contribution we can make to improving 
GOAJ management of the avian influenza problem here. 
HARNISH